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The thesis examines Aristotle's ethical theory with primary reference to 
the Nicomachean Ethics (ED. It argues that the EX is intended not to 
improve its audience ethically, but rather to give it the political 
tools to pass an its already good life. 
The EN does this by articulating the goodness of that life and thus 
allowing the audience to enter effectively into ethical discussions. 
These form part of the process of passing on the good life by way of 
legislation in the polls and by more informal methods in institutions 
such as the household. 
The thesis examines in particular the accounts of practical reason, 
pleasure and the ergon argument in the Elf, and seeks to understand them 
in this context. It argues that by allowing the audience to improve the 
transmission of its values over the generations and by allowing its 
menbers to articulate the value of so doing, it moves the audience's 
life closer to divine perfection. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to trace a plausible philosophical 
argument through the EN which will suggest an overall structure 
to the work. 
The main argument of this thesis is that the EX is intended to 
help the audience describe their existing virtuous life and 
thereby to pass it on to following generations. A central feature 
of the good life which is thus articulated is that it aims to 
imitate the divine activity which is eternal. Human beings draw 
close to such eternal activity when they pass on generation after 
generation their way of life, and do such passing on conscious of 
the ain of eternal survival. 
Chapters one and two argue that any account of the EN's purpose 
which suggests that the audience is not already virtuous is 
wrong. In chapter three, I argue that the ain of the Eff is to 
impart to the audience the skill of being able to articulate 
their own already virtuous life, thus enabling them to pass on 
that life. 
Xuch of the EN is concerned with describing particular virtues; 
and the point of such description is clear given my account of 
the purpose of the work. Xany of the other issues dealt with, 
however, are not so self-evidently related to the claimed purpose 
of the EN: the remaining chapters of this thesis are devoted to 
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considering a number of such issues and shewing how they may be 
related to the articulation of the virtuous life. 
Chapters four, five and six argue that human action Jr. typified 
by the pursuit of a future goal. For the virtuous, that goal is 
eudalynnnin which is argued to be the reflexion on a good life 
from the perspective of the end of that life. 
Chapters seven and eight argue that It is characteristic of the 
virtuous not only to act for a future end, but also to enjoy the 
goodness of that end in the present by taking Immediate pleasure 
in the pursuit of a future goal. 
The final three chapters, dealing with the orgon argument# 
attempt to express the reasons for these two features of the 
virtuous agent's life. They are explained as imitating the divine 
activity which is eternal and also pleasurable. By articulating 
the fullness of the good life, the EN not only allows the 
audience to be more effective In passing an that life, but also 
by making their own lives more self conscious, make them approach 
more nearly the divine activity. Since the eternal aspect of the 
divine activity is imitated by the eternal passing an of human 
life through the generations, the purpose of the BY -which I have 
argued to be the Improvement of the means of passing an through 
greater articulateness- is itself justified as being an improved 
Imitation of the divine. 
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The above argument is intended to have both exegetical and 
general philosophical plausibility. In setting out and defending 
the argument, I have made a number of methodological assumptions 
which I shall now address. 
I have concentrated on the BY within the corpus and attempted to 
produce an account which provides a unified account of that work. 
In so doing, however. I have sought to emphasize the consistency 
and plausibility of the account rather than to concentrate on 
difficult passages for my interpretation. I offer two 
justifications for this sort of approach. Firstly, any account 
which is going to justice to the BY is going to be 
philosophically complex: there are accordingly sufficient 
difficulties in the initial setting out of any plausible account 
to keep a commentator occupied in the first instance without 
attempting to do justice to every difficulty within the text. 
Secondly, whatever view is taken of the creation of the EX, it 
seems unlikely to be a work which has been completed and fully 
formed by Aristotle to be internally consistent: at the least, if 
an internal consistency does exist, it is not immediately 
apparent. (Although little hangs on this as far as the present 
thesis is concerned, my own view is that the BY is likely to be a 
series of edited lecture notes, and it is as a course of lectures 
that I shall style the BY throughout the thesis. ) An emphasis on 
difficulties at the beginning of an interpretation is likely to 
distort that interpretation: only once a general line of thought 
has been advanced can those difficult passages be reread in a new 
9 
light in order to see whether difficulties disappear on 
reinterpretation. That said, I hope to have firmly anchored my 
arguments on a close and extensive reading of the EN. 
Vith respect to the rest of the corpus, similar considerations 
apply. It is clear that complete internal consistency does not 
exist. I have accordingly used the corpus outwith the EN rather 
as a quarry for the interpretation of the EN than as a test for 
that interpretation. Again, however. I would hope to have 
anchored my interpretation within the corpus so that it possesses 
considerable plausibility as exegesis. As far the EE is 
concerned, I have taken no firm view an the relation of that work 
to the EN and certainly none on their respective merits as works 
of moral philosophy. That said, there are places within the 
thesis where I have noted an apparent difference between the 
arguments of the EE and the EIF, and others where I have pointed 
to evidence within the EE to back ny interpretations. 
One overarching methodological assumption has been Aristotle's 
pragmatic tendencies within the EN. I have assumed this firstly 
because I believe it to be a generally plausible philosophical 
position: a philosophical theory should be judged at least in 
part by what It sets out to do and how well it performs that 
task. Moreover, when reeking to understand arguments, an 
understanding of what purposes those arguments are intended to 
serve Is often useful to comprehension. As has been suggested 
(Baker and Hacker 1984), the model of geology and its exanination, 
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of rocks is not applicable to philosophy; philosophical evidence 
does not exist entirely untouched by the theory which is brought 
to interpret it. Secondly, such praganatism is explicitly adopted 
by Aristotle in the EN. Particularly in his examination of 
phainamena. and lagnmena, Aristotle does not approach and set out 
the evidence without a view to what he is trying to prove. A 
striking example of this is the adoption of a bipartite 
psychology in the EN when he takes an analysis of the soul which 
he knows and admits to be theoretically inadequate because, 
broadly, it will 'do' (EY 1 13 1102a23-32). Unless we know or 
make some attempt to descry what Aristotle is trying to argue in 
the EN as a whole, we are accordingly likely to misread the 
evidence of the stones he has used to build his edifice: torn 
from their place in the overall context, they wili be 
unrecognizable and uninterpretable. It is perhaps a lesson that 
modern philosophers need to ponder carefully: the plausibility 
and force of philosophical arguments lie far more in their 
overall coherence than in sone presumed absolute truth of the 
conponent parts. 
It is for this reason that in the first three chapters I attempt 
to discern the context within which the arguments of the EN must 
be read. I argue that only by taking seriously Aristotle's claim 
that the EX is a political work can it be understood. Moral 
philosophers, because they are no longer expected to have much 
practical Influence, rarely ask themselves what they are trying 
to do besides the imparting of knowledge in a context of academic 
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assessnent and awards prior to the entering of the young into the 
fully adult world. We cannot assume such a background to ancient 
philosophy. For Aristotle, I argue that he Is trying to produce 
political effects: his aim is not to change the ethics of his 
audience, but rather to allow them to act effectively as 
politicians in the creation of the conditions for the good life. 
To do this. they have to be able to articulate the values by 
which they already live. 
To modern philosophical work can close its introduction without 
an explanation of its author's use of gender specific language. 
Such explanations are often a nix of defiance, apology and 
defence. I shall merely state the facts: that I use male and 
fenale examples randomly and without any conscious pattern or 
intention other than to ensure that, overall, my thesis# 
Aristotle and philosophy are not taken to be applicable or of 
interest to only one sex. Although Aristotle does believe deep 
and inportaut differences exist between the sexes, his views an 
this natter do not enter into this thesis and I bave accordingly 
ignored them. 
A word of explanation is required about the title of this thesis 
which might otherwise be regarded as an example of lucus a zOn 
lucendo. I argue in this thesis that the Ell can be understood 
and, indeed, Is better understood when it Ira not regarded as 
being in thrall to a view of nature from which teleological facts 
can be read off: that argument takes the form of shewing how it 
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can be understood otherwise. That does not alter the fact that in 
places I have argued that Aristotle assumes certain brute facts 
about human nature, an important example being that human beings 
characteristically act for temporally distant goals. In these 
assumptions or, more strictly, observations, Aristotle is doing 
nothing other than ordinary people or psychologists do every day; 
and, in the same way, these observations are open to be rejected. 
That Aristotle almost certainly viewed these observations as 
being underpinned by a general teleology of nature is irrelevant 
for present purposes, since the existence of such a teleology 
would have to be demonstrated by its fertility of explanation in 
individual cases. The ethical life of human beings is one such 
individual case; and the plausibility of the teleological claims 
in this individual case will have and have always had to be 
tested on their own merits. 
Finally, I would like to thank William Charlton and Rosalind 
Hursthouse for help over the years which has gone far beyond 
their duties as supervisors. This thesis Is dedicated to my wife, 
Karen, without whose support it would not exist, and to our 
children, Conrad and Oscar. 
Edinburgb 
Jrune 19.98 Step. hen Watt 
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Chapter one 
The purpose of the El 
In chapters one to three of this thesis, I consider what is the 
intention of the lectures forming the EX. Xy aim in so doing will 
be to provide a context in which the contents of the EX can be 
examined and interpreted. 
In chapters one and two, I address two questions: in what sense 
is the audience of the Eff good already; and in what sense are 
its menbers to be improved? My answers to these questions will be 
given in chapter three and will be that the audience are already 
fully virtuous or morally good, but need to improve their ability 
to articulate that goodness. 
In chapter one, I consider perhaps the most obvious solution to 
these questions: that the audience has been well brought up, but 
needs to be made more virtuous because it is still immature. I 
conclude that the audience in fact needs to be already mature and 
virtuous in order to benefit from the lectures and that, 
accordingly, this solution fails. 
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Vhat is Aristotle's purpose in giving the lectures which make up 
the EK? The obvious reply to this question is that his purpose is 
to make his audience morally better. As Barnes puts it: 
The Isc FicomacheanJ Etbics bopes to make us into good men; 
having read it, we shall be better able to pursue tbebighest 
buman good, and to belp others in the same pursuit. '. 
Such a view appears to be supported explicitly by several 
passages in the EN; 
As then our present study, unlike the other branches of 
philosophy, is not for the sake of the6ria (for w? are not 
investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing 
what it is, but in order that we may become good, wi tbout 
which result our investigation would be of no use), we have 
consequently to carry our enquiry Into the region of conduct 
and to ask how we should act. (Ell Il 2 1103b26-30) 
.. for the purpose tsc of the work] isn't zndsl but pzaml . 
(EN 13 1095a5-6) 
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to tbose who guide tbeir desires and actions by reasons 
knowing about sucb t1ings may be of great value. (ibid. 
1095alO-11) 
Although the EX is in some sense clearly intended to improve Its 
audience, there are difficulties in understanding this to mean a 
moral improvement. 
The first difficulty is that Aristotle appears to believe that 
the audience is in some sense already good and not in need of 
improvement. For instance, he states that the young are not fit 
to be students of his course because they have no experience Of 
life and conduct and that 
.. It is t-bese that supply the premisses and subject miatter of 
this branch of pbilosopby. (EY 13 1095a3-4) 
This entails that he thinks his actual audience do have 
experience of life and conduct. Xoreover, that experience must 
have resulted in their being good. because bad people cannot 
benefit from ethical reasoning: 
For it is the nature of the many to be ammable to fear but 
not to a sense of honour, and to abstain from evil not 
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because of its baseness but because of the penalties it 
entails... Vbat reasoning can then reform tbe natures of men 
lilre tbese? To dislodge by argument babits long firmly rooted 
in their characters is difficult if not impossible. (Eff X8 
1179bll-18) 
The second and related difficulty is that it is very hard to see 
how anything Aristotle says in the EIr could morally improve the 
audience. He admits throughout that his conclusions and arguments 
are only generally true and require the insight of the good agent 
actually to be applied to conduct. 2 Given the actual contents of 
the Elf, this doesn't seem to mean so much that there will be 
exceptions to any general rules propounded, but rather that the 
contents of the EN are pitched at a fairly high and abstract 
level: there is little casuistry In the EN. The difference is 
important. To say that the rule, 'Always return what you owe', is 
generally true might mean that It's perfectly clear how to apply 
the rule, it's just that in a minority of cases, by applying it, 
you'll perform the wrong action, say, by returning money to a 
drug addict who'll use it to buy drugs. Aristotle's generality 
appears of a different type. Unless you already possess goodness, 
it's not so nuch that you'll go wrong by applying a rule rigidly, 
it's rather that you'll not be able to apply your knowledge to 
conduct at all, remaining instead trapped in the world of the 
ethical boudoir, content with fine words rather than fine 
actions: 
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But tbe mass of mankind, instead of doing virtuous acts,. bave 
recourse to discussing virtue, and Yancy that t1ey are 
pursuing plilosopby and that this will make tbezr good men... 
(EN 11 4 1105bl2-14) 
This point shouldn't be misunderstood. It Isn't that the EX can't 
be of some use to bad people. If, from the Aristotelian point of 
view, soneone is of a very bad character, he could learn some 
general points from reading the EX. He could learn that be will 
need to resist some bodily pleasures; that he needs to be 
prepared to die in battle; that be needs friends whom he should 
associate with, not for financial gain or enjoyment, but because 
of their virtue; and that the highest activity of a human being 
lies in the area of theoretical reason. Now, Aristotle is clearly 
sceptical about whether Just learning that the good life has this 
sort of general orientation rather than, say, fast cars and fast 
wonen is going to have much of an effect on a bad agent' s 
conduct. But, for the sake of argument, say it did. This would be 
irrelevant to our understanding of Aristotle's purpose in writing 
the EX, for, as we have seen, the sort of audience at whom the 
lectures were directed appears to be at least fairly good 
already, certainly good enough not to be able to benefit from 
these broad lessons In how to orientate your life. 
Accordingly, we appear to face the paradox that, in order to 
benefit from the EN, the audience must already be morally good; 
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but, if they are already norally good, they have no need of the 
Eff. 
I ----I 
t A- .. 0 
Since Anscombe's essay, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', there has been 
a suspicion among some analytical philosophers that any notion of 
'moral reasoning' as being a species of practical reasoning with 
its own principles and conclusions separate from other types of 
practical reasoning may be incoherent. 3 
Aristotle begins the Eff by apparently defining his subject matter 
as the whole of practical reasoning (EN 11 1094al-3). So until 
it is shewn otherwise, we have no reason to consider that the EY 
is only interested in a particular type of practical reasoning 
rather than practical reasoning in general. If the EN is intended 
to remove a deficiency in its audience, there Is accordingly no 
reason in advance of any argument to restrict that deficiency to 
a 'moral' deficiency: it could be intended to remove any 
deficiency in the agent which prevented her from achieving some 
good. And in advance of any argument, that good could be anything 
from tying a bootlace to achieving eternal salvation. 
lone of this should be taken as arguing that Aristotle ends up 
being Interested in all types of practical reasoning: he isn't, 
for example, interested in that form of practical reasoning which 
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is concerned with technal and poi4sels rather than prazels (EY VI 
4 1140al-23); and he is centrally concerned with practical 
reasoning which leads to Ptidalmnn1m (EN 12 1094al8-26). But the 
boundaries of his interest will be something for us to argue to 
rather than something we are entitled to assume from the outset. 
On this basis and in the abstract, there now seems nothing 
paradoxical in the audience's being good and at the same time 
being deficient in some particular area: no one is good at 
everything a human being can benefit from being good at. Vhether 
there Is in fact a paradox will accordingly depend on what sort 
of action it is argued that the Eff sets out to improve. 
Ve have already seen that Aristotle considers his ethical 
lectures to be unsuited to the young (Jul u&=) because the young 
have no experience of life and conduct, and are also led by their 
feelings (EN 13 1094b27-1095a6). Moreover, this unsuitability 
extends to the i=mture of any age (ibid. 1095a6-9). 
low, although this restriction on the maturity of the audience is 
clearly going to exclude the very emotionally uncontrolled and 
the very inexperienced, given that the Elf is an exercise in 
education, it would be extremely strange if the audience, in some 
sense, were not to be more immature than their teacher. The 
20 
normal case of education, whether at school or university, is of 
the older teaching the younger. Xoreover, the Greek word for 
education -pgLidei&- suggests that it is restricted to children 
(pai des). 4 
But does Aristotle regard the lectures of the EN as palAall? In 
his discussion in Pol VII 15 1336b35-40, Aristotle restricts the 
term paidela to periods of training up to the age of twenty-one. 
Furthermore, nowhere in the EX does Aristotle suggest that the 
lectures form part of paideia, but rather seems to require that 
his audience has benefited from a satisfactory paidela before 
they attend. 6 
That Aristotle doesn't apply paideia to the contents of the EN 
wouldn't be important if this was a purely verbal matter; but I 
suggest that it in fact reflects a substantive point. Paideia, 
for Aristotle, always has a certain passiveness about it: it is 
sonething you have done to you rather than something you do 
yourself. It is imposed through inflicting pleasure and pain (EN 
11 1172alg-21; cf Pol VIII 4 133ga28-29). It Is given by someone 
who is your superior (EX VIII 12 1162a4-7; X9 118OW-8). 
XDreover, whatever the student does in paidela is done, not for 
its own sake, but for the sake of being able to perform a 
different, a4ult, action. Thus, of the four customary subjects of 
education noted by Aristotle (Pol VIII 2 1337b24-25), three - 
reading and writing; drawing; and gymnastics- are self-evidently 
pursued for the sake of adult practices with which they are not 
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identical. Although the status of the fourth is left 
ambiguous, it can be plausibly argued that it too is learned, not 
for its own sake, but for the sake of its influence on virtue 
(ibid. 1338al3-30). '- 
The passiveness of paidela is to be contrasted with the 
development of virtue and tachnal, which are only attained by 
actually doing the virtuous actions themselves (EN 11 1 1103a32- 
b2). 7 
low, this suggests that there are two developmental stages: one, 
where an individual has to do childish things in order to get 
into a position to perform adult actions; and an adult stage 
where, although the actions to be learned nay initially be done 
through gritted teeth and done badly, they are nevertheless from 
the very beginning still actually done. So an the one hand, we 
have the children playing in sand pits and paddling pools to 
develop hand-eye coordination and the ability to cooperate with 
their fellows; and on the other, we have the apprentice 
signwriter spending three days on a Job an experienced craftsman 
could have done in an hour. Just as we would see no contradiction 
between the claim that someone was well educated, but still 
required training to perform a certain task, so Aristotle would 
see no contradiction between the claim that someone was 
pepaldeuinan=, but still required further -thA-, IP . 
22 
If the EN is a form of teaching but isn't paideia, this suggests 
that, whatever action the Eff is trying to get the audience to 
perform, it is itself an Instance of that action. Clearly, this 
can only be some sort of high-level practical reasoning. Ve are 
accordingly left with the conclusion that the Elf is intended to 
help an audience which has already undergone paldeia engage in 
high-level practical reasoning. 
4.00: A prnj2mr-ed rnlutione The RX as a training in reasoning- 
The sort of picture that is beginning to come into f ocus may 
renind us of the Bepublic 537b-c: 
Socratp :I... a select group of the twenty-year olds will 
receive promotion above the rest, and will be required to 
consolidate the subjects they were taugbt unsystemtically as 
cbildren until tbey gain an overview of the relationsbips 
these subjects have to one anotber and to reality. ' 
'Yes, it's only wben this bas occurred that one's 
learning has a secure foundation. ' 
Socrate : 'And it's also the main way of testing whether or 
not someone is naturally suited for dialectic, since the 
ability to take an overview Is the distinguishing mrk of a 
dialectician. ' 
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This similarity nay be reinforced when we bear in mind that the 
EN is widely taken to be an example of dialectic, and is, 
certainly, an overview of practical reasoning. 
So perhaps the sort of audience we are looking at in the EN is 
conposed of youths of about twenty years of age, who have been 
well brought up, but who haven't really had to get any 
theoretical and rational rigour into their opinions about life. 
Accordingly, although their instincts are sound, they'll probably 
have a mishmash of notions picked up from sophists, tradition, 
Platonism and whatever, none of which have been thought through 
with any consistency; in fact, rather like a modern undergraduate 
class in moral philosophy. But the audience's saving grace is 
that they want to be good, are eager to learn, and that they are 
aware of their own immaturity and feel shame when they do go 
wrong. '3 
low the attractions of such a view are obvious. Firstly, it seems 
plausible that there is a stage in the development of good people 
when, as youths, they are full of enthusiasm and good intentions, 
but are rather underdeveloped in the rational control needed to 
be fully good. Secondly, it fits in rather nicely with the 
Vestern practice of beginning Higher Education at around the age 
of eighteen, suggesting that around that age, there is a need to 
change from the passive all-round education (pmldela) of the 
school pupil, to the more participatory, active and more narrowly 
intellectual training of the university. Both these points 
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suggest that, if the general account given in this section does 
reflect Aristotle's view of his task in the EN, it is likely to 
be a view that fits in well with a conmonsense view of hu3man 
nature. 
The sort of picture proposed, as noted, depends partly for its 
plausibility on what we imagine the typical psychological state 
of an adolescent to be -a state that might be described as 
'puppydom' . So if it could be argued that the Ell Is in fact 
addressed not to an audience of youths but rather of adults, the 
picture as an explanation of the purpose of the EN would 
accordingly become less persuasive. 
As already cited, Aristotle specifically excludes the immature 
from the audience of the EN (EIW 13 1094b27-1095al3). Although 
this covers both immaturity through lack of age and immaturity in 
character, given the general biological bias of Aristotle's 
thought, he tends to think of human agents as having a 
characteristic life cycle and as having certain typical 
attributes at specific stages of that cycle. "' Accordingly, 
although some individuals will remain immature when they are no 
longer chronologically young, and, conversely, some that are 
young will possess a maturity in advance of their years, h6a gpj 
25 
ta pgjjL, the in-ture in years will tend to be identical with the 
imnature in character. 
In Pol VII 14 1335a28-29, in order to avoid the unfortunate 
consequences of marriage among the young, the ideal age of 
marriage for men is set at around the age of thirty-seven. Later. 
he remarks that mental prime is reached at fifty (1335b32-5). In 
Rhet B 14 1390bg-ll, the mature are distinguished from the 
young, and the age of bodily maturity set between the ages of 
thirty and thirty-five, and mental maturity set at forty-niue. 
Apart from these specific statenents in the corpus, the Politics 
suggests the splitting of the citizenry of the ideal city into 
the young and the old, with the young being ruled and acting as 
the military arm of the state, and with the old acting as rulers 
(Pol VIl 8 1328b2g-1329al7; ibid 13 1332b35-38). Although 
Aristotle puts no specific ages an this division, some hints may 
be gleaned from the Athenian constitution where citizens were 
liable to military service between the ages of twenty to sixtY9 
service in juries was restricted to citizens over the age of 
thirty, and appointment as an arbitrator in cases over the value 
of ten drachmae was restricted to those over the age of sixty-" 
Since Aristotle makes no effort to criticize existing 
constitutions specifically an the ground of failure to allocate 
the tasks of citizenship to the appropriate age group, this would 
suggest that the mature and politically governing class of 
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Aristotle's ideal city are unlikely to be younger than thirty, 
and probably nearer sixty. 
Turning to the Republic, although a rigorous intellectual 
training will begin for the Guardians at about the age of-twenty, 
this will be in the mathematical sciences, and the study of 
dialectic will only begin at the age of thirty (535a-541b). Since 
Aristotle explicitly distinguishes the subject matter of exact 
sciences such as mathematics from that of the Ell (EX 13 1094b19- 
28), before going on to shew that the young are unsuited for the 
latter (ibid 1094b27-1095all), this suggests that he might follow 
Plato in distinguishing the aptitude of those under thirty for 
mathematics, from the aptitude of those over thirty for the 
dialectic of the EN. 
None of this is, of course, conclusive evidence that Aristotle is 
thinking of an audience over the age of thirty. It Is, however, 
strong circumstantial evidence that, instead of thinking of the 
paradigm student as being around twenty, we would do better to 
consider whether he is more likely to have been older than 
thirty. 12 Now, if this were to be the case, then the model of the 
EN's purpose as being the rational training of puppydom is less 
plausible; for, whatever the case may be in respect of twenty 
year olds, it is implausible to argue that thirty year olds, 
particularly those who have been engaged in ten years of active 
military service, are going to be puppies, full of heady 
enthusiasms. Instead of thinking of Aristotle's audience as being 
27 
a collection of Rupert Brookes, eager to rush off in 1914 and 
serve a noble cause dimly understood, we night do better to think 
of then as rather analogous to the troops returning home in 1918, 
grimly determined to change society. 
A piece of possible textual evidence that Aristotle may have been 
directing his lectures at the young can be found at Eff X9 
1179b7-10, where Aristotle indicates that arguments Q=W can 
stimulate and encourage well-born youths. 13 Certainly, this could 
be taken as meaning that the Eff itself could stimulate such 
youths. On the other hand, since the Eff doesn't contain every 
species of practical argument, and, in particular, does not 
contain detailed casuistry, the passage can be read as making the 
general point that you can argue with someone who is properly 
educated about what they should do, while you can't argue with 
someone who isn't. low, up to a point, a properly brought up two 
year old is open to persuasion by argument -'If you eat your 
dinner. you can have Teddy'- but from the general assertion that 
argument plays a part in the bringing up of the young, nothing 
follows about the role of high level argument such as that 
contained in the EN. 
For the sake of argument, however, say that the logoi referred to 
are the arguments of the EN. The words used in the passage - 
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stimulate and encourage (12rotrepsasthai. and parormgsai) seem 
inappropriate if they are to be regarded as intended to describe 
the main purpose of the EN. Both words seem to suggest the 
inception of a process of education and not the process of 
education itself. For example, an elementary class in philosophy 
may encourage a student to be a philosopher by lighting an 
enthusiasm for the subject; watching television courtroom dramas 
nay stimulate an interest in becoming an advocate. In neither 
case, however, is the stimulation or the encouragement the same 
as the teaching which is required to fulfil the desire which has 
arisen as a result of the encouragement. Many people nay be fired 
with enthusiasm for philosophy or law; to pursue that enthusiasm 
requires more than attending those lectures or watching those 
programmes which were the occasions for that enthusiasm; and it 
is quite likely that the majority of enthusiasts will not achieve 
the ambition on which their hearts have been set. But just as a 
trial nay enthuse a law student without the purpose of a trial 
being that stimulation of enthusiasm, so may the EN stimulate 
noble youths without the purpose of the lectures being the 
inspiring of that enthusiasm. The test is surely whether or not 
suggesting the purpose of the lectures is the inspiring of 
enthusiasm adequately explains the richness of argument and 
detailed analysis which the EX contains. I would suggest that it 
is difficult (though admittedly not impossible) so to think, Just 
as it would be difficult (though again not impossible) to 
understand the detailed workings of the courtroom as having the 
purpose of arousing the Interest of prospective lawyers. In both 
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cases there seems so much that is dry and difficult# so much that 
is simply in excess of the requirements of stimulating the youngs 
that the identification of the purpose of the observed processes 
as stinulation seems ill-founded. 
In sun, the evidence of this passage does not count against the 
identification of the audience as nature. Firstly, it may UOt 
refer to the arguments of the EN specifically but nay be making a 
far more general point. Secondly, even if it is referring to the 
EX, the improvement caused by the lectures might be only 
accidental to their true purpose. In either case, there is 
nothing to undermine the 'hypothesis that the audience have an age 
in excess of thirty. 
Putting aside the direct textual and circumstantial evidence that 
the audience is mature as set out above, can the claim that the 
audience needs to develop the rational control of its actions by 
attending the lectures forming the EN be made sense of in 
Aristotelian terms? 
In non-Aristotelian terms, there doesn't seem to be too nuch of a 
problen. Taking again the picture of puppydom, we are used to 
drawing a distinction between an agent's fundamentally good 
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nature, and his lack of training or intellectual rigour: I He has 
" good heart, ' might go up the cry, as he flounders around making 
" ness of his own and others' lives. Now, of course, if this were 
" pernanent condition, one where the agent always did the wrong 
thing however much he wanted to be good, it might be more 
difficult to be so forgiving: good natured muddleheadedness often 
ends up, perhaps rightly, being reclassified as self absorbed 
carelessness. But we can put this hard case aside: whatever sense 
we attach to puppydon, it is normally going to be a temporary 
condition which the agent grows out of. 
To put this sort of picture in Aristotelian terms, we can use as 
a basis Aristotle's division of the soul into an affective part 
amenable to reason and reason itself (EY 1 13 1102a26-1103alO). 14 
To each part, there is attached a different kind of virtue: to 
the affective part, the virtues of character; to the rational 
part, the intellectual virtues (ibid 1103a3-10). In broad, our 
claim will be that the audience have developed their virtues of 
character, but have, as yet, only imperfect intellectual virtues, 
a deficiency to be remedied by the EX. 15 
As this claim stands, it is too strong. Aristotle makes clear 
that virtue in the true sense QA. kuria cLretg) cannot exist 
without phron6sis, the intellectual virtue of practical reason 
(EN VI 13 114014-17). 16 So the original claim has to be amended 
to the claim that, although the audience have only imperfect 
intellectual virtues, and, consequently, strictly speaking, also 
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only possess the virtues of character in an imperfect way, 
broadly speaking, their virtues of character are in good order. 
This claim has to be interpreted carefully in order to remain 
Aristotelian and the difficulty rests in how to separate the two 
types of virtue so that one type can be broadly in good order 
whilst the other isn't. I now turn to consider how this 
separation might be achieved. 
the 'bllnd nbedienne'--nadel 
kristotle talks of the affective part of the soul being obedient 
to reason in the way that a child is obedient to its parents (Eff 
1 13 1102b28-1103a2l). One way of interpreting this nodel would 
be that the child has become so docile that it will do anYtbing 
the parent tells it to without question. The plausibility of this 
interpretation is enhanced by its standing in the tradition Of 
Plato, who argues, for example, in the Republic (588b-592b) that 
the affective part of the soul should be tamed like a wild animal 
or ruled like slave. 
The model assumes that there is a rigid and real difference 
between the rational and affective part of the soul analogous to 
the difference between two people or an animal and a person. The 
slave doesn't obey his master's instructions because he thinks it 
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good to obey them: he obeys them because he is afraid of being 
beaten. He doesn't need to identify the reasons for the 
instructions before he obeys them: all he needs to do is to 
identify them as coming from his master. 
In the case of the instructions from reason, the analogy, if 
applicable, would require that why the affections obeyed the 
instructions from reason wouldn't be that the instructions were 
reasonable- ie had a rational quality- but rather that they came 
from the reasoning part of the soul. This would entail that there 
was some extrinsic property of the rational part of the soul -its 
location or appearance, say- which would enable the affective 
part of the soul to recognize the rational part of the soul as 
something separate from it in the way that a slave recognizes its 
master's instructions, not because they are jolly good 
instructions, but because they come, say, from the man carrying 
the stick and wearing the hat. 
The problem with this for the Aristotelian is that the parts of 
the soul referred to by Aristotle aren't really separate physical 
or spatially located parts, but rather more capacities 
distinguishable in thought but not in reality. 17 This being so, 
it is hard to see how the rational part could have any extrinsic 
properties since the quality of being rational exhausts its 
nature. 
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Hence, the blind obedience model would have to be revised into 
an obedience model where the affective part of the soul has not 
sinply been beaten into a mindless acquiescence to the dictates 
of reason, but rather. in some as yet vague sense, seeks to 
follow the orders of reason. not blindly as a broken slave, but 
as a willing employee might seek to carry out the orders of an 
employer. Vhen we turn to Aristotle's discussion of slavery in 
the Politics, we do indeed find that he is fully aware of the 
need for a slave to exercise an active and intelligent obedience 
in the performance of his master's orders (Pol 12 1255bl6-40). 
Xoreover, the rule of the soul over the body -a 
archAn- is explicitly contrasted with the rule of the reason over 
the appetites -an arnhAn polltlkAn kat bAgiljk6m (Pol 12 12504- 
6). 10 All this suggests a model where the affections coope-rate 
with reason, a suggestion supported when we return to EY 1 13 
1102b25-1103a3 and note that the language used perhaps Indicates 
respect and reasoned acquiescence rather than the blind obedience 
originally claimed. 
4.05, SaparatIng the virtuag Of character frnTn the intellectual 
vir, tueg! the 'co-opArmtinn' -mndel 
EN VII 6 1149a25-b2 talks of spirit (thu-mog) rushing off like a 
hasty servant before he has heard the order properly, or barking 
like a dog at a knock at the door before he knows whether it is a 
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friend or enemy trying to get in. Burnyeat glosses this passage 
as follows: 
As In Plato, the overeager dog In us is concerned witb wbat 
Is noble and just, witb bonor and self-esteem, without taking 
tbougbt for the consequences or the wider view. "" 
This appears to be a promising model for the state of the 
audience: a state of puppydam. full of vim and vigour, yet 
lacking something in the way of cammonsense. Nonetheless, Plato 
can't be the exact model for Aristotle's solution. Plato's model 
of the division of the soul is a substantial one: he believes 
that the three parts of the soul are equivalent to three 
different individuals. Aristotle, on the other hand, as we have 
seen, regards the divisions within the soul as conceptual rather 
than real differences. 20 
Putting aside Plato's substantial division of the soul, we could 
try a broad division based on the different ends or reasons 
pursued. Ve know, the argument night go, that Aristotle claims 
that the virtues of character set the ends of action whilst the 
intellectual virtue of phrontsls sets the means to those ends (EY 
VI 12 1144a6-9). Puppydom is the state of getting the end right - 
nobility- but getting the wider picture or means wrong. 21 
Clearly, any such account would need to provide a detailed 
account of terms such as 'means' or a 4wider picture' before it 
could be finally accepted. But in broad, such an account, quite 
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apart from any textual plausibility, seems psychologically 
persuasive: youth is perhaps full of principles, pursued without 
any awareness of the consequences and costs of the means used to 
put those principles into effect. It moreover suggests a link 
with psychoanalytic theory and Aristotle's theory of akrasla: if 
akrasla and puppydom are both states of failure of rational 
control over the affections, akrmRim might be identifiable as a 
case of arrested development. 22 
It is worth emphasizing how plausible and familiar such a picture 
is. Especially since the development of a discrete and ill- 
disciplined youth culture in the fifties, we almost expect noble 
youths to be full of a high-principled anger for a time, before 
settling down to the trimming and compromise of the mature life. 
It Is, moreover, akin to Plato's view in Laws 653 that there is a 
stage 
wben pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are 
rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding 
the nature of them, and wbo find then, after tbey b3ve 
attained reason, to be in barimpy witb ber. This barmonY Or 
the soul, taken as a wbole, is virtue; but the particular 
training in respect of pleasure and pain. wbicb leads You 
always to bate what you ought to lzate, and love wbat YOU 
ougbt to love from the beginning of life to the end, JOY be 
separated off; and in jivy view, will be rightly called 
education. 
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But Is this picture in fact Aristotelian?. Ve have already seen 
that the virtues of character without the intellectual virtues 
aren't properly virtues. This prompts a question: we know why 
possessing the pseudo-virtues of character isn't like possessing 
the full virtues of character -they lack some element of rational 
direction and control. But why are the pseudo-virtues 
sufficiently like the full virtues even to be considered as 
pseudo-virtues? Vhy do we want to say more than simply that they 
are on the way to becoming virtues without being there yet? 
One strategy for defining the putative state of pseudo-virtue is 
that it is a state where the agent's immediate response to a good 
or an evil is in good order, but where the agent's character 
isn't such as to allow him to subject that immediate response to 
the rational test of deliberation or reflection. 23 Such a 
strategy fits in well with Eff VII 6 1149&25-b2 and Burnyeat's 
glass cited above: youth is hasty, maturity more reflective. 
low a problem with this strategy is that it seems to assume that 
the difference between the fully virtuous and the pseudo-virtuous 
agent is a matter of an additional reaction: both agents 
initially have the same reaction, say, the same emotional 
response of fear; but the fully virtuous agent then has the 
further reaction of reflecting an that fear. Although this is 
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undoubtedly the case in some instances, surely more common is the 
case where it is precisely the Initial reaction which is the 
crucial difference between the virtuous and other agents. (This 
is supported by EN 111 8 1117al7-22). The account suggests for 
example that the initial reaction couldn't be just that period of 
reflection and deliberation which the virtuous agent undertakes, 
the pseudo-virtuous agent instead rushing off without thought, 
although this is an obvious interpretation of Ell VII 6 1149a25- 
b2. Different agents surely not only have different ultimate 
reactions, but also, and perhaps centrally, different initial 
reactions. 
Xoreover, deliberation can itself be a sign of i=mturity: 
hesitating, as with Hamlet, can be a failing. As Aristotle notes, ý 
fear makes people deliberate (Rhet B5 1383a6-8); and since the 
courageous agent will not fear an as many occasions as the non- 
courageous agent (eg BY 111 7 1115blO-11), he will accordingly 
deliberate less than at least some types of non-virtuous 
character. 
The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that the virtue of 
the fully virtuous agent will not be measured by whether he 
performs more (or less) reflection than the non fully virtuous 
agent, but rather whether he performs the appropriate amount: as 
always, the measure is what the fully virtuous agent does (EN III 
6 1106b36-1107a2). Getting the amount of deliberation right isn't 
therefore just a bolt on extra that can be developed after, say, 
38 
the age of eighteen, but rather an essential part of getting the 
response right. The imperfectly virtuous get the anount of 
deliberation that the phron1mos would perform wrong: standardly, 
the young may be too hasty and thus perform too little; but like 
Hamlet, on occasions they will also be too hesitant and go wrong 
in that way. 
Aristotle doesn' t clearly address the question of the existence 
of pseudo-virtues, but he does acknowledge the possibility of an 
inborn natural virtue without a developed virtue of phron6sis (EN 
VI 13 1144blff). In doing so, he seems to be making two related 
points. Firstly, all human beings normally possess the capacity 
for virtue just as they all normally possess the capacity for 
learning a language (ibid 11444-6; cf EY 11 1 1103a23-26). 
Secondly, Just as in the case of physical aptitudes, different 
individuals will have different natural capacities to achieve 
virtue CEN VI 13 114010-14). Putting aside the first point, let 
us consider the second. That someone, as it were, starts off the 
race with an advantage, means nothing in the absence of 
phrongsis: indeed, an agent with a natural disposition to virtue, 
in the absence of practical wisdom night well prove more 
dangerous than someone with only a normal capacity for virtue. 
Taking the hint from Aristotle's example (ibid), we night point 
to fanaticisn as a realization of a high natural capacity for 
virtue without phrongsia. A rational agent with a high natural 
capacity for virtue, but little phrongrair. isn't good qua virtue 
but bad qua reason, he is just very bad. 
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low, if Aristotle did acknowledge a state of pseudo virtue24, his 
view of it would have to be the sane as his view of natural 
virtue: it might be on its way to becoming something good, but as 
a state viewed in its own right, it might be very bad indeed. And 
if we try to imagine the sort of student suggested by the picture 
of puppydom as a state of lacking reflection, lie does seen rather 
unsuited to Aristotle's classes: if be is an fire with the love 
of the noble, he might be unlikely to sit still long enough to 
complete the fairly dry lecture course that is the EX. In facto, 
he seems rather more likely to be precisely that sort of 
undisciplined student excluded by EX 13 10956a4-11. 
Consider, for emample, the case of the soldier. Greek p0lais Of 
Aristotle's period have been described as being permanently On. a 
war footing. 26 The state of active military service is assumed by 
Aristotle to be a normal part of the young man's role, even in 
his ideal city state (Pol VII 8 1329a2ff), and bravery in battle 
is the central case of courage (EX 111 6 1115a28-35). 
Accordingly, the virtuous man would seem to need to be a good 
soldier. 
Could someone be a good soldier without reflecting and 
deliberating? Clearly not. You can't be a good soldier without 
getting the amount of reflection right: too much and you falter. 
too little and you rush off to destruction. Imperfect soldiers 
will perhaps tend to go wrong in both ways, lurching from one 
extreme to another. Deliberation isu*t, therefore, something 
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separate from the activity of soldiering, but rather something 
which is essential to that activity and which nust be learned as 
part of that activity in order for It to be effectively 
performed. 
I conclude, therefore, that pseudo-virtue can't exist as a state, 
good in its own right, if it is taken to be a state which lacks 
reflexion. A state which Is unreflective is, taken in its own 
right, a bad state: it may be of such a nature that it is able to 
progress to a state of virtue; but of itself, it gets things 
wrong and produces vicious actions. It accordingly seems an 
extremely unsuitable state for the audience of the EY and this 
suggests that, if Aristotle did acknowledge the existence of a 
state of pseudo-virtue among the young, his audience would need 
to have grown out of it before being fit for his lectures. 
5.00@ The EX as learning by dolu& 
The foregoing reflexions on pseudo-virtue suggest that, even if 
pseudo-virtue can exist, It is not a suitable state for learning 
from the EN. 
I argued above (0.01) that the EN was not itself paideim because 
paideia was passive and was confined to the i-ature: adult 
learning involved the active participation of the learner. The 
reflexions on pseudo-virtue reinforce this conclusion In that, in 
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order to be able to perform any complex task such as soldiering 
well, the agent needs already to have developed practical 
reason. 
Putting aside Aristotle f or a moment, the suggestion that human 
beings mature and becone adult through learning to perform some 
complex and long term task is a familiar and plausible modern 
claim: thus it is widely mooted that young men are socialized 
through the disciplines of paid employment and that, in the 
absence of such employment, they do not become properly 
functioning adults. The point here is not that paid enploymerLt is 
itself a necessary part of the good adult life, but rather that 
it is one of the possible schools of virtue. It should be noted 
that military service might be argued to be particularly well 
suited to such an educational function: since the Incentives for 
performing well and disincentives for performing badly are an the 
whole immediately apprehensible by even the least virtuous - 
plunder and medals among the Incentives; death and beatings among 
the disincentives- soldiering is a very suitable means of 
instilling virtue into even the most unpromising material. 
So if the audience are old in terms of years and have already 
performed military service, they are, broadly speaking anyway, 
practically rational; and In a state where they can go on -to 
learn how to do moral philosophy. This leaves the question of why 
they should want to do noral philosophy and It is to this 
question that I shall turn In the following chapter. 
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It night be objected, however, that by emphasizing that the 
audience is to learn to do moral philosophy by actually doing 
some by way of following the EX, I am overlooking the distinction 
that Aristotle makes between the way that intellectual virtues 
and virtues of character are acquired. EN II I 1103al4ff seems to 
make it clear that intellectual virtues -including 'phron&sis owe 
their existence predominantly to being taught, whilst virtues of 
character are qualities that owe their existence predominantly to 
practice and training. 26 So, the objection would go, it is no 
more necessary that the point of teaching moral philosophy is 
that the adult can do moral philosophy than it was the point of 
teaching classics that adults should be Greek scholars: in each 
case, the ain is to produce qualities of mind -the intellectual 
virtues- tbrough the teaching of something else. 
In order to answer this objection, a distinction needs to be 
drawn. In one sense, the aim of teaching someone, say, classics 
is always to get her to be a classicist: this would be the case 
even if the ultimate point of being a sixth form classicist was 
to be an adult colonial adniminstrator. And In some cases, there 
is no ultimate and ulterior motive: the point of teaching someone 
French is very often simply that she should learn French. So even 
if a hard distinction were drawn between the learning by doing of 
the virtues of character and the teaching of the intellectual 
virtues, this would not deny that the point of the EN was sinply 
to do moral philosophy: it would only mean that it couldn't be 
assumed that this was the ultimate point. Here I can only appeal 
43 
to general plausibility. The depth and breadth of the EN seems to 
me more easily explicable on the assumption that the lectures are 
intended to produce, put roughly, permanent philosophers rather 
than philosophers who will grow out of it. Xoreover, whatever the 
precise conclusions of the EX, it is clear that in general the 
life of philosophy is an important feature of good living. For 
such reasons, if a hard distinction is to be drawn between the 
learning by doing of the virtues of character, and the learning 
by being taught of the intellectual virtues, I would suggest that 
it remains the most plausible explanation that the point of the 
Eff is to produce, in the broad sense, moral philosophers. At the 
least, I take it that such an explanation has a high degree of 
plausibility as a heuristic device. In any case, since the EY 
does tend to produce moral philosophers, the burden of proof ir. 
on those who would suggest that this is a purely temporary aim. 
On the other hand, there is no reason to postulate such a hard 
and fast distinction between the ways in which ethical and 
intellectual virtues are learned. Zagzebsk127 argues that both 
are acquired through habituation. Sorabji28 emphasizes the 
intellectual aspect of habituation. Ve might as a consequence 
judge that evidence of EN 11 1 1103al4ff is too weak to postulate 
an absolute distinction in Aristotle's philosophy where none in 
fact exists. The passage could be ignored on the basis that it is 
an isolated and inconsistent view or perhaps that it Is written 
primarily with theoretical rather than practical reason in mind. 
But even if the passage is to be accepted as making an absolute 
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distinction between, for present purposes, phron6sis and the 
virtues of character, it would not follow that broadly 
intellectual qualities were not learned by doing. Vhen a modern 
talks of Intellectual virtue, the temptation, particularly among 
those influenced in a general way by Aristotle, is to produce a 
list of intellectual virtues analogous to the ethical virtues. 
Zagzebski, for example, lists among others the following: 
sensitivity to detail; open-mindedness; adaptability of 
intellect. " But this contrasts with what Aristotle actually 
gives as intellectual virtues: sophia or sunPAIR; phrongsis (EN I 
13 1103a4-7). In general in the EN, Aristotle notes only two 
intellectual virtues, distinguished by being the virtues of the 
two different parts of the rational soul: namely, practical and 
theoretical rationality (EY VI 11 1143bl4-17). So whatever 
Aristotle night mean by asserting that phronAsIs isn't learned by 
doing, this certainly wouldn't entail that the intellectual 
quality imparted by the EN isn't learned by doing. Indeed, if we 
are to say that the EN teaches moral philosophy, it becomes 
increasingly implausible to deny that in this case learning is 
doing: philosophy of all academic subjects is the one where the 
ability to do it well is produced by constant practice rather 
than by, say, the acquisition of facts. 
For whatever reason, therefore, I take it that the aim of the EN 
is to impart broadly speaking the ability to perform moral 
philosophy. On this assumption, it becomes again clear that the 
audience do not need the EN to live a good life. Only if 
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discussing conduct philosophically is always part of virtuous 
action could the Ell be intended to be a remedy for lack of 
virtue. It is a very add idea, a very Platonic idea, that only by 
being a philosopher can one attain virtue in any sphere. If you 
go back to my earlier claim that Aristotle is Initially concerned 
with all practical reasoning and not just with a specific type 
of practical reasoning called morality. while it is plausible to 
claim that a certain intelligence and practical wisdom is 
essential whatever you put your hand to, it is highly 
implausible, in the absence of a Platonic metaphysics, to claim 
that you need to be any sort of philosopher to excel in most 
forms of practical reasoning. 
I have argued in this chapter against the assumption that the 
purpose of the EN is to improve its audience norally. Instead, I 
have argued that the audience is already morally good and thus 
already possesses the virtue of phron6s1s. It follows from this 
that whatever improvement is intended to be produced by the Eff 
must be at least akin to what the EN itself is, that is, broadly, 
a work of ethical philosophy. 
In the following chapter, I consider what might be the practical 
point of being able to philosophize in this way. 
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Notes to chapter one 
1. Barnes 1976 p26. It should be noted that I am not drawing a 
distinction between moral goodness and virtuousness. But see note 
3 below. 
2. Eg EN 13 1094bll-27; 11 2 1103b34-1104all; 11 6 1106b36- 
1107a2; 11 9 1109b20-23. 
3. For Anscombe, see eg pp26-44 in Crisp & Slote 1997. Anscombe's 
own position would seen to be that some modern philosophy helps 
itself to ways of reasoning which make no sense in the absence of 
belief in a God who acts as a supreme legislator for mankind. (Cf 
Xaclntyre 1985 esp ch 4; J Haldane, pp92-4 Xaclntyre's TbDmistic 
Revival: Wbat Next? in Horton & Xendus 1994; N Johnston, pp85-6, 
Objectivity refigured. Pragmatism without Verificationism, in 
Haldane & Wright 1993. 
The claim that Judaeo-Christian morality is essentially act and 
rule based while Greek ethics is essentially agent and virtue 
based is perhaps dubious (cf Annas 1981 pp157-9 and Dover 1974 
p252). However, if the modern conception underlying the word 
'morality' is widely held to be incoherent, it is prudent to 
avoid the use of the word in explaining Aristotle, simply to 
avoid explanation obscurun per obscurius. 
4.1 owe this point to DS Depew, p373, 'Politics, Xusic and 
Contemplation, ' in Keyt & Xiller 1991. Depew's thesis is that 
Aristotle never regards paidela as applicable to adults: among 
the quotations cited in support of this thesis, Depew fails to 
notice that PD1 VII 14 2333b3-5 specifically refers to the need 
for paideln by both children and other ages (allam h6llklmm). 
levertheless, as will be seen, I regard his thesis as 
substantially true. 
5. Index in Bywater 1890 ad verbum. 
6. MousIkA as an end in itself is suggested by Pol VIII 3 
1338al3-30. That actually performing -1-McA is only a means for 
the young to gain the ability to Judge, as an audience, others' 
perfornances is stated at 1340b2O-39. Accordingly, whatever the 
point of adult an-MrA -ie judging performances- childhood 
innuRUA -ie performances themselves- is a means not an end. For 
more detailed discussion, see: Lord 1982 and DS Depew (op cit). 
7. But cf Eff 11 1 1103al3-16: 
-intellectual virtue is for tbe nost part produced and 
increased by instruction Eek didaskalias] ... whereas etbical 
virtue is the product of babit. 
The contrast here, however, is not between acquiring virtues on 
the one hand by being taught and on the other hand by doing: this 
is shewn by 1103bg-13 where it is stated that techmal such as 
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building require a teacher QiAmy8n), even though it has 
imnediately before been stated that tpnbnm4 are acquired by 
actual performance (1103a3l-32). The actual contrast being made 
is, I suggest, between those virtues and skills which tend to 
require and to be helped by the explanation and commentary of a 
teacher on a tyro's performances, and those which tend to be 
acquired by sinple imitation. As is usual in Aristotle, the 
distinction need not be absolute, but night rather relate to 
poles of a continuum. (See S5.00 of this chapter for a further 
discussion. ) 
8. For the EN as dialectic, see Irwin 1988 (eg p8); cf Jaffa 
1952, esp ch IV. 
9. This is the position of X Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on Learning to 
be Good', pp69-92 (see esp pp78-9), in Rorty 1980. 
10. cf Rhet B 12 1388b, 30-1390bM 
11. See Vebster 1978. Cf Aristotle's Athenian Constitution. ch 
XLIlff. 
12. cf Aeschines 1 11 where the decade between forty and fifty Is 
described as the most s6phrAn age. (Cited in Dover 1974 p103). 
13. Interpreted thus by Burnyeat, op. cit.. p75. 
14. The bipartite division of the soul Is, in fact, rather a 
tripartite division into vegetable, affective and rational. 
However, since the vegetative part of the soul Is of no 
consequence to the purpose of the Eff, it can be ignored for 
present purposes. (See Gauthier & Jolif 1958 ad 1103al-3. ) 
15. The general picture is supported by Burnyeat, op. cit. esp 
pp79-80; and Sorabji in 'Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in 
Virtue' (eg p217) also in Rorty 1980. Both of these would insist 
on the adjustment to the claim made in noting that virtue without 
intellect is, in some sense, only a sham or pseudo-virtue. 
16. Note, however, that Pol VIII 5 1340a15, Rhet B 12 1389a33-35 
and EX 11 1 1103a23-26 nay suggest that virtue without reason 
renains entitled to the name 'virtue'. 
17. See Eff 1 13 1102a28-32. Cf DA 111 9 432alg-b7; Gauthier 
Jolif 1958 ad 1102a28-32; Bechler 1995 p211, n1g. 
18. Despotic rule is a tyranny (Pol 111 5 1279bl6-19). A tyranny 
is a monarchical government in the interest of the ruler as 
contrasted to kingship which aims at what is best for the common 
advantage (Pol 111 5 127ga25-1279blO. Cf EN VIII 10 1160b22- 
116la1g). 
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19. Burnyeat, op. cit. p84. (This reference to Plato is to the 
Republic. esp 440d. ) Burnyeat specifically uses this passage as a 
model for the state of the audience of the Ell. 
20. For a discussion of Plata's and Aristotle's different 
approaches to the division of the soul, see Ando 1958. cf 
Fortenbaugh 1975 pp23-44. 
21. Eg Burnyeat, op. cit. pp86ff. 
22. The identification of akrasla as a case of arrested 
developement is made by Burnyeat, op. cit., at p85. The link with 
psychoanalysis, particularly Freudian psychoanalysis, can only be 
at a very general level, ie both Freud and, allegedly, Aristotle 
identify going wrong as typically a matter of getting stuck at an 
earlier stage of normal development. Freud's own theory, as I 
understand it, Is less a matter of a global immaturity, such as 
would be the case in akraRln, but rather a fixation of specific 
impulses at an inappropriate stage of maturity (see eg lecture 23 
in Freud). 
23. Fortenbaugh 1975 for example argues that the distinction 
between the two parts of the soul is that the emotional response 
is i--diate Whilst the deliberative response takes tine for 
reflection. In general, it appears a flaw in Fortenbaugh's 
account that he helps himself to the distinction between an 
immediate emotional response and a delayed reflective response 
without addressing what, if anything, nakes a response emotional 
rather than deliberative besides its innediacy. It would seen for 
instance that deliberation is itself a response which is 
immediate but non-enotional. 
24. Sorabji (op. cit. pp2ll-212) is doubtful but seems to tend to 
the view that Aristotle did not. I am finally uncertain whether 
or not Aristotle could have acknowledged such a state, although I 
tend to the view that he could not. Although it is possible that 
intellectual and affectional development could proceed at 
different rates at different times -this is hinted at in Pal VIII 
4 1338b38-1339alO- I think it rather inplausible that any state 
resembling akrasia would be the normal precursor of virtue either 
in fact or as a matter of Aristotelian exegesis. But even were it 
the case that Aristotle did recognize the state of pseudo-virtue 
as an actual one, this would not affect my arguments to the 
effect that this could not be the state of the audience to the 
EX. Cf Fortenbaugh 1975 p52 nl. See also McDowell in Whiting 
Engstrom, p30: 
As I Insisted, Aristotle does not see the product of 
babituation Into the excellences of cbaracter as a collection 
of mindless bebavioural tendencies. The result of babituation 
is a motivational tendency but one witb a conceptual and 
bence rational aspect. Feaple witb a properly formed 
cbaracter bave learned to see certain actions as wortb 
underta. king on the ground that they are noble, they bave 
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acquired that reason-giving concept in a way tbat -is 
inextricably bound up witb acquiring the propensity to be 
motivated by thoughts In wbicb it Is applied. 
25. Dover 1974 p159. Cf p161 where Dover discusses the effects of 
the permanent threat of war on the assessment of character. 
26. See Zagzebski 1996 p149. As noted in note 7 above, I would 
argue that the teaching/habituation distinction is not, in any 
case, an absolute one. 
27. Zagzebski 1996 pp150-158. 
28. Sorabji (op. cit. ) p216. 
29. Zagzebski 1996 p114. 
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Chapter two 
The purpose of philosophizing 
A number of conclusions have emerged from the above discussions 
which need to be summarized before we can take the analysis 
further. Firstly, we need to think of the Intended audience of 
these lectures as being of an age greater than thirty and having 
had experience of military service. Ve are accordingly not 
concerned with ill-disciplined youths who have had no experience 
of life but plenty of high motives, but rather with men who are 
mature, virtuous in a cammon-or-garden sense of the word, but who 
are unable to philosophize about that virtuousness. Secondly, we 
perhaps need to think of the deficiency in the audience's life 
which the EN is supposed to remedy as being not a global one 
which affects all their practical activities, but rather one 
which affects only a limited and specific type of action. There 
may be no reason to think that the audience will be improved in 
every aspect of their common- or-garden virtue: the soldier, for 
example, will not become a better soldier by attending the 
lectures. I have argued that type of action to be improved is 
likely to be what the EN itself is, ie philosophizing. 
Accbrdingly, we now need to investigate why philosophizing about 
practical matters night be thought to be a good thing. 
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In this chapter, I examine a number of strategies to supply a 
solution to the problem of how an already fully good audience 
might yet be said to be improved by the lectures. One strategy is 
to claim that the Elf sets out to reorient the lives of the 
audience either towards eupraxia or towards the6ria. I shall 
criticize such a strategy on the ground that it conflicts with 
the conclusion that the audience Is already fully good. Another 
strategy is to argue that the aim of the EN is to maintain the 
goodness of the audience rather than to improve it. This will be 
criticized on the ground that such a strategy again fails fully 
to acknowledge the existing goodness of the audience and, 
moreover, is a considerable weakening of what the EN actually 
proclaims itself to be doing. 
The f irst chapter of the Xetaphysics distinguishes between the 
man of experience. who knows what to do but not the reasons f or 
doing it, and the man of wisdom (sophla)', who knows 'the why and 
the cause' (: LcL d1oti kj; L : tAL aitlan (Meta 11 981a29-30). 
Gaining a philosophical understanding of practical matters will 
accordingly give the agent an understanding of the reasons which 
explain and Justify his actions. 
That the El might be setting out to provide the reasons f or 
actions would set that work in the tradition of the Republic 
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which can be seen as a criticism of the unreasoning performance 
of conventionally required actions. 2 But we need to ask what is 
so good about knowing reasons; for Aristotle seems to make it 
clear that the man of experience is certainly no less and often 
more effective than the man of wisdom (Meta 11 98lal2-15; cf EN 
VI 7 1141b2l-22). ýý 
Ve might, very broadly, make an initial distinction between two 
sorts of answer to this question. Firstly, and despite 
Aristotle's apparent contradiction, we night insist that the man 
of wisdom -or, at least, the man of wisdom and experience- is 
more effective than the man of experience alone. Ve would then be 
left to explain both how this is possible and also how we are to 
understand Aristotle's apparent contradiction of this view. 
Secondly, we might accept Aristotle's statement at face value 
and, instead of arguing that the man of wisdom is more effective 
than the man of experience, argue instead that, although the 
effects of his actions are unchanged, he feels differently about 
them. 
Taking the latter point, it is rather easy to understand how 
seeing your life as making up a coherent rational whole night be 
rather more pleasant than just seeing it as one damn thing after 
another; loosely, you would feel rather better about yourself. 
Vhilst acknowledging this aspect of the solution, I shall, for 
present purposes, ignore it. Xy chief reason for doing so is that 
it Is very hard to see how such a change in an agent's 
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understanding of her life wouldn't produce some changes in her 
actions and their effects. Again, and still talking at a very 
general level, the injunction of pop-psychology to feel better 
about yourself is supposed to produce some changes in your life: 
to make you more assertive, less self-destructive and so on. So 
if seeing the reasons for your actions were to change the way you 
felt about your life, it is hard to see how this change of view 
wouldn't ultimately be cashed into a change in actions and 
effectiveness. Xoreover, although in the discussion in EN VI 12 
1143bl8-1145a6, Aristotle notes that the faculty of reason would 
be desirable even if it produced no effects (EY VI 12 1144al-3), 
he goes on to claim that both theoretical and, of especial 
importance for current purposes, practical reason do in fact 
produce effects (EN VI 12 1144a6-9). A 
I accordingly turn to the forner alternative and how 
understanding the reasons for your actions might nake you a more 
effective agent. 
Practical reason (phron8sls) is said to ensure that an agent 
f inds the correct means to his end (EN VI 12 1144a7-9). I have 
argued in the previous chapter that Aristotle's audience cannot 
be regarded as being devoid of the powers of practical reasoning 
and, equally, they cannot be regarded as being completely devoid 
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of understanding the neans to effect their ends: a doctor who had 
no idea how to realize his ends just wouldn't be a doctor. 
So the claim must be that knowledge of reasons increases the 
ability of an agent to give effect to his ends. low the 
understanding of this version of the claim can't be, in any 
straightforward sense, that knowing why, say, cuts heal better 
when cleaned and covered with a plaster will make you better able 
to heal cuts: knowing that cleaning and covering is required is 
sufficient to provide the best treatment. In most of our everyday 
life, it seems simply false to claim that our actions would 
achieve better effects if we knew more about the reasons behind 
what is conventionally accepted as the appropriate action. And if 
we assume, reasonably enough, that we can, in a lifetime, only 
amass so much knowledge, knowing why something happens will 
reduce the amount of knowing that an agent can do: pursuing 
knowledge of reasons has a cost in terms of lost opportunities to 
pursue other, perhaps more practically significant knowledge 
tbat. 
Let us assume that for any agent. there will be an opti=m 
balance between knowing why and knowing that, where the 
advantages of pursuing further knowledge why will be outweighed 
by the costs of lost knowledge that. On what grounds could we 
suggest that the state of a given agent wasn't at that opti=m 
balance? In particular, given our present attenpt to discern the 
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purpose of the EN, on what grounds could we say that an agent 
might need to increase her knowledge why? 
one way of understanding the Eff is to regard it as advocating the 
life of Pupraxia, of practical virtue. Another way is to 
understand it as shewing that the life of the8ria is the best 
life, while the life of practical virtue, although good, is not 
the best (Eff X7 1177a12-1179a32). 
Taking Pupraxia first, this possibility can be understood in two 
ways. Firstly, it nay be the claim that the good life consists 
solely in the goods of practical virtue and not in the goods of 
theoretical virtue. Vilkes seems to countenance such a 
possibility when she makes the basis for the goodness of a life 
t. bat the best man is the man wbo exercises bis rational 
capacities to their fullest extent to gain far bimself the 
best life passible. 15 
Secondly, it may be the claim that the good life consists in some 
mixture of a number of different goods. 
I shall have nore to say about Vilkes' distinction between a good 
life simpliciter and a good life for a human being in my 
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discussion of the =4= argument in chapter eleven of this 
thesis. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that 
the two interpretations of eupraxia are not identical. Whilst the 
second possibility is compatible with the goodness of being a 
holy fool, of losing a life to save it (Luke 9,24), of 
passiveness or reliance on serendipity, the first is not. ý" In 
essence, the claim that goodness, of whatever sort, must be 
attained by the exercise of rational powers does restrict the 
ends which may be regarded as goods: to plan to exercise the8ria 
as part of a life of eupraxia is perhaps possible because the5ria 
could be an element in a life of practical reason; to plan to be 
a holy fool is self defeating because it would destroy that life. 
That the audience might be reoriented towards the life of 
eupraxia as practical virtue entails that the contents of Book X, 
clearly in some sense advocating a life dominated by t'hp6riA, are 
disregarded. Wilkes for example regards the arguments of that 
book in favour of tht-Aria as simply wrong. Throughout this 
thesis, I shall be operating with the methodological assumption 
that any account which rejects a portion of the EF as 
incompatible with the rest is to be less favoured than an account 
which interprets the EN as a broadly coherent whole. On this 
ground, such an interpretation of eupraxia must be rejected. 7 
The other interpretation -eupraxia as inclusivismr- cannot be so 
immediately dismissed. In order to be compatible with Book X, it 
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would have to be understood as claiming that the audience is 
currently undervaluing the8rIa and must be reoriented towards a 
greater appreciation of its value. Such a view, I shall argue, is 
subject to the same weaknesses as the claim that the audience 
would be better to adopt a life of pure the6ria and, for present 
purposes, I shall argue against these two possibilities of a 
reorientation towards the8ria as either the dominant best end or 
as one -currently undervalued- end among many together. 
The suggestion is, therefore, that Aristatlels' audience are 
practically virtuous, but not living the best sort of life 
because of an absence of the8ria; and that, accordingly, the 
purpose of the EN is to take the good and make them into the best 
by rearientating their lives from practical concerns to those of 
the8ria. *' 
Such a solution to the problem of the EN's purpose has the 
imnense advantage of resting on one of the few aspects of the Eff 
that is beyond question if the work is to be taken as a whole: 
Aristotle clearly thought the8ria was better than practical 
virtue, even if the details and practical implications of this 
view are less clear. There is good prima facie reason for saying, 
therefore, that reorientating a life from practical virtue to 
th--8ria would be an improvement in that life. Moreover, the 
existing state of the audience would be explained as being good 
(practically virtuous) but not the best it could be (living the 
life of the6ria). It also places the EN once again firmly within 
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the tradition of a certain understanding of the Republic, which 
regards that work as being concerned with the education of 
Glaucon, the education of the political nan away fron the pursuit 
of honour and towards the pursuit of truth. 9 
A major difficulty with this view is that it makes the point of 
most of the EN problematic. Of the ten books of the EN. Books II 
to V are wholly concerned with the practical, ethical virtues; 
and of the rest, only Books I and X can readily be understood as 
advancing the claims of the theoretical life in preference to the 
practical. Although it might be possible to explain this apparent 
imbalance away -as perhaps a starting point in co-on-sense 
practical ethics away from which Aristotle progresses during the 
course of the work', ', - the more straightforward explanation is 
that a large number of the audience -or, perhaps more exactly, a 
large part of each member of the audience- remains concerned 
with connon-sense practical ethics even after he has achieved 
whatever enlightenment the EN is intended to provide. This 
suggests that any reorientation of lives Intended by the EN is 
far less radical than that which may be intended by the Republic. 
That lack of radical change is not, in itself, conclusive proof 
that the EX Is not concerned with reorientation towards thp8rla. 
Aristotle might, after all, be concerned to make only a fairly 
minor reorientation of most people's lives, say, to allow an 
acknowledgment of the importance of the8ria in a society which 
had previously been completely oblivious of or even actively 
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hostile to It. One difficulty with this view Is that it still 
does not easily explain why so =ch of the Ell is devoted to an 
apparently co-on-sense and practical ethics: even if it is 
accepted that, say, Book X serves to encourage the6ria, what part 
do, in particular, Books 1I to V play in this reorientation? 
Xoreaver, can the switch from practical concerns to a concern for 
thp6riA be characterized so that it may be regarded as non- 
radical? 
4.01. - Reorientating the use of leisure 
One solution which has at least prize facie plausibility is that 
the reorientation In question is one which is limited to the use 
of leisure. The city-state, a society unused to the material 
circumstances which allow leisure has. willy-nilly, created Just 
those circumstances. It is therefore faced with what to do with 
that leisure. Some uses -what might be loosely covered by 
hedonism- will corrupt the broadly military structures which led 
to the existence of leisure in the first place and without which 
it could not survive. Simply ignoring leisure, and translating 
society into a permanently armed camp, night also corrupt 
existing structures in the way that, say, soldiers who do not 
regularly fight real wars, will either lose their ability to 
fight or will turn that ability to inappropriate uses such as 
revolution. " Only the acknowledgment of the need to fill leisure 
with the6ria will avoid the corruption of the existing state. 12 
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low this fits in rather well with' the picture just presented of 
the likely audience of the Eff. If the audience are battle- 
hardened men over the age of thirty, it seems. highly plausible 
that they may f ind it rather difficult to occupy their leisure 
or, indeed, to recognize that leisure has any part to play in the 
good life. Clearly such people, hard nosed nen of affairs, do 
exist, and there is no reason to understand anything in Aristotle 
as denying the existence of such an character. So the account 
does have an initial psychological plausibility. 
Xore importantly, the underlying strategy of the approach is 
coherent. The general problem is, roughly speaking, to account 
for the fact that the audience is already good, whilst at the 
sane time acknowledging that the EN is intended to improve its 
menbers. Since leisure is, we night say, ethically ring-fenced. 
any changes in its use could be entertained without affecting the 
non-leisured life and its goodness. 13 
There are two issues that the development of this sort of account 
must address. Firstly, it must shew how the current values of the 
audience's leisured lives fall short of perfection by failing to 
acknowledge the primacy of the8ria, whilst remaining broadly 
good. Secondly, it must say something about how the concept of 
leisure is ethically ringfenced, how the reasons for leisured 
action are related to non-leisured action. 
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Beginning with the f irst issue, two possibilities suggest 
themselves. Firstly, the practical objects of the audience'S 
interest are perfectly correct and proper, it's just that, as men 
of affairs, they take an exclusive interest In them when they 
should be taking an interest In practical matters which is 
subject to and is tested by the clains of tbp8rin. Alternatively, 
although the objects in which the practical person is interested 
are inappropriate, his way of approaching them displays an 
attitude -a broadly tleoretical attitude- which when reorientated. 
towards more noble objects, will allow the life of the8ria. 
On whatever understanding we have Of the role of the6ria in 
Aristotle's good life. it doesn't completely purge the goodness 
from practical ends such as honour. If we understand the6ria as 
being the sole constituent of the wholly good life, then goods 
such as hanour will still have goodness as means to the end of 
the6ria. If, alternatively, we understand the8ria as only one 
good, albeit perhaps the most Important, in a life of other 
autonomous goods, goods such as honour will possess goodness in 
their own right, even if that goodness nay. in some sense, be at 
least conditioned by the supreme good of the8ria. 14 
Given the doctrine of the mean (EN 11 6 1106a26-1107a27). it 
seems that we can go wrong in two ways in pursuing goods such as 
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honour: we can pursue then too much or too little (of EN IV 4 
1127bl7-20). Since the hypothesis is that we are dealing with an 
audience of practical men, the danger will not be that they will 
pursue honours too little. Accordingly, we must assume that the 
audience are pursuing practical goods such as honour too much, 
and that the EX is intended to remedy this excess of interest by 
shewing the audience the reasons for pursuing such goods in the 
correct, less single minded way. 
I have already mentioned that there is more than one 
understanding of the role played by the activity of tbp6ria in 
the good life. At one extreme, there will be the view that the 
goodness of any good nust be explained by its relationship to 
the8ria# whether as an external cause, an instance, or by 
sinilitude. At the other, although the goodness of any good will 
not be explained by the goodness of tho-Bria, the fact that 
theAria is th! 3 best good nust at least affect the ranking of 
those other goods in some way. I shall style the former view the 
#strong account', and the latter view the 'weak account'. 
The effect of learning about the importance of the-Aria on the 
strong account is reasonably clear: the whole of the agent's 
understanding of the goodness of all her goods is liable to be 
changed. So let us put the strong account aside for the moment. 
If I can prove that, even on the weak account, the change 
required in any given type of practically minded audience is too 
great to be entertained on an Aristotelian understanding of 
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agency, and, accordingly, the given type of audience cannot 
be 
that to which the EN is addressed, the same consequence will 
apply a fortiori to the strong account. 
A very weak example of a weak account is the following. A 
practically minded man attends the EN lectures. He learns that 
everything he thinks good Is inferior to a good attainable by 
another theoretically minded character. He feels his place in the 
world to be a little more humble as a result of this discovery, 
but, otherwise, sticks to his last and carries on with his 
ethical system unchanged. Now, this increase in humility must 
produce some change in his actions (see also S2.00 above). He 
will, for example, think hinself rather worse in relation to the 
theoretically minded and, thus, be rather more willing to 
sacrifice his own interests in favour of such individuals than 
previously either directly in his own actions, or Indirectly by 
countenancing a political system which favoured the theoretically 
over the practically minded. Given Aristotle's encomia on 
thpSrix, particularly In Book I of the EX, it is hard to see how 
a life that contained rather a lot of Jhr&1J& wouldn't be better 
and more divine, ceteris paribus, than one which did not: 
whatever the influence on one's, own objectives, it is thus surely 
unavoidable that the practical man should acknowledge as his 
better someone like Aristotle or Plato, and so reorder his ethics 
that his life is regarded as less good and, consequently, able to 
be sacrificed, at least in part, in favour of the lives of his 
theoretically minded betters. 
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If we consider Aristotle's portrait of great souledness 
(megalopsuchla -EN IV 3 1123a34-1125a35), a virtue which is the 
crowning ornament of all virtue (ibid 1124al-4), the radical 
nature of such a shift in world view becomes apparent. The great 
souled man is not just someone who has a proper estimation of his 
abilities and deserts, but rather someone who thinks himself 
worthy of great things and actually is worthy of them MY IV 3 
1123bl-2). Although the stage In the dialectical argument reached 
in Book IV suggests that the greatest good we can offer to the 
gods is honour, and thus the greatest good to which mankind can 
aspire is hanour from our fellow citizens (EY IV 3 1123bl7-22). 
by the time we reach Book X, it is clear that this provisional 
conclusion must be revised in favour of the view that the 
greatest good to which mankind can aspire is imitation of the 
gods through the8r1a and the divine favour consequent on such 
activity (cf EN X8 1179&22-32). 16 If a great souled man living 
for human honours turned up to Aristotle's lectures and took 
their central message on board, he would either have to revise 
his own objects of pursuit away from human honours, to the6ria, or 
else accept that he was not himself capable of the best and was 
thus not capable of being a great souled man. 
Vhat should we conclude from this? If Aristotle's audience were 
hard headed practical men, the discovery of the supreme worth of 
thedr1a should come as a radical shock. Either they would have 
completely to revise their ethical view, or they would dismiss 
Aristotle's arguments as just the sort of airy-fairy stuff to be 
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expected from a philosopher. Given the nature of the contents of 
the EN (see, eg, chapter one, S 2.01). the former is 
psychologically implausible; and the latter alternative view 
would lead to the EN's having no practical purpose. Given that I 
have already argued that the audience consists of men over the 
age of thirty, already schooled in the military and political 
life of a city state, we should by reductio ad absurdum conclude 
that the EN cannot be intended to produce a shift in the 
audience's worldview even of this nininal kind. 
One reason why this conclusion may have appeared Initially less 
obvious is that it is concealed by the gra-mmar of 'valuing'. If I 
first value the practical goods such as hanours highly, and am 
then led by the influence of the EN to value then less highly, it 
looks as though we are talking about a fairly minor quantitative 
change which is psychologically very plausible. That this can't 
be assumed simply from the persistence of 'valuing' through the 
change can be seen as follows. If I value a painting at t500 and 
later change my mind and value it at 4500,000, it is not to the 
point for me to claim that my change of mind Is fairly trivial 
because, even though the figures have changed, I valued the 
painting both before and after my change of mind. Getting the 
figure right Is to the point, not just the fact that I put some 
value on the work. As we have already seen, Aristotle thinks that 
the characteristic way of going wrong isn't to ISmore the value 
of certain goods, but rather to value then too much or too little 
(see this section, above). 
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Another way of drawing attention to the correctness of this 
reductio is through a distinction which has been made by some 
writers between two levels of ethical judgment. "- The general 
proposal is that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
Judgments of the form Ix is good' or Ix is beautiful', and 
Judgements of the form 11 must fl or 'I ought to j'. (I shall 
style the former evaluations and the latter practical 
Judgements. Of these two levels, the practical Judgments are 
dependent on and, in some sense, derived from the evaluations. 17 
Vould we call a person good who made the correct evaluations but 
made the wrong practical Judgments? Ve might think her better or 
at least more redeemable than the psychopath who failed to notice 
that there were needs and wants and goods that had to be taken 
account of in some way; but such extreme cases of ethical 
blindness are rare, so rare that we explain them as being the 
result of mental illness. The normal case of wickedness is 
soneone who gets the balance wrong, who thinks that it would be a 
good thing if everyone got what they wanted, but, given the 
choice between himself and other people, chooses himself. In 
educating a child, the child is not complimented for recognizing 
that other children have needs and wants -and then disregarding 
them, she is punished if she doesn't act in certain ways in 
certain circumstances. Again, what counts is getting the balance 
right, not just noticing that there Is a balance to be struck. If 
hard-nosed men of affairs notice that the6r1a is good, and 
practical goods are also good, but think that thp8rlm is really 
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pretty trifling while practical goods are what is really 
important, they are displaying precisely one instance of a 
paradigm case of badness of character, not the initial stages of 
goodness. 
lone of this should be taken as denying that the El might 
exercise an influence on the character of its audience at the 
margins: the audience night be excited to pursue philosophy 
rather more vigorously than they had in the past. But what I am 
arguing is that the EN can't be seen as an attempt at 
wholehearted conversion'O: that if the EN attempts to promote the 
goodness of the8ria, the audience must already have acknowledged 
that goodness in their pre-lecture lives. And being a hard nosed 
man of affairs who suddenly, as it were, finds himself with 
leisure and no idea of how to fill it, will not do as a model. 
Another approach to the issue of the pre-lecture state of the 
audience would be to clain that, although they were interested in 
practical goods rather than the goods of the6ria, that interest 
was of a theoretical kind. The suggestion would then be that the 
lectures build on this theoretical interest and attempt to lead 
it towards worthier objects. 
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The suggestion again has a great deal of initial plausibility. 
Perhaps its strongest suit is. tbat it provides an account of why 
the audience would have bothered to turn up to hear Aristotle in 
the first place. On the account sketched in the preceding 
section, it remained problematic why a man of business should 
have been initially enticed into the Lyceum: are we perhaps to 
imagine that the lectures were billed as being sophistical 
exercises suitable for practical advantage, some such trickery 
concealing their true nature until the audience were safely 
inside? On the present suggestion, there is no difficulty in 
providing a plausible psychological account. Aristotle is turning 
his philosophical expertise to the practical world: since the 
audience already have a, loosely, philosophical attitude to the 
practical world, it isn't surprising that they want to take 
advantage of the opportunity to learn from him. 
Quite apart from its general psychological plausibility, the 
approach fits in rather well with some obvious trends of thought 
within the corpus. The evolution from experience in practical 
matters, through learning about the reasons for acting, to the 
end point of a full blown theoretical interest in divine rather 
than mundane objects, is a progression specifically cited in the 
Xetapbysics as typifying human development (see Meta 11 and 2). 
Xoreover, in the BY, although theoretical reason is defined by 
the invariability of its objects, there are gestures towards the 
existence of a more-than-practical interest in practical 
matters. 19 
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On this account, the audience would be made up of people who have 
a philosophical interest in practical matters. The EX would serve 
to reorientate their lives by detaching this philosophical 
interest from the inappropriate object of practical life and 
reattaching it to the appropriate divine object. low, in a 
culture, and over a number of generations, there Is nothing 
implausible in such a general progression. At the level of the 
individual family one might consider, for example, the case of 
innigrants. The parents, say, have virtues of application and 
intelligence which they apply to building up a family fortune in 
business: the children have the same virtues, but, cushioned from 
the need to make ends meet by inherited wealth, turn those 
virtues to becoming art connisseurs or scholars. What is 
plausible within one family is equally if not more plausible 
within a whole culture. 
Before dealing with such an account head on, we need to note 
firstly that the account of the progression from practical to 
theoretical life in the Netaphysics is clearly at a general, 
cultural level rather than at the level of the individual. 
Xoreaver, although the EN does hint at a more than theoretical 
interest in practical matters, nothing is said about how such an 
interest night evolve Into a theoretical interest in theoretical 
objects. So nothing in the textual evidence compels an 
interpretation which suggests an evolution from a theoretical 
interest in practical matters to a theoretical interest in 
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theoretical matters within an individual's life, although the 
text certainly does allow such an interpretation. 
Accordingly, if the account is to be adopted, It nust rest on its 
psychological plausibility. Vhat then are we to imagine the 
audience of the EN to have been doing before they attended the 
lectures? Perhaps we should imagine an ancient analogue to the 
businessman who has developed a love for the intricacies of 
business life -pursuing paper qualifications in commercial 
subjects; engaging in the work of professional societies- in 
excess of the demands of profit-naking. Can we imagine that the 
EN might detach his enthusiasm from, say, marketing and reattach 
it to, say, theology? To do BO is, I suggest, to misunderstand 
the nature of a theoretical interest. If someone is enthusiastic 
about marketing, they love mrketing- it is the object of their 
enthusiasm which keeps them enthusiastic. To suggest that such a 
condition of mind is detachable from its objects is to 
misunderstand it: the nore the person has a non-practical 
interest in an object, the less likely he is to abandon that 
object in favour of another, because to love an object is to 
regard that object as being good. 20 I conclude therefore that the 
suggestion that the aim of the Eff Is to detach a theoretical 
interest from practical matters and reassign it to divine matters 
lacks psychological plausibility and, accordingly, in the absence 
of positive textual support, should be abandoned. 
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Vhat does perhaps lend a superficial plausibility to this sort of 
account is that it is undoubtedly true that practical men of a 
studious cast of mind do reorientate their lives In retirement: 
thus, it is no means rare for someone in a learned professiono 
such as a doctor, to turn to a subject such as Classics in 
retirement. But this change in life doesn't necessarily represent 
a change in the agent's ethics or psychology: the doctor nay have 
always regarded Classics as a fine pursuit, but one that the 
circumstances of her life prevented her from pursuing. Now that 
the circumstances have changed, she can put her Interest into 
effect. It is worth noting here that we are probably again 
encouraged into a misleading train of thought by the grammar of 
'valuing'. Almost everyone values, in some sense, the aspects of 
a good life that are proposed by serious thinkers. Thus, almost 
no one thinks that fine art has no value whatsoever. but many 
think it, say, only a fit pursuit for Sunday afternoons after the 
proper business of stockbroking has occupied the week. 
Analogously, we wouldn't say that an agent who, within a 
lifetime, goes from being a stockbroker and Sunday painter to a 
full-time and starving painter, hasn't changed: as Aristotle 
surely hints in his talk about ends and means in practical 
reason, when we talk about what a person is like, it isn't enough 
to remain at the level of the ends everyone acknowledges, we need 
details about what, to put it roughly, that person is prepared 
to do to realize those ends. 21 
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The reflections in the final paragraph In 94.03 should prompt us 
to return to the second issue raised in §4.01: how to distinguish 
the concept of leisure from non-leisure. The two interpretations 
discussed in 94.02 and S4.03 both, roughly, sketched the audience 
as hard-nosed men of business with time on their hands. Both 
intepretations failed because it is difficult to see how someone 
can really be a hard-nosed practical agent at the same time as 
she is a person who thinks the8ria highly important. The more 
plausible the latter claim, the more difficult it is to see why 
the EN is needed: it gives only high level, general guidance; if 
someone truly thinks thp6rlm important, why does she need to be 
reninded of thisl' (Does the retiring doctor need to be reminded 
that she can now spend time on her hobby? ) The more plausible the 
former claim, the less likely that person is to be a fit auditor 
of the lectures as any change in character is too radical for the 
pre-lecture agent to have been regarded as good. 
I do not assume that the two possibilities sketched above exhaust 
intepretations of the claim that the audience's leisured lives 
should be reorientated. But their failure indicates, I suggest, a 
fundamental flaw which will arise in any account based on a 
certain understanding of leisure. One understanding of leisure is 
what might be described as the 'holiday' version. This version 
might go that for some agents, there are certain stretches of 
tine that are filled with work, and there are other periods of 
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tine which aren't. So the question for agents in this fortunate 
position is how to fill these empty periods. Two sorts of general 
approach suggest themselves: either the holiday should be devoted 
to recuperation or some other way of making the agent more fit 
for the next bout of work; or it should be devoted to an activity 
which is different and separate from work, but which is, in some 
sense, compatible with the work: it doesn't, for example. render 
the agent physically incapable of fulfilling her tasks. Let US 
put aside the first possibility as suggesting a wholly foreign 
instrumental interpretation of Aristotle's view of the6ria. The 
second interpretation goes on to suggest that the holiday is 
filled with the8ria because any alternative is incompatible with 
the period of work. 
A nuance needs to be introduced into the claim before it can be 
taken seriously. As it stands, it rather suggests that any old 
filling for leisure would do, Just so long as it doesn't mess up 
the really important business of the working life. This obviously 
won't do. Whatever Aristotle does think, he doesn't think that 
thpArla is good Just because, say, it doesn't upset the digestion 
of a lawyer. So the claim must be amended to something like this: 
the fact that an agent can pursue the8rigi in leisure and the 
practical life of a citizen during the non-leisured time reveals 
rather than constitutes the goodness of the6ria. If human beings 
couldn't find such a life workable and good, then it couldn't be 
good; but their finding it workable and good isn't (necessarily) 
the basis for its goodness. 
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Vhat is wrong with the holiday concept lies in the very idea of 
leisure as a discrete part within a life which needs to be filled 
rather than an aspect of the whole life. It is a common 
observation that someone who enjoys his work becomes increasingly 
unable to distinguish between working and leisure: -the two 
categories blur. As I shall go on to argue later in this thesis, 
for Aristotle, the truly virtuous agent enjoys what he must do, 
and has to do what he enjoys: again, there is a blurring of the 
distinction between the enjoyable and the necessary. Now, if we 
pursue this sort of thought, leisure is no longer a holiday, but 
rather equivalent to a lack of constraint by external 
circumstances. A man of leisure isn't someone who doesn't engage 
in hard and unpleasant tasks: he is someone who chooses to do 
what he does, regardless of whether It is hard and unpleasant, 
rather than being compelled to act by external circumstances, 
such as lack of food (cf EN 111 1 1110al-19). In this case, the 
question as to how to spend one's leisure isn't to be understood 
as referring to holidays, but rather to one's whole life: how to 
spend a life which isn't constrained by the need to make money or 
wage continual war, and so on. 
Given this interpretation of the question, an answer which is of 
the same kind as an answer which night be given to the 
pensioner's 'How do I spend my retirementV is misplaced. It is 
open to me, at the age of thirty, say, to choose how to spend my 
next vacation or even my retirement: that period of time hasn't 
happened yet and is, moreover, ethically narked off from the rest 
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of my life as a time for a different kind of pursuits. It isn't 
open to ne, again at the age of thirty, to be quite so open to 
the question: 'How do I spend my life? ' My mind, on that matter, 
is likely to have been largely made up. So, if the audience to 
the EN is mature, which I have argued it is, on the second 
understanding of leisure, it will be unable to contemplate a 
radical reorientation in its life which means, roughly. that it 
will go on leading the sa sort of life after the lectures as it 
led before. The conception of leisure as an unconstrained life 
denies that it can be ethically ring fenced and doesn't, 
accordingly, allow any way out of the original paradox of a 
reorientation of lives when the audience is already ethically 
mature and good. 
Ve need therefore to turn to the textual evidence to see whether. 
Aristotle can be regarded as understanding leisure under the 
'holiday' conception or under the *unconstrained life' 
conception. Aristotle's treatment of leisure is chiefly in two 
places in the Politics (Pol VII 13 1334al-b5; Pol VIII 2 1337b22- 
1338a3O). Nuch in both these passages can be read either way. A 
crucial passage for my interpretation is, however, 1337b33- 
1338a3, where a distinction Is relied on between between play 
(paldla) and leisure (--*hn1A). Pmidln is for the sake of 
inactivity or rest, for recuperating in order to return refreshed 
to the struggle, while re-hnIA as bAtinnA widAlmnnIA and ta ZAa 
wuRkArjAg (1338al-2) is rather to be characterized as activity par 
excellence (see eg EN 17 1098al6-20). Given this distinguishing 
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of rnhnIA from paidla precisely on the ground that paidia is non- 
work and that, accordingly, would be able to be filled with any 
sort of activity and would remain separate from the values of 
work, whilst RchnIA is rather everyday life stripped of its need 
to make compromises with necessity, and its values rather a 
heightening of the values of workaday life rather than something 
completely separate, I conclude that Aristotle's 'leisure' is to 
be understood as an *unconstrained life' rather than as a 
'holiday'. As a result, reorientating leisure will not provide an 
account which can reconcile the, as yet unresolved, paradox of 
changing an audience which apparently stands in no need of such 
reorientation. 
The failure of the attempt to account for the reorientation of 
lives by restricting the influence of this reorientation to 
leisure does not, of course, entail that no account of 
reorientation could succeed. It does. however, heighten the 
problem which we have faced: how to reconcile reorientation with 
the pre-existent goodness of the audience. If the audience were 
very bad, then the general guidance of the EN would benefit then: 
however, Aristotle is very clear that such an audience would not 
heed his lectures. Even if the audience were not so nuch bad, not 
ax murderers and muggers and the like, but rather hard headed men 
of business, it again seems unlikely that anything Aristotle says 
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could sway them fro= their existing lives . 22 The Instinct Of 
the` 
'leisure solution' was sound: to nake reorientation more 
plausible by restricting Its effects to a discrete part of a 
life. Is I have argued. however, this attezpted solutiou fails 
and we are thrown back to considering either bow an entire life 
could be rearientated or how a part of a life could be separated 
off and the reorientation confined to that part. The burden of 
proof. I suggest, Is now firnly with anyone who wishes to argue 
either version of reorientation as a purpose for the BIT, and 
there. for the noment, I shall leave it and turn to other 
possible purposes. 
Vith the failure of the reorientation model, the obvious 
conclusion Is that the EN Isn't Intended to change its audience 
at all. JL solution based on this assu=ption might be that the 
goodness of the audience's practical life is under attack fro= 
the arguments of those such as the platonists and the Sophists* 
To respond to such attacks, the audience =st articulate its Own 
existing unreflective life or else, Pied Piper like, be led to 
its destruction. Aristotle Ira accordingly the Burke of fourth 
century Athens: giving an inarticulate conservatism the 
Intellectual tools to preserve itself. As Broadle puts it: 
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Aristotle says that good arguments do not make us good 
people, but it does not follow that bad ones might not help 
to make us bad. 23 
The f irst thing to notice about this claim is that it is a 
dramatic weakening of what would otherwise apear to be fairly 
explicitly claimed In the Elf: as noted in chapter one, the EN 
does seen to promise some sort of improvement In the audience 
rather than a nere damming up of threatened floodwaters. 
Secondly, even though this claim is considerably weaker than that 
which seems actually to be made by the EN, it does in the 
abstract seem a not unimportant contribution to the good of the 
world that can be made by philosophy. But even If the claim is 
true in general, can it be true of the audience of the EX? Can it 
be true that the audience of the EN needs to engage in 
philosophical reflexion because it is in danger of going wrong in 
its ethics precisely by engaging in such reflexion? There appear 
two sorts of possibility. Either the audience has already been 
thrown into confusion by the attacks of the social critics and 
needs to re-establish its ethical equilibrium; or it believes 
itself likely to be so confused in the future and is seeking to 
forearm itself. The time difference between these two 
possibilities is in fact accidental: whether the level of ethical 
disintegration resulting from radical philosophies has reached 
its climax by the time the hapless agent reaches the haven of 
Aristotle's lecture room being surely a matter of chance. Both 
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possibilities assume that ethical reflexion on its own has the 
power to undo a good ethical education. 
As far as the text of the EN goes, although Broadie is correct 
that the contention that arguments do not nake us good doesn't 
formally entail that bad arguments don't make us bad, she almost 
certainly misrepresents Aristotle in expressing the matter thus. 
Aristotle talks of arguments having no effect on the mass of 
people because they pursue base rather than noble pleasures (EY X 
9 1179blO-20). Since such people do not form part of the 
audience, and in any case, are just waiting for an excuse, 
whether derived from philosophy or elsewhere, to pursue their 
ignoble lives, we can set this category aside as irrelevant for 
present purposes. He also talks of arguments having the power to 
stimulate noble youths to virtue (1179W-9). I have argued that 
this should not be read as meaning that the EN is intended to 
teach virtue. If I am correct In this, then could it still be the 
case that argument could teach vice? This seens an even stronger 
claim than the claim on the teaching of virtue which I have 
rejected; for, in the case of virtue, the arguments fit in with 
the previous education of the youths -they have been brought up 
to have a genuine love of what is noble- whilst in the case of 
vice, it goes against that education and the ingrained habits 
derived f rom it. Even if I an wrong in my contention that 
argument cannot teach virtue, Aristotle seems to hold that it can 
only be taught because the previous education of the youth has 
prepared the way f or the EX: in the case of vice, previous 
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education would work against rather than in favour of its 
acceptance. (I shall have nore to say in this vein shortly. ) 
Remaining with the text, the virtuous adult for Aristotle is 
before almost everything else, stable and not easily shif ted, 
even to the point of indifference (Eff 1 10 1100b15-22; ibid 
110la6-13; IV 3 1124al2-19). The sheer inertia of virtue should 
therefore make it unlikely that anything, including corrupting 
arguments, could shift the virtuous towards vice. 
Finally, there is the lack of argument In the text which is 
specifically addressed to the sort of challenges that 
conservative Greeks night fear. It Is reasonable to assume that 
the two sorts of challenge most prevalent would be that of the 
radical rationality of Platonism and the ethical scepticism of 
the Sophists. Although there are arguments and tendencies in the 
EN which can be seen as responses to both these poSitionS24 the 
overall shape and detail of the Eff do not seen particularly well 
suited to the task of combating these errors, and the 
overwhelming impression to be gained from the text Is one of a 
philosopher in dialogue with sympathetic interlocutors rather 
than hostile ones . 26 
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None of the above points are conclusive, although together, they 
constitute, I suggest, strong evidence that it Jr. unlikely that 
Aristotle intended the EN to provide reasons for preserving an 
existing good. Moving beyond the text, let us say that I have 
listened to a bad philosopher and he has convinced me that 
killing wives is a good thing. Two conditions could result: I. 
might actually go about marrying and then killing my wives; or I, 
might become a sort of academic Bluebeard, content to expound my 
bloodthirsty views in learned journals, but otherwise leading a 
blameless life. Now, in the first case, I am clearly a murderer 
and a bad man. My plea that I have been rationally convinced of 
the strength of the case for uxoricide Is not an excuse. In most 
cases, the normal reaction to such a claim would be not to take 
it at its face value: it might be supposed that I had been led 
astray by the personal attractiveness or charisma of the bad 
philosopher rather than by the quality of his arguments. But let 
us say that I persist in my claim. There night be circumstances 
in which I would be believed. Take, for example. the persistent 
claims that Heidegger was an enthusiastic Nazi. putting aside 
whether or not this claim is true, if he had come out and said 
that he was fully convinced by the prograx- of the Nazi party 
and that this support was a natural consequence of a lifetime of 
philosophical thought, then be night well have been reasonably 
believed: it night ultimately be a more reasonable hypothesis 
than the alternative of assuming that he had been swayed by. says- 
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the personal attractiveness of Hitler. But what should we 
conclude from the acceptance that he was actually convinced? 
Certainly not that he is somehow excused any crimes he committed 
as a consequence: if anything, it makes the crime worse, not more 
forgivable. 
At first sight, this is hard to understand. If it is some sort of 
excuse that you were swept up by Hitler's personality, why should 
it not be a better excuse that you thought long and hard about 
Nazism and you came to accept it? At least the latter excuse has 
in its favour, it might be argued, that some effort went into the 
choice, that at least the intellectually convinced Nazi realized 
that the choice was a serious one, a moral one, rather than a 
matter to be settled by passing enthusiasm. And, yet, it is 
surely in this seriousness of attention that the problem with the 
excuse arises. 
A plausible view of intellectual development is that embodied in 
the Scottish, indeed, most European education systems. Consider 
the intellectual history of a university professor, say, of 
French literature. She will have attended a primary school where 
she was taught to write connected prose, to pay attention, to 
work with others. Later, she will have attended a secondary 
school where she will have studied French and other subjects 
germane to the study of literature, firstly at a basic level, 
then at a more advanced one, sitting public examinations to test 
conpetence at each stage. Thereafter, she will have attended 
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university where she will have run the ga-lt of undergraduate and 
graduate studies. 
Vhat is to be drawn from all this? At each stage in her education 
which will lead her to her professorial chair, she has developed 
skills and knowledge which will be built on in the next stage. 
Now, if there is failure at any stage, it is not just the 
effectiveness of that stage which is put into question. but the 
success of the previous stages. If. for example, students having 
passed their Highers at seventeen are delivered to the 
universities where they all fail their degrees, then not only is 
the university system subject to criticisn, but also the 
secondary school system. Analogously, if Heidegger's intellectual 
career led him to the point that he could be convinced that 
Nazism was a good thing, then it Is not just the period of his 
life at which he accepted Nazism that becomes subject to 
criticism, but the career that led up to it. An education is a 
progression: if that progression leads to a bad ending, then it 
is not just the ending which Is flawed but the progression 
towards it. 
Iow it might be objected that this idea of progression in 
intellectual education is fair enough, but that individual 
failure at any one stage does not throw the previous stages under 
suspicion. Just because soneone passes an G-grade examinations 
does not mean that she will pass her Higher examination, does not 
mean that she will get a First, does not nean that she will get a 
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Ph D. There are a couple of points to be made here. Firstly, this 
objection might be understood as the claim that the failure of 
one person does not throw a system into doubt. This is 
unquestionably true: accidents do happen, and what occurs in the 
life of one person nay Just be an accident which" has no 
repercussions for the lives of others. So it might be the case 
that Heidegger's (putative) Nazism has no implications for his 
philosophical system: it was just an accident of Heidegger's 
personality. But in this case, surely we have rejected his claim 
that he was rationally convinced: it wasn't really the 
intellectual qualities of Nazism that attracted him, it was the 
uniforms, the music, something accidental. But if we think that 
Heidegger becane a Nazi because of what he had learned and taught 
up to that tine, then we must question those earlier stages, just 
as if we are convinced that a student has failed at university 
because of what has been taught in his secondary school, we must 
question the secondary school. 
Secondly, there is the type and degree of failure. It is natural 
to expect a petering out over a period of education, so that. for 
instance, someone who did well at secondary school might do 
moderately at undergrdauate level, might do badly at post- 
graduate level, and there would be nothing surprising in that 
ultimate failure. But It is not natural to expect a radical 
failure at any particular stage, so that it would be odd if 
someone who did exceptionally well at secondary school did 
exceptionally badly at university level. 
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How does this affect the EX and its audience? Remember that the 
situation is supposed to be one where the audience is in danger 
of going wrong through the influence of bad thinkers. Remenber 
also that unless this going wrong is of a particularly 
catastrophic kind, it becomes hard to understand how the broad 
guidance of the EN can help. Now such a situation is one where 
the intellectual and moral skills that the audience have learned. 
certainly up to the age of seventeen and, as I have argued, 
probably up to the age of thirty, have been insufficient to allow 
then to deal with these intellectual attacks, to allow them at 
least to smell a rat. Such a failure is a radical failure and 
consequently one where not just the influence of Platonists and 
Sophists is open to criticism, but more importantly, where the 
course of their education up to that time is also problenatic. 
Consequently, we are left with a picture of an audience that has 
gone badly wrong by listening to the philosophers, but also one 
that has been going badly wrong in its previous education. Such 
an audience is not one that appears to be in any way good, but 
rather paradigmatically bad. As such, it is hard to accept that 
it can be Aristotle's audience and, correspondingly, it is hard 
to accept that preserving its goodness is the aim of the EN. 
The other possibility that I suggested at the very beginning of 
this section was that the audience night be in danger of becoming 
or, indeed, might already be, academic Bluebeards as a result of 
the corrupting influence of bad philosophy. In such a case, they 
would think badly, but act (against their better Judgment) well. 
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Such a position might well be described as one of reverse 
akr-la, a weakness of the will which was, however, benign, as 
the will (or, better, intellect) was corrupt (cf Eff VII 2 
1146al6-21). 
low it is clear that there are many different ways in which the 
conflict in the academic Bluebeard can be realized. He may, for 
example, Just be enter-taining the idea of uxoricide: it may have 
just come to him in the course of writing a paper and he is 
merely pursuing the thought as far as it will go. On the other 
hand, he may well be absolutely convinced of the truth of his 
arguments and be making real attempts to overcome his reluctance 
to murder, perhaps building up his moral strength by strangling 
kittens or the like. So there Is once again a gamut to be run, at 
one end of which is the good man, momentarily puzzled by an 
errant thought, and, at the other, a bad man struggling to bury 
whatever good remains instinct in his character. As far as the 
academic world is concerned, the strength of conviction with 
which the idea is held is irrelevant: all that matters Is the 
quality of argument. But as far as the academic's moral character 
is concerned, It is of the utmost importance how strongly he 
holds the view. If he merely entertains the idea of uxoricide, 
then he can remain a good man; if he is convinced by it, then he 
becomes bad. 
It might be objected that this misses the point. A person starts 
by entertaining an idea; years later, she ends up by being 
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convinced by it. There is, in other words, a slippery slope from 
intellectual experimentation to corruption. Accordingly, the 
story rLight go, Aristotle's audience are on the nursery slopes of 
corruption because they have entertained the ideas of either 
Platonism or Sophistry: unless they are argued out of their 
notions now, then these will gradually take root and they will be 
transformed from academic to active Bluebeards. 
It is here, I suggest, that we need to return to the ideas 
already brought forward in this section. Intellectual development 
is a progression: the thinker who entertains the 'Bluebeard 
theory' has an intellectual history behind him in which, if he is 
to be counted as good up to that point, uxoricide has played no 
part. He then entertains an idea which is apparently repugnant to 
the whole system of thought in which he has been educated. What 
should he do? Well, In fact, the new theory isn't completely 
repugnant to what may be described as received wisdom: it must at 
least be supported by an argument which draws an received wisdom 
for it to be counted as even prima facie possible. Accordingly, 
what he should do is think about the new theory carefully and 
perhaps find arguments against it. But what if he can't? What if 
lie spends years and years seeking an answer to the problems posed 
by the new theory and he just can't prove them wrong? 
Bring this flight of fancy back to earth. late that we are 
talking about, in Aristotle's case, the challenge of ideas which, 
unlike the promotion of uxoricide, do not just affect part of a 
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system of thought, but which affect its very basis. If the EN 
with all its generalities is to be of use in countering alien 
behaviour, then that alien behaviour must be radically different, 
perhaps analogous to the challenge posed to conventional 
nineteenth century morality by Nietzsche. So we are to imagine, 
analogously, an Anglican divine with notbing to say against 
Nietzsche? That this man might spend years and years and find no 
reasoned arguments to put against Nietzsche's views? This -might 
be a theoretical possibility but, in practice, it is completely 
impossible. Human ideas just aren't like that. Vhat will make the 
divine become Zarathustra, the IraInkagathng- a convinced follower 
of Thrasymachus, is not the quality of abstract rationality of 
the arguments which support the new Ideas, but the individual's 
own moral character. If the individual has a sound moral 
character, he will resist the new ideas: he can continue to 
behave with the highest standards of academic rigour and 
propriety in that he nay take the arguments seriously, but take 
then seriously in trying to refute then rather in accepting them. 
And even if he as an individual cannot find the arguments to 
resist the new teachings, why should he not say, as Einstein in 
effect did in relation to quantum theory, that he simply could 
not believe it although the evidence to counter it was lacking at 
the time? It is irrational neither to be sceptical of one's own 
abilities to devise arguments, nor to doubt the abilities of 
one's age. 
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It Is to be concluded fron all this, I suggest, that an inability 
to be resistant to evil ideas, even if those evil ideas are 
apparently supported by good arguments, is no part of the 
character of the good and mature agent. Accordingly, if the 
audience are good and nature, and this I have argued. we must 
conclude that the intention of the Eff cannot be to preserve the 
audience's goodness. 26 
6.00: Conciusion 
I argued in chapter one that there was a central problem in 
understanding the intention behind the EX: to reconcile the claim 
that the EN was intended to improve its audience with the fact 
that its audience needed to be already good to benefit from the 
lectures. In that chapter, I argued against any view which 
suggested that the audience were not in fact fully and maturely 
virtuous. I also concluded that the area of improvement must be 
to enable the audience to do what the EN itself was doing. 
nanely, philosophical reasoning about ethics. 
In this chapter I considered what might be the point of such 
philosophical reasoning. I considered the suggestion that whilst 
the audience might already be living good lives, they might be 
reoriented to better lives. This possibility I rejected on the 
ground that such a suggestion undermined the current goodness of 
the audience's lives. I then considered the suggestion that 
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philosophical reasoning night be necessary not to improve but to 
defend lives. This possibility I rejected on the ground that the 
ability to preserve one's own goodness was an essential part of 
virtue. 
The major conclusion of the first two chapters is thus 
essentially negative: that the audience is not going to be 
substantially improved ethically by the ethical philosophy of the 
EN. Such a conclusion is endorsed by McDowell: 
-moving beyond the 'that' to tbe because, jzLigbt leave the 
't. hat' undisturbed. In fact I do not believe Aristotle 
suggest otherwise. He proceeds as if the content of a 
conception of doing well is fixed once and for all, in the 
nzinds of the sort of people be assumes bis audience to be, by 
their upbringing; as if moral development for sucb a person 
is over and done witb at the point wben bis parents send him 
out into the world to make his own life. There Is no 
suggestion that an increase In reflectiveness and 
explicitness will alter the substance of the conception. 27 
This leaves the problem of how the audience can be said to be 
improved by learning to philosophize, and It is to a positive 
account of a solution to this problem that I now turn. 
91 
Noter. to chapter two 
1. Vithin. the EX, Aristotle restricts the virtue of Rmphim to 
theoretical wisdom, and the virtue of phron6sis to practical 
wisdom. Vithin the coz-pus, the terms are used more flexibly 
of both sorts of wisdom and rationality. The context of the 
passage in the Netapbysics makes it clear that sophia here 
covers practical rationality. 
2. Eg Annas 1981, ppg-10. 
3. In the passage fron the Xetapbysics, Aristotle indicates that 
the man of no experience but possessing theory (Ingon ech8n) 
is often less effective than the man of experience alone. 
This does not entail that men of both experience and theory 
are not more effective than men of experience alone. However, 
nothing in Aristotle or life indicates that experience plus 
theory is always better than experience alone: a university 
professor of engineering might be nore honoured (cf 98la3l) 
than the mere practitioner, but the mere practitioner night 
still be better at getting certain jobs done (cf EN X9 
1180b7-28). 
4. Of course, one account which emphasized the need for a change 
in reasons for acting without any consequent change in 
effectiveness would be the Kantian, one: learn to act for the 
sake of the rightness of the action rather than any reasons 
external to morality. I avoid tackling Kantianism directly 
because, I suggest, it is now accepted -correctly so- that 
Kant and Aristotle are working in two ethical approaches so 
very different from each other, and that it follows that 
little light is to be expected as far as interpretation of 
Aristotle is concerned from examining a Kantian understanding 
of morality. (This is despite some noting of links between 
Kant and Aristotle in, for example, McDowell's 'Deliberation 
and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics' p19 (in Whiting 
ý& Engstrom) and Sherman 1989 passin). That said, a complete 
answer to a putative Kantian interpretation would take the 
lines sketched in my text: a change from obeying a 
hypothetical imperative to obeying the categorical imperative 
would normally result in a change in the sort of effects 
produced in the world. 
5. Vilkes in Rorty 1980, p354. 
6.1 should enphasize that this is not to assune that such 
possibilities are goods: merely that their being goods is 
conpatible with an understanding of eupraxia as inclusivisn, 
but not with Pnpraxla as, roughly, prudence, thus shewing 
that these two interpretations of eupraxia are distinct. 
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7. It would, in any case, be subject to the sort of criticism I 
level against any reorientation account: broadly, that the 
possibility of reorientation entails an existing failure an 
the part of the audience. 
8. Cf Broadie 1991, esp, pp391-398. 
9. Cf Wilson 1984 ppxii-xiii. 
10. A view expounded in Jaffa 1952. 
11. Xore subtly: the leisured cult of military life -militarism- 
is different from and more corrupt than a military life 
pursued out of necessity. 
12. Broadie 1991, pp419-427. 
13. By ethical ring fencing, I simply wish to nake the fairly 
uncontroversial point that what someone does and is like in 
his spare time Isn't necessarily connected with what he does 
or is like In his working time -leisure is, for the modern, a 
Saturnalia which has gained in frequency what it has lost in 
riot. 
14. The distinction between happiness as consisting in one good 
Cdominant end') or in several Cinclusive end') is discussed 
widely in the literature. See for example: JL Ackrill, 
Aristotle on eudaimonia, in Rorty 1980. Cf Kraut 1989, p8 
n13. 
15, Cf Jaffa 1952, ch vi, ppll6-141. 
16. See eg Wiggins 1991 and Hurley 1989. 
17. Of the two philosophers referred to in note 16 above, Wiggins 
treats evaluations as objective, whilst practical Judgements 
are subjective; Hurley, on the other hand, argues for the 
objectivity of both. 
18. Cf Annas 1993 who argues that ancient ethical theories always 
begin from the Individual's reflexion on her own life (plD 
and effect a reordering of that life, although Annas notes 
that Aristotle is rather conservative in the amount of 
reordering required (p440). Such a perspective Is inevitable 
given Annas' methodology which is to attempt to descry a 
pattern within ancient theories, since Hellenistic theories 
undoubtedly do attempt to effect such conversions (cf p58). 
19. Eg the quality of RimA-mig (EY VI 10 1142b34-1143al8). 
20. Eff VIII 2 1155b23-27. 
21. No one criticized Gauguin for being a Sunday painter; many 
criticized him for becoming a full-time artist. 
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22. The baleful influence of the word 'morality' and, to a lesser 
extent, 'ethics' is felt here. If the problem was stated so 
that it was a question of how the audience's char-acter rather 
than its morals or ethics night be changed, the 
implausibility of the Eff's effecting a change from 
practicality to theory would become more obvious. 
23. Broadie 1991, p24. Broadie goes an to argue that the 
articulation of the pre-reflective culture leads to its 
reorientation towards the6r1a, a conclusion which I would 
reject on the ground that articulation will reveal that the 
culture is already orientated towards +'hp8rla. 
24. Eg: against Platonism: the attack an the theory of ideas in 
Book I (EN 16 1096all-1097al4); the lauding of the practical 
life as truly albeit imperfectly good (BY X8 1178a9-10); 
against Sophistry: the need to distinguish the apparent from 
the truly good (EN VII 12 1152b25-33; the respect due to age 
and experience as opposed to argument (EIF VI 11 1143bll-14). 
25. Cf Broadie 1991 p387: 
the practical lessons of the Etbics are mostly such 
that, to begin to make a direct difference, they need 
only to be brought to the reflective attention of the 
persons in Aristotle's audience. 
But bringing something to relective attention isn't an 
argument, especially if it is a matter of an opponent who 
begins from a position sharply opposed to your own. 
26. The discussions of this section are obviously connected with 
Aristotle's claim in Book VI of the EbT that phrongsis and the 
ethical virtues are intimately linked. There is further 
discussion of this linkage will in chapter one of this 
thesis. 
27. McDowell in Vhiting & Engstrom. p3l. He goes an to note that 
it might be consistent with 'the spirit of Aristotelian 
ethics' to suppose that reflexion can bring forward moral 
development. I an somewhat less convinced; and, in any case, 
what is in point for present purposes is the interpretation 
of the text, which McDowell acknowledges precludes such a 
possibility. 
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Chapter three 
The political aim of the Ell 
The arguments of the previous chapters are intended to support the 
view that, whatever the marginal effects of the BY -and here we must, 
as always, remember that we are going to be talking hDa eRi la p2lur 
the character of the audience, what they are like, isn't going to be 
changed by the lectures. There is going to be no reorientation of 
their lives, since they are already mature and good. Moreover, there is 
no need for them to be afraid of their own corruption, because of the 
stability of their good character. 
If the aim of the Eff is to make the audience more effective, better at 
doing something, then matters cannot be left there. Vhat are the 
audience to be made better at? The answer here must be, broadly, moral 
philosophy since that is what the EN Itself is (see chapter one 
95.00). But what then is the point of this? A full and f inal answer to 
this will be given only in chapters nine to eleven of this thesis, 
where it will be argued that the point is to make the audience's 
existence more divine. For the moment, however, the answer is that the 
point of philosophizing is broadly political and that the audience are 
to be made better at politics: that after all is what Aristotle claims 
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to be concerned with (Eff 12 109010-11). If we add to this the rider 
that politics is prinarily concerned with making othem good (Ell X9 
1180b23-28), we can see that the general problems with reconciling the 
fairly broad guidance of the EN with the pre-existent goodness of the 
audience need no longer arise; for it is other people who are neither 
good nor nature who are to receive the benef it of the Eff. 
In this chapter, I shall consider this suggestion of political 
intention in the EN more closely. I shall argue that the p211a is a 
relationship of friendship between citizens and particularly between 
ordinary citizens and the authorities as phromimni. In order to pass 
on that structure intact to the next generation, what has remained 
inplicit in the relationship has to be made explicit. Part of this 
naking explicit is getting to articulate the character and mind of the 
phroninga. It is to this task that the EN is devoted and in the 
following chapters I shall turn to consider the content of this new 
understanding of the phrnnimas as revealed in the Eff. 
2.00- Understanding the RX poiltl=lly 
The understanding of the E-1 as being concerned with, broadly, 
political rather than moral improvement has considerable scholarly 
support. ' The preceding chapters are intended to give it fresh 
plausibility by indicating the difficulties that result from any 
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attempt to argue that the aim of the EN is to ef fect any sort of 
inprovement in character in the audience. 
The more specific claim that the EN is intended to provide the 
potential legislator with the skills to create the good palia is also 
not new. Such a claim would seen able to provide at least a general 
explanation as to how it is possible for the the EN to improve an 
already virtuous audience: however virtuous someone is, it does not 
follow that she possesses all possible skills. Bod6us for example 
argues that the Politics is intended to put into effect the teaching 
on PiAAinnnim advanced in the EN; the aim of the EN is accordingly to 
give the legislator an account of that happiness at which he is 
aiming. 2 As Vander Vaerdt points out, however, an account of the 
relationship between the EN and the Politics which assumes a simple 
neans-end relationship between the two has to explain why the good 
life as sketched in the Politics appears rather different from that 
indicated in the EN; and why the means to that good life appear, at 
the least, difficult to relate to the putative end as shewn in the EX.: 3 
Vander Vaerdt's own solution to this problem is to argue that the 
legislator has two purposes: firstly, to preserve the existing Ralia 
and its values; and secondly to steer those values towards the 
perfectly good life as set out in the EX. " In the Folitics as we have 
it, the discussion which would reconcile the account of the 
individual's Pudainn-niA in the EX with the accounts of the life of the 
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best city and the sort of laws which would be required by such a city, 
as well as the accounts of actual cities -all of which are indeed to 
be found in some form in our Politics- is simply missing. The account 
in the EN stands in need of completion and correction by these 
missing sections before it could be fully practically relevant. 
I shall not attempt a detailed refutation of Vander Vaerdt's approach 
here. I take it as a reasonable methodological assumption, however. 
that it is always preferable to attempt to understand a work as it 
exists without making perhaps tendentious assumptions about lost 
sections. If the Politics and the EN can be accounted for in roughly 
their existing shape, that account would at least have the advantage 
of making fewer assumptions about textual transmission. It is such an 
account that I shall now attempt to provide. 
2.01- Understanding the phronlinDs 
If we are talking about the EN being concerned with the formation of 
political craftsmen6 rather than with the audience's own ethical 
inprovement, what might we expect to find in its contents? Not, on any 
account, a simple recipe book where clearcut means are set out for the 
achievement of clearcut ends. Firstly, Aristotle is a pioneer and is 
aware of this fact (eg EX 17 1098a20-26). Not only are there 'no 
absolutely agreed an aims, but there have been very few attempts 
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consciously to deliberate an the means to achieving political and 
moral ends; and where these attempts have been made, they have been 
misdirected towards the end of martial prowess (EN X9 1180a24-29; 
Fol VII 2 13205-9). So any work an the political craft cannot take 
for granted the existence of a received body of conclusions: that is 
something that must be worked towards rather than received. Secondly, 
there is Aristotle's view on the nature of politics: since it deals 
with the world of the variable and Imprecise, its conclusions must be 
correspondingly variable and Imprecise (EX 13 1094bll-1095a6; VI 4 
1140al-2; ibid 1140bl3). 
Such considerations have led many scholars to regard the EN as being 
a work of dialectic. - The Topics contrasts demonstrative and 
dialectical reasoning thus; 
Beasoning is demomstratim lapodeixis] when it prvceeds fr*om 
premises wbicb are true and primary... Reasoning is dialectical 
wbicb reasons frx2n generally accepted opinions. (Top 100a25-30) 
Xoreaver, as the Topics makes clear later, there is always a certain 
ad bominam cast to dialectical reasoning: 
As far as the cboice of ground goes, the pbilosapber and the 
dialectician are making a similar inquiry, but the subsequent 
arrangement of material and the framing of questions are the 
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peculiar province of the dialectician; for such a proceeding 
always involves a relation with another party. On the other band, 
the philosopher and individual seeker does not care if, though 
the premisses by means of which his reasoning proceeds are trve 
and familiar, the answerer refuses to admit them.. (Top 155b10- 
23) 
Now it is certainly true that something unfortunate has happened in 
the history of the transmission of what were presumably lectures into 
manuscript and in their subsequent history up until the present day: 
the difficulties regarding the common books and the connexion between 
our text of the Folitics and that of the EN indicate that nuch. 7 But 
even apart from these accidents of transmission, there would remain 
sufficient reason, in the state of knowledge of the audience to whom 
the lectures were addressed, or in the difficulties of the subject 
matter worked upon, to explain a certain sprawlingness and lack of 
system in the EX. Indeed, part of the effectiveness and influence of 
the EN must be attributable to a certain lack of cohesion, in the same 
way that part of Shakespeare's influence is attributable to a certain 
unclassical breadth, or that contemporary fiction can provide ethical 
guidance in ways that more systematic philosophical treatments cannot. 
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A putative lack of system in the EN is mirrored in the claim that the 
principle Qmgm) which governs virtue is as the pbrnninnn would 
determine it (EN Il 6 1106b36-1107a2). Although this remark in itself 
does not rule out the further articulation of the principles or reasons 
used by the pl=nima -indeed Aristotle seems to regard laws as such 
an articulation (eg Pol 111 11 1287a32)- when coupled with the claim 
that moral Judgment is a form of migth&: ýir, (EN 11 9 1109b21-23), this 
does seem to suggest that any further articulation of ethical 
reasoning beyond the bald claim that what is reasonable is what seems 
to be the case to the phrnninns Is always going seriously to 
underdetermine the phroninns own process of Judgment. 
Now whether or not the EN is itself a work of phrands1s, it does 
appear to be intended in some sense to help us understand the 
phronlans, better: if this were not the case, it would for example be 
difficult to understand the articulation of the various virtues 
throughout Books II and VI, which appear precisely to attempt to 
develop what has previously been attributed to the simple mlAtUal- of 
the phrnnjnnr,. Given the practical purpose of the EN, the only reason 
for so doing must be to make the audience phrnninni, or at least More 
like pbrnnimni. But why? Since I have argued that the audience are 
already virtuous, it cannot be to make them ethically better. 
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In the Folitics, Aristotle notes that yhrnnAgir- is the only virtue 
which is peculiar to rulers rather than the ruled (Pol 111 2 1277b25- 
29). This connexion between phron6sls and political power is noted 
elsewhere. For example, in EN VI 5 1140a24-25. Aristotle approaches a 
definition of phronAsIs by considering what people we describe as 
phrnn1nn1. In the ensuing discussion, Aristotle noves from an initial 
attempt to define the pbrnnianr- at being good at deliberating about 
his own life (1140a26-27) to the definition of the phrnninng, as being 
skilled at deliberating about what is good for human beings in general 
(1140bg-10; cf 1140b4-6,1140b20-21). The phrnninng thus defined is 
then described by Aristotle as being identical not with the good man 
simpliciter, but rather with the expert in household management or 
politics, the specific example being the politician, Pericles (1140b7- 
11). 
Now, I have already relied on the claim that phr=4ýsls and ethical 
virtue are interdependent, so that no one can be completely virtuous 
without possessing phronAsls nor completely phrorinng without being 
ethically virtuous. If the thesis Is to be defended that, in some way, 
the Eff is intended to give the audience a skill (using this word in a 
broad, non-technical sense) so that they can be rulers and, hence, 
lawgivers -since rulers must be legislators (Fol 111 10 1286a2l-22)- 
that skill cannot be phronAslR simpliciter an pain of admitting that 
the audience do not yet possess that virtue and, hence. are not 
virtuous. On the other hand, if the skill to be produced by the EN 
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isn't phronAsls, this suggests that the audience are already 
phrnninni and, hence, In no need of a series of lectures helping then 
to become such. 
I shall offer here a number of possible solutions to this apparent 
paradox without making a final decision between then. It nay indeed be 
the case that no one solution should be expected. 
2.03- Vhat skill is prntitic-i by the EN? 
One solution would be to claim that while the audience are already 
phrnninni, that is, expert practical reasoners, this does not entail 
that this expertise cannot be improved on. Aristotle notes that the 
term 'doctor' is used both of the ordinary practitioner, the master of 
the craft QIQ architektonikos) and the cultivated amateur, all of 
Whose Voices have a certain authority (Pol 111 6 1282a5-7). 
Analogously, although we call experts in politics and household 
management phrnninni, because they can discern the human good (EN VI 
5 1140b9-11), it seems unlikely that Aristotle means that all 
phrnnInni are equally adept in all situations. Pericles, for example, 
whilst noted as a phrnnimos Ubid 1140b8), was notorious for having 
brought up his children badly (Protagaras (319d-320b): this would 
appear to be a situation where expertise in politics was not matched 
by expertise in household management. Such a distinction within 
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phron6sis would appear in any case consonant with common sense. It 
might be the case, therefore, that although the audience are p"hrnnjnr)1 
adept at sone aspects of phron6sis, they are not adept at politics; 
and it is with phron6sis in this area that the EY is concerned. 
An alternative solution would be to claim that possession of phrongsis 
is not synonymous with being a phron4inng. Aristotle is concerned in 
Eff VI 5 1140a24ff to elucidate the concept of phrondsis by analyzing 
the presumably more accessible concept of the pbroni-rongt. low while it 
certainly must be the case that the phronimos possesses, as a 
necessary condition of so being, Rhrongsls, it does not follow that 
the possession of ph=4ýsis is sufficient to establish someone as a 
phronimos, any more than it is the case in English that the 
possession of wisdom by a woman is sufficient to establish her as a 
'wise woman'. (In an example from Aristotle, which is perhaps 
analogously counter intuitive, he states that not all participants in a 
relationship of philia are necessarily philoi GE VII 4 123ga4-5)). In 
this case, it would be possible for the audience to possess phrongsis 
without those further qualities which would make then phrnnjTnn1. And 
since, as I have already noted, the concept of the phronimos is 
closely associated with politics, those additional qualities would be 
broadly political ones. So here the solution would be that the Ey was 
intended to make an audience who possessed phron&sis, into. or at 
least more like, phrnrinni. 
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Finally, in the Politics, Aristotle notes that it is just to obey 
someone who is our superior not only in virtue but also in practical 
capacity for the highest actions (krpitt8n k"! aretAn kaj kAJ& 
ell-Azin tA& praktikdn tA& arist8n Pol VII 3 1325blO-12). This 
suggests a distinction between a practical political ability and the 
possession of complete virtue, so that someone who possessed the 
latter night not possess the former. So here the solution would be 
that the EN was addressed to an audience who possessed complete 
virtue but not this additional practical capacity for politics. 
The differences between the three solutions suggested' nay well 
ultimately be Just a natter of vocabulary. The substantive point would 
be that Aristotle allows a distinction to be made between the person 
of complete virtue and practical wisdom, and the person who is 
politically expert. Accordingly, it would be possible for the audience 
to be suffering from an inability or ineffectiveness politically 
without being imperfectly virtuous. However, it is important to note 
that one solution which night appear an obvious candidate won't 
actually do. This is to claim that, as phrnnAgi-cz is very clearly stated 
not be a craft (tpehnA Eff VI 5 1140bl-2) whilst politics is said to 
be a master craft (arch itekton Uns eg EN 12 1094a26-28) and the EN 
to be politics Mid 109010-1112), it follows that the EN, being 
technA, is not a work of phrondsis. This putative solution won't do 
for two sorts of reason. Firstly, having perhaps hinted that politics 
is a craft (as above and eg EN 11 1094al), Aristotle, as far as I 
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have been able to f ind, is very careful never actually to use the word 
technAs to describe it. Apart from the etymologically related 
architektonikos, Aristotle rejects technA in favour of words such as 
eplstgnA or dirnAmip (EX I 1094a26) in his Book I discussion. In the 
Book X discussion, Aristotle confines himself to the etymologically 
related nonothetikogs. (eg EN X9 1180b2g). So unless it is to be taken 
that etymology alone is to establish the argument, it cannot be 
assumed that the EN is a work of tetnhnA. Aristotle, in any case, seems 
clear that polltik6 is part of phrondsis (EY VI 8 114lb23-26; ef EE I 
8 1218bl-16). 
The f irst sort of reason why the claim that the EN is technd and 
hence not phrongsis won't do is accordingly textual. But, it night be 
objected, isn't Aristotle here simply being fairly -and not 
uncharacteristically- loose in his use of terms? TpnhnA is 
distinguished from phrondsis as being a poidsis, where the end is 
separate from the act of making that end, as opposed to being prazis 
where the end is the act itself (EX VI 5 1140b6-7). Isn't this 
precisely the case with politics, where the good of the end can be 
separated from the goodness of the action which brought it about? 
Without being too precise at this point, it is perfectly plain that 
politicians are Judged by standards of effectiveness which, at the 
least, reduce the role of good intentions in the political as opposed 
to the private actions of an individual. Hence, modern politics is 
still full of questions about the relationship between private 
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innorality and political effectiveness that, whatever their resolution, 
indicate a widespread intuition that night seen to class politics as a 
technAs. So whatever Aristotle's text, the claim might go, shouldn't he 
Just have said that politics is a : LegIzA? 
Such an argument brings in the second sort of reason why the earlier 
claim won't do. I shall argue that what is intended to be produced by 
the EIT is a greater articulateness about the good, virtuous life that 
is currently lived by the audience, and, as part of this 
articulateness, a greater ability to articulate the reasons for that 
life. Such an articulateness is, broadly, a skill, in that it will 
facilitate the passing an of that life. (I shall say something about 
this shortly. ) But, unlike the techng proper, it does not leave the 
agent's view of her own life entirely untouched. Accordingly, it is not 
Just about the producing of separate results: roughly, the 
articulateness has a value in itself quite apart from its 
effectiveness. 
Bef ore passing on to what I take to be the more interesting and 
difficult argument about the changes wrought in the agent herself by a 
greater ability to articulate the reasons f or her actions, I must say a 
little to justify the claim that being able to articulate the reasons 
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for one's actions is liable to increase one's effectiveness in passing 
an onels way of life. 
In passing, it has f irst to be noted that the EY stands in some sort 
of relation to the Politics. I say 'some sort', for the difficulties 
concerning the precise relationship are well known and, like most of 
the many textual problems that concern the cor-pus, probably ultimately 
insoluble. 13 I shall assume that the Eff was intended to be the f irst 
part of a two part series of lectures, the latter half concerned more 
explicitly with matters concerning the p2lla and mirroring, very 
broadly, the sort of subject matter contained in the extant Politics. I 
note again my methodological assumption that any exegesis which can 
explain the current shape of the EN without making radical 
assumptions about the differences between the extant and the intended 
second 'political' volume of the lecture course must be prima facle 
preferable (92.00 above). 
Continuing with the above ref lexions, a solution to the status of the 
Eff night be sought by considering that whatever else the Politics is, 
it is clearly an account of laws, even though those laws are concerned 
almost exclusively with what Hart describes as secondary rules setting 
up the institutions of a state, rather than the primary rules (es the 
Decalogue) which are the more usual concern of moral philosophy. 9 But 
we know, both from common sense and Aristotle, that lawmaking isn't 
and couldn't possibly be the only way to influence other people to the 
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good. Passing on a good way of life to one's children or friends could 
never be solely a matter of laying down good rules for the conduct of 
a household: it must always consist In part of a more informal 
conversation about ethics. 10 
The effectiveness of articulateness is not, however, confined solely to 
the private sphere of influence. I have already noted in the previous 
chapter that the Netapbysics (1 1) closely associates the master 
craftsman with the ability to teach and understand reasons. One 
explanation for this association is that the master craftsnan -Ila 
archl-tekt6n with its root in arch8 11 rule'- is not so much an 
extremely good craftsman, but rather a master of craftsmen, someone 
who is responsible for giving orders to and leading other craftsmen. 
Such a position requires an ability to articulate what other craftsmen 
nay simply be able to perform without being able to describe, let 
alone explain. A leader in a democracy such as Athens would need above 
all else the ability to engage successfully in debate, to be able not 
only to understand what is good for human beings, but to put that 
understanding into convincing words. Since Aristotle analyzes 
effective rhetoric as being primarily rhetoric which is the most 
rationally rather than emotionally convincing (Rhet A1 1354al-30), a 
successful politician would be the man who was really extremely 
skilled in understanding and articulating human goods. Accordingly, 
even to be an effective nnnmthPtjV-nr_, the ability to talk and argue 
informally about reasons and goods would be essential: It is one skill 
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to f rane laws to embody and encourage goods; it is another skill to be 
able to persuade others to pass those laws. 
I shall say more later in the thesis about the effectiveness of 
articulateness in a specific case (see chapter nine an the argon 
argument). In general, however, I do not take it to be controversial 
that the ability to articulate the reasons for one's actions nay help 
to persuade others to adopt those reasons and those actions. I shall 
accordingly turn to the other part of my suggestion: that increased 
articulateness in some sense alters the agent's own life. 
2.05o Articulating one's own life 
I have argued in earlier chapters that the audience are fully virtuous. 
So in improving the articulateness of their own reasons for action, I 
cannot be arguing that this makes the audience any more virtuous. On 
the other hand, the fact of articulateness, in order to sustain a 
substantive difference between a techn& and what I take to be the 
praxIs of phronAsis and hence of the EN, cannot be a trivial matter; 
it must, roughly, make some important difference in the lives of the 
audience. 
I shall argue in the final chapter of this thesis that the difference 
it makes is one of happiness. By achieving a greater understanding of 
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their lives in a wider context, the audience, even those immersed in 
the political life of the pDlia, live a life closer to the divine 
activity of the6ria. They are accordingly happier, even if they are not 
more -although certainly no less- virtuous. 
Putting that part of my thesis aside for the moment, therefore, I need 
to be able to argue that by learning to articulate the reasons for 
their own actions, the audience are not changing their lives or their 
reasons by becoming more virtuous. 
2.06@ The hald JZLJm 
It is important to note that in common unphilosophical talk, the view 
that an agent's actions can embody beliefs that the agent herself is 
not conscious of holding is widespread. To take one case from common 
sense, what is wrong with a hypocrite is that she says one thing and 
does another. Sometimes hypocrisy is deliberate. Very often it is not 
-which is why the accusation of hypocrisy can be so stinging: if true, 
it carries the additional shame that others know more about the faults 
in your own life than you yourself know. (Compare the shame of the 
innocent party in an adulterous relationship who discovers not only 
his partner's infidelity but also that all his friends knew of the 
affair before he did. ) Moreover, such a case of unintended hypocrisy 
doesn't leave the hypocrite accused of being a split personality": it 
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is normally no answer to the charge of hypocrisy to say, 'Well, at 
least I said the right thing. '12 If the charge is correct, the 
hypocrite stands convicted not of getting it half right, but of really 
believing what was embodied in her actions. 
In common, unphilosophical talk, therefore, we have no problem in 
accepting the intuition that human beings' actions can reveal beliefs 
of which they are unaware, that actions speak louder than words. Such 
a view also appears to be present in Aristotle. Non-human animals, 
although they lack speech and reason, act in ways that can be 
described as a pursuit of the good (eg EN X2 1172bg-15) even though 
they are not aware of the good as such (Pal II 1253ag-18). The link 
between what Is thought and said and actions is asserted in De anima 
where Aristotle specifically notes at the least an analogy between 
thinking and acting (DA 111 7 43la8-16). Human agents' beliefs, 
noreaver, are more securely Judged by their actions than by what they 
say (EN X2 1172bl5-18). 
The bald claim that human beings' actions embody beliefs about goods 
of which they may not themselves be conscious accordingly has, I 
take it, a high degree of initial plausibility. The remaining chapters 
of my thesis will depend, fundamentally, on the notion that the 
audience are trying to pass on their lives to the next generation. 
Since the actions which make up those lives are aimed at certain 
goods (EX 11 1094al-3), a consciousness and ability to articulate 
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those goods will help them in this task. The bald claim simply notes 
that human beings quite nornally act for reasons of which they nay 
not be conscious and that, as a consequence, there is no prima facie 
reason to think that there is anything wrong with soneone who acts 
without full consciousness of her reasons, nor, on the other hand, 
anything particularly good about anyone who is so conscious: it is 
actions that really matter. (The final chapter of the thesis will 
indicate why full consciousness might be better, but that is a 
position to be argued for rather than itself having prlma facie 
plausibility. ) 
Although the bald claim will, on its own, substantiate much of the 
following thesis, it night be felt, on its own, to be rather 
unsatisfactory. One of. the most attractive parts of Aristotle's ethics 
is generally supposed to be the integration of the psychologically and 
the morally persuasive so that the 'is-ought' or 'fact-value* gaps 
which exist in post-Hunean ethics do not arise. But if the goods for 
which we act are not actually present in the conscious mind of the 
agent, an explanation is owed as to how they can still be 
psychologically effective. 
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The beginnings of such an explanation might be sought in a general 
strategy which attempted to locate the consciousness Of the reasons 
upon which the agent is acting in the mind of the observer. Thus, in 
animal behaviour, the justification for anthropomorphism is based in 
part on the consciousness of the human observer: we nay not be using 
lion language, but we are using a language that comes naturally to us 
to describe lion behaviour. Analogously, the human observers of the 
hypocrite's actions are using human language in a perfectly normal way 
to describe what they see. The trouble with this sort of strategy for 
Aristotle is if we take the audience to represent, roughly speaking, 
the pinnacle of phron4sls, in moving beyond the sort of language that 
they naturally use to describe their own and others' actions, we are 
moving beyond language that anyone currently uses. So unlike the case 
of the aninals and the hypocrite where the situation is one of a 
perfectly familiar language being applied to a partly alien situation, 
the EN would be an example of developing a partly new language to 
describe a perfectly familar situation. This leaves two possibilities: 
either we accept that the audience of the EX are the pinnacle of 
phron6sis, in which case we have to accept that they are attempting to 
develop a new language to describe their own existing actions; or else 
we accept that there are others who are. again roughly. more adept in 
phron8sis than they are, and whose language they are trying to adopt. 
Since the latter is the simpler solution -it is the situation in the 
behaviour of the animals and of the hypocrite- it is the one I shall 
pursue. 
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Although adopting the model of an existing describer avoids, let us 
say, problems of intelligibility about the reasons for and the 
descriptions offered of the audience's actions, it leaves open the 
problem of authority and psychological effectiveness. Why should I 
regard someone else's descriptions of my actions as having anything 
to do with me? And why in fact should they have any effect on my 
life? I shall ignore here the question of animal behaviour which, as a 
result of the animal's complete lack of language, raises particularly 
difficult issues here, and turn instead back to the hypocrite. Why the 
hypocrite may ultimately accept the observer's description of his 
actions is, simply, because he acknowledges that how his actions are 
described isn't just up to him. that description of actions is, 
roughly, objective. Even though individual hypocrites may reject 
particular accusations and nay even reject much of the authority of an 
outside observer -'Who do you think you are. telling me what I 
think? 11- a general point remains that there is no absolute bar an an 
observer getting my reasons for an action right, whilst I get then 
wrong. What I shall now argue is that this authority for attributing 
descriptions is variously attributed to other people: that what a 
stranger may have no right to do, an intimate nay well be expected to 
do. I accordingly turn to Aristotle's account of friendship. 
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Aristotle places politics firmly in the context of philia. Philia is 
said to be the bond of the state (eoike dg ka; L t&a poleis gunechein bA 
philla EN VIII 1 1155a22-23). Hnnnnia, which is phIlla pnlitik6 (EE 
VII 7 124laL32-33; EN IX 6 1167b2-4), is a primary goal of statesmen 
(EN VIII 1 1155a22-28). Moreover, justice is intertwined with pbilla: 
Tberefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is 
to seek for a particular kind of Justice. In fact the wbole Of 
justice in general is In relation to a friend... (EE VII 10 
1242alg-21; cf EN VIII 9 1160a7-8). 
On the other hand, philla politikA is pre-eminently a friendship based 
upon mutual advantage, a friendship of utility (EE VlI 10 1242a6-7). 
This would suggest that such friendship isn't the primary form of 
friendship, which is that based an virtue rather than utility (EN VIII 
4 1157a. 25-36). Moreover, philla is to be restricted to a fairly few 
people lest it be spread too thinly (EW IX 10 117laB-13). 
Frima facie reasons accordingly exist within the account f or 
understanding phIIIA politiklý either as a fairly fundamental aspect of 
philla proper, or else as a marginal case included only for 
completeness. In view of the lack of any obvious quality of friendship 
existing between members of the modern nation state, it is tempting to 
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assume that the latter interpretation is the correct one. I shall, 
however, argue instead for the centrality of philin politikA. 
The common Aristotelian distinction between what seems good to a 
particular person and what is absolutely good Q. Q haut6i agathon; and 
ja hapl6s altathon) is noted in the EE account; and it is then stated 
that it is the aim of politikg to bring these two into line by way of 
pleasure: that the absolutely good or ta kaInn should become pleasant 
to the agent and thus good to him (EE VII 2 1236b32-1237ag). Philia 
is then defined as the state which constitutes and itself causes the 
reciprocal choice of good things on the ground that they are good and 
pleasant (d6lon br±j kaj hol6s U phil4a LA prAU antiproairesis t. Li 
hapl8s agath6n kaj hAdtz5n h= agatha kaj h6dea- e= d'autt IIA philia 
hexis apliý jiý-a LA toiautA proairesis (EE VII 2 1237a3l-34)). Such a 
claim is of course not easy to interpret, but I would suggest that 
some light is thrown on it by the claims that friends are the only 
people who prefer human beings to things GE VII 2 1237b3O-34; 
1238al6-19), and that Aristotle should here be understood as 
adyocating an agent-centred approach to ethics rather than an act- 
centred one. 
A shift in the paradigm of ethical theories from an act-centred 
approach to an agent-centred one has been the central demand of 
modern virtue ethicists. I "-I However, besides the pragmatic 
Justification that virtue ethics tends to be able to provide answers 
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to problems intractable under other systems, it is difficult to see 
why a concentration on characteristics of agents should be more 
central to our concerns than a concentration on their actions: to put 
the point crudely, it is my neighbour's beating me over the head with 
a baseball bat that does the damage, and it is as often as not of very 
little concern to ne whether this is the result of an isolated 
incident out of character, or one which is the result of the 
entrenched vice of anger. We now have some sort of answer to this 
kind of objection. In any close friendship, what is finally loved is 
the other person. Although there is clearly some sense in which the 
friendship depends on certain characteristics of the partners, in any 
deep, long-standing friendship, the commitment given is to another 
person, and remains in great part open ended as to what that 
commitment entails: one ends up loving what a person does because it 
is that person's action. 
In love, one discovers a new type of reason for acting. As Aristotle 
puts it: 
... if one wisbes to make men not act unjustly, it is enoueb to 
make them friends, far true friends do not wrong one anotber. ME 
VII 1 12308-30) 
118 
Or, as St Augustine of Hippo argued: 
.. Ydr it is not in vain that the apostle says: 'Adam was not 
deceived but the woman was deceived: ' but it sbews that the 
woman did tbink that the serpent's words were true, but Adam 
only would not break company witb b1s partner, were It in sin. 
and so sinned wittingly... (City of God Book XIV c. 11) 
low this sharing of another's actions, although perhaps at its most 
acute in a relationship such as a marriage, of course extends to other 
forms of relationship which would be covered by p1jIla. At one pole, 
there is Adam's sin: not sharing his partner's reason's for acting -he 
doesn't think any good will come of eating the apple- but preferring 
to keep company with his wife rather than with God. At the other pole, 
two* partners may Just happen to share the same reasons: in the 
friendship of utility, for example, it is a pre-existent common purpose 
which forms the friendship, rather than the other way around. The 
friendship of the good lies somewhere inbetween. One stops seeing 
another's reasons as her reasons and not yours, and instead begins to 
share a life: 
Therefore a man ought also to share bis friend's consciousness of 
bis existence uA dai kai : Uu philou bsfti 
ea=3 and this is attained by their living together and by 
conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other; for 
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this is the meaning of living together as applied to buman 
beings, it does not mean merely feeding in the same place, as it 
does wben applied to cattle. (EN IX 9 1170blO-14) 
There are various shades between the poles. Near Adam there is the 
friend who keeps company with another's actions, not really 
understanding what is going on, but trusting in the friend's having a 
good reason. Near the friendship of utility pole, there is the friend 
who would act in such a way regardless of her friend's actions, but 
finds her individual choice reinforced and given an additional motive 
by the friendship. 
Running through all this is a distinction, hinted at in Aristotle but 
clearer in Aquinas, between seeing a good and seeing a good as a 
good. 14 The group solidarity of friendship, when the friends are good, 
can allow people to respond to goods without seeing them as goods: 
they simply do what their friends do because that is what friendship 
is like. By taking pleasure in doing the same things as their friends, 
they learn to act for the sake of goods of which they are not 
conscious but of which they can become conscious: 
Tbus the friendsbip of Inferior people Is evil, for they take 
part together in Inferior pursuits and by becoming like eacb 
otber are made positively evil. But the friendship of the good is 
good, and grows with their intercourse. And they seem actually to 
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become better by putting their friendsbip into practice, and 
because they correct eacb other's faults, for eacb takes the 
impress from the otber of those traits in bin that give -him 
pleasure -whence the saying. - 'Noble deeds from noble men'. (EN IX 
12 1172a8-14) 
In friendship, people can learn to act f or goods and learn ultimately 
to see goods as goods which they otherwise could not. But, as 
Aristotle points out, 12bilia extends beyond the relationship of equals. 
Thus, philla can exist in positions of Inequality, even if it cannot be 
said that the participants in that unequal relationship are actually 
friends GE VII 4 1239a4-5). So a ruler should be loved, even if it 
would be absurd for him to love in return (EE VII 3 1238b26-30). (And 
even perhaps if it smacks a little of the 'love that's born of fear' 
(Browning: Bishop Blougram's Apology). ) 
I have already noted that the sort of person Aristotle appears to have 
in mind for the phronings is a political leader such as Pericles. 
Whether the phronlirarm is taken simply as someone with political 
authority, or perhaps more broadly as someone with moral authority, by 
being in a relationship of philia with that 12hrnninng, I can be 
brought to respond to goods by dint of my friendship that I could not 
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otherwise respond to, and which I cannot yet see as goods. It is thus 
I suggest that we should understand how I can act for reasons which 
are my own, and yet of which I am not conscious. As members of a 
relationship of philia, the phroninns and I share a life and the goods 
of that life. But whilst he sees then as goods and ran articulate 
then, I merely respond to them through the authority of the phronizos. 
It nay be objected here that this overlooks what I have already noted: 
that ph111A can only extend to a few people. It is therefore quite 
inpossible for philin to explain how more than a handful of people can 
share the same goods, and thus will not serve as an explanation of 
how, say, a city the size of Athens could share those goods. 
There are a number of possible responses to such an objection. 
Firstly, although we are certainly talking about more than a handful 
of people, we need not be talking about a society the size of Athens: 
the only people who have to share the reasons of the phrnnlnos are 
Aristotle's audience, presumably a much smaller number. Vhatever their 
precise relationship within the Lyceum, the members of the audience 
would, presumably, be able to share the fellow-feeling that exists 
within a small college; and thus be more open to sharing the influence 
of relatively few phraninol. Secondly, as noted particularly by Hegel, 
ethical influence through ground level institutions such as the family, 
can serve to open individual's lives to the influence of the state. " 
Put crudely, if each family has someone who possesses authority within 
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it, who in turn respects others' authority, who in turn respect others' 
authority, and so on, there is no reason why this network of 
authorities shouldn't knit even a very large society such as the pialia 
into a fairly homogeneous whole. This may be what Aristotle hints at 
when referring to the partner-sbips of the state (EE VII 9 124lb24-5). 
Finally, although Aristotle certainly emphasizes the difficulty of 
having large numbers of friends, he does not always rule it out 
completely (eg EE VII 12 1245blg-25). And certainly, he does not rule 
out an unreciprocated love given by many to a particular person. When 
we turn from Aristotle to the modern world, the existence of 
patriotism, and the moral authority and affection which is given to 
very distant figures such as the Pope or pop stars, should again 
provide an understanding of how philia can allow our lives to embody 
goods which we are not ourselves conscious of or able to articulate. 
3.00@ Cone-lusion 
I have argued in this chapter that the difficulty of resolving the 
paradox of how the EX can both Inprove the audience whilst requiring 
the audience to be perfectly good In order to appreciate It can be 
resolved by the suggestion that the EN is intended to provide the 
audience with the skills to nake others good: ie political skills. 
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I have argued, in general, that it is possible for human agents to act 
for the sake of goods of which they are not conscious and which they 
cannot articulate. This claim may be found plausible in itself without 
further Justification. Alternatively, it may be explained by noting 
that we sometimes act under the moral or political authority of 
others. Accordingly, being in a relationship of philia with them, we 
share a life, and hence can act f or the sake of goods of which we are 
not aware, but of which our leaders are. 
In the rest of this thesis, I examine some aspects of the articulation 
of the good life as set out in the EN. 
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Notes to chapter three 
For example: Bod6us 1982, Tr6panier 1963, Cashdollar 1973, Vander 
Vaerdt 1985. 
2. Bod6us' position is summarized thus by Vander Vaerdt. p77: 
The account of legislation and forms of regime provided in the 
Politics ... is intended to enable the statesman to put the teacbing 
on buman &uddlz2ala advanced in the Nicomachean Ethics into 
effect. 
3. Cf Vander Vaerdt, p7g: 
.. [Tbel assumption that the EN and Politics in their extant form 
represent a unified exposition of Aristotle's teaching on 
political science requires reconsideration. The Politics as we 
have It: (a) quotes the BE not the EN, (b) it divarges 
significantly from the investigation announced In EN X 9; and (c) 
it is incomplete: it larks Aristotle's pr=ised 'discourses on the 
regimes'... One cannot grasp the structure and intention of 
Aristotle's work without understanding these facts. 
4. ibid p87. 
5. Cf EN 11 1094a24-28. 
6. Eg Irwin 1988; Jaffa 1952. 
7. See eg Vander Vaerdt, pp79-80 for a summary of the debate 
regarding the relationship between the EN and the Folitics. Kenny 
1978 provides a controversial discussion of the relationship 
between the EE and the EN including the common books. 
8. See n7 above. 
9. See Hart 1972, esp ch5. 
10. EN X9 1180a29ff indicates the legislative science is useful for 
family life. It is useful, however, not In the direct way of 
enforcing obedience as in the state, but rather in the indirect 
way of providing an articulated framework of principles. 
11. Unlike for example Akrasla where the agent Is in a sense divided. 
12. Normally, but not always. It was Chesterton, I believe, who said: 
'God forbid that I should preach what I practise. ' One of the 
reasons why politicians and the clergy nay be particularly 
subject to charges of hypocrisy is that they have a duty to 
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articulate the truth even where they cannot themselves practise 
it. 
13. Eg Statnan 1997, pp7ff. 
14. We can perceive good things with our sense but not goodness as 
suab; only our minds can grasp tbat. Yet it is goodness as Suc-b 
that draws the will. So goodness of will in depending on Its 
obJect depends an mind. Good as good, as attracting, appeals to 
our will ratber tban our mind but only because it first appeals 
to our mind as true. The will can only be drawn to wbat reason 
perceives to be good. STh Ia Hae q19 a. 3. 
This is to be contrasted with animals who are drawn to goods by 
instinct and not because of an awareness that they are goods: 
Reasoning creatures are perfiectly aware of goals: aware of wbat 
is in fact their goal, but also aware of the notion of goal as 
such and the way their activity is adapted to it; wbereas otber 
animals are aware only of wbat their goal is by sense-percePtiOn 
and instinctive judgment. ibid q6 a2. (Both translations from 
McDermott 1989. ) 
Aristotle remarks in Pal 12 1253alO-18 that it is a unique 
property of human beings to have an mIRt'hA,: zI-- of good and bad. 
whereas animals only have an aisth6sis of pain and pleasure 
which allows them to respond to good and bad. 
15. Primarily in the FbIlosophy of Rigbt. 
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Chapter four 
Prohairesis (D 
1.00: Introduction 
In the previous three chapters I have argued that the intention of the 
Ell is to give the audience the political skill to produce good people. 
The Eff emphasizes not the content of the laws which are the primary 
means of producing good people at the level of the pialia, but rather 
the content of that informal debate which surrounds the business of 
legislation, both in the creation of legislation, its adoption, and in 
the more intimate social circles such as the household which for much 
of the time are outwith the immediate influence of law. 
That political skill is given by being able to articulate the goods at 
which the audience's actions already aim. This entails that actions 
have an articulable structure which the audience can learn to 
articulate, but which they have not yet articulated (see 91.01 below). 
In chapters four to six, I argue f irstly that the notion of a 
12rohairesis is an account of the articulable structure of a typical 
action rather than something separate which precedes and causes an 
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action. I argue that the artlculable structure takes the form of acting 
for the sake of a future end, that end being -Aml-mnnin. 
It should be noted that I am not claiming that the articulable 
structure and importance of the prohalresis is exhausted by its being 
aimed at a future end, but only that this feature is a central one, in 
particular, for an understanding of the ET as a whole. 
As noted, above, my &in in the remainder of this thesis is to describe 
the life which is already lived by the virtuous. That the audience 
already live a virtuous life but cannot articulate that life nay be 
understood in two ways. Firstly. as argued in 92.06 of the previous 
chapter, that a life can be lived without being yet articulated May be 
accepted as a matter of common sense. In this case, the audience will 
be trying to understand their own life, but precisely In what way that 
life is already their own, yet unarticulated, will be left unexplained. 
However, since Aristotle works by presenting the normal or 
paradigmatic case, we can expect to be dealing with actions and 
characters which are in some sense taken to be paradigmatic of 
humanity. 
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The second way of dealing with the clain that the audience already 
lead a virtuous life but cannot articulate that life was outlined in 
§2.07ff of the previous chapter. There I argued that the audience, by 
standing in a relationship of ph111a with a phrnnings, already shared 
his life. Since phrnninni tend to be political leaders and hence fairly 
articulate about the good life (02.01-2.04 previous chapter), the 
sense In which the articulate and the inarticulate already share a life 
is made somewhat clearer. In this case, the EN will be trying to move 
the inarticulate audience towards the articulateness of the phronimos. 
Again, however. given Aristotle's general pattern of explanation, we 
can expect to be dealing with paradigms of action and character. ' 
Given either understanding of the EN, much of its contents is 
inmediately explicable. Books II to V, insofar as they merely 
articulate the content of the virtues, fit into this account fairly 
easily. I shall therefore be concentrating in this thesis on those 
aspects of the EN which appear less straighforwardly explicable on 
this model, in particular, those aspects concerning practical reason, 
pleasure and the argon argument. 
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2.00* I)PgIrfm 
I begin my argument with a consideration of the role of desire in 
Aristotle's philosophy of action. Xy aim in this put of the argument 
will be to shew that Aristotle's prohalresIs is a description under 
which an action is performed and, hence, an articulable structure of 
that action, rather than, say. a preceding event. 
For present purposes, there are two sorts of desire (g=ia) with 
which we are concerned in human action: Ppith-JAI, which are directed 
at pleasure (EX 111 1 1111a32; 2 1111b17); and rrnliatreseis. which are 
choices of means to an end (EN 111 2 111lb26-29; EE 11 10 1226all- 
13). 2 
Before turning to Aristotle's account, we need to consider why he 
night be interested in desires. Given the concern of the EN with 
actions, we know that the explanation must have to do with their 
connexion with actions. But more needs to be said than this. 
One reason might be that he had noticed whilst introspecting the 
furniture of his mind that there is present a class of events styled 
'desires' and, moreover, noticed that these cause actions. A desire, 
therefore, night be an internal event which begins the causal chain 
which extends beyond the body and results in another event in the 
world. 
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Another reason might be that, knowing actions exist, he wanted to 
describe then and classify them. He accordingly made use of the 
concepts of 'folk psychology', among which was, for example, desire. On 
this basis, there is no reason immediately to assume that desires are 
events: the ontology of folk psychology will be too indistinct for 
this to be immediately ascertainable. Vhether desires are causally 
initiating events will, accordingly, be a result of analysis rather 
than an assumption. Desires night, after all, prove to be a 
construction to suit Aristotle's or his society's pragmatic purposes, 
rather than actual events. 
In the EN, as we have seen, Aristotle is interested in actions and 
their improvement. If he becomes interested in desires, it is because 
and to the extent that desires are related to action: it is for this 
reason that we hear very little about that species of desire 
relatively unrelated to action -the wish (b=14ýsis) (EN 111 2 11lb19- 
26). We need accordingly to keep the action very much in the forefront 
of our minds; for this is the focus of Aristotle's interest. And only 
to the extent that a desire Is related to this focus need we consider I 
it important. 
Now the desire an which the virtuous acts is a prohairesis, which is 
defined at EE 11 11 1227b36 as a choice of something for some object, 
ie having the general structure of Oing for x. low, the position 
suggested by De Anina 111 7, is that an action, say, of pursuit and 
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the prohaires1r. are different In essence, but are nevertheless the 
same thing. In what sense, therefore, can they be said to be the same 
thine. One possibility would be if the prohairenis was the action 
under a description of the form '# for the sake of V, where 10, is a 
means and 'x' the end. For the moment, I an contezt to let 1#1 and 'x' 
represent any means and end. Later, I shall argue that IxI is a future 
end, and, for the virtuous, that end Is widminnnIA situated at the end 
of the agent's own life. Given that a prohalresls is of this form, ran 
we go an to identify It with the action? 3 
Let's consider this as a textual point firstly. The strongest evidence 
against such an identification within the Eff would appear to be at EN 
VI 2 113ga3l-33, where prnha1rP-czIcz is said to be the efficient cause 
(hnthen hA of the action. On the Humean reading of efficient 
causation, this would require a prMjjjrgzj to be a separate event 
preceding the action. Although such a Humean cause might be one 
possible reading of this claim, Aristotle's notion of efficient 
causality is far more generous than Hume's, taking in efficient causes 
which are neither events nor which precede in time their effects-4 
If we turn to the positive evidence within the El in favour of such an 
identification, we note at Il 5 1106a3-4 that the virtues are 
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Identified with prohairesels. Although Aristotle immediately adds to 
the identification '.. or [the virtues are] not without prohairesis' 
(ibid), it is not enough here to say, with Gauthier and Jolif, for 
example, that this comment should be regarded as correcting the 
preceding identifications: such a reading is less a correction than a 
denial. If the identification is taken at face value, then a 
prohafremIS becones a hpxi--,, a disposition rather than an event (EX II 
5 1106alO-12). 
This remark is perhaps iluminated by Xetapbysics IX 5 1048al-24 
where, having noted that rational potentialities can produce opposite 
results, Aristotle concludes that something must explain the fact that 
only one result is in fact aimed at, and attributes this to desire or 
choice (orexis a prohalrpRin. (1048alO-11; cf EN V1 1129all-17). What 
explains the fact that, say, if I an challenged to a duel, then I will 
fight, is that I have a prohalrpqi--. so to do: a prohairesis. is that 
feature of my character which accounts for my acting in a given 
nanner. 11 
Now, when we turn to the word Jiuja, we note f irstly that it is a 
quality which is particularly deeply entrenched (Cat 8 b27-8); and, 
secondly, that by dint of being a eliatbe-qls- or disposition (Meta V 20 
1022blO-12), is an arrangenent of sonething which is conplex in the 
sense of having parts (Ibid 1022bl-3) .7 The fact of the prohairesis 
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being deeply entrenched is met by its forming part of the agent's 
character. Vhat then of Its being a diathasis 
Substances lie at the heart of Aristotle's ontology (Meta VII 1 
1028a25-W). Aristotle consequently appears doubtful of the reality of 
definitions with anything else other than substances as subject Meta 
VII 5 1031al-14). If this tendency were to be found in his practical 
philosophy, we might expect to find that individual human beings as 
substances were the mrn'hal of their actions, and that any attribution 
of responsibility for actions to non-substantial aspects Of 
individuals -such as desires- would only be approximately or 
inperfectly true. And indeed, the point that the individual human being 
is the archA of her actions is stressed in the EX. CET VI 2 1139b5; EE 
11 6 1222bl5-1223a2O). Pursuing this line of argument, we might point 
to the fact that what sort of character a person has will affect what 
sort of actions she will perform: given the (not unreasonable) 
Aristotelian view that human beings are a combination of reasoning 
and non-reasoning parts (eg EN 1 13 1102a26-28). we would want to 
say. broadly, that it is the character of these two parts and of the 
relationship between the two that determines the action (of EX VI 2 
1139a3l-b5). It Is in this sense that a 1prohalrests, might be regarded 
as a d4AthPqj-_. 
Returning to the text, we f ind at Ell 111 3 1113ag-12, that after we 
have deliberated, we first judge. then desire: if the grolairealra. is 
134 
separate from the action, then there is a Judging, a choosing, then an 
action -which seems a rather luxuriant ontology and one, in its 
separation of the putatively mental events of Judging and choosing, 
which is rather difficult to interpret. Xoreover, at EN X1 1172a25-6, 
choosing is contrasted with the action of fleeing, which suggests that 
choosing itself is identical with the action of pursuit: 
F= they choose fp=lrountafl pleasant tbings, and they flee 
painful ones. 
All this would seen to suggest that a prohairesls, might be the 
realization of the character of an agent In an action or, to put it 
another way, a way of understanding an action as being, one night say, 
done under a description stamped with the character of the agent. In 
the same way that to say that an utterance expressed a meaning might 
either be a harmless way of talking about understanding an utterance 
without any comnitment to the separate existence of a meaning, or a 
misleading reification of that understanding, so talking about a 
prohalreAir, might either be a harmless way of talking about 
understanding an action, or else a misleading reification of that 
understanding: in each case, there is Just the utterance or the action 
and our understanding it, with no intervening tertium quid. 
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2.02- ObjectIn-! tiýg nbjeý-tjvg. r@alltl ef mntinn epscrlýtf=s 
I have suggested tlat the ; rr! '-, 0r@cjez n3y be action understood as 
being done under a particular f orn of description. A broad objection 
to this line would be that It suggests an ele=eut of subJeCtivitY in 
describing action, In that the f inal authority an any action 
description will be the agent herself. This would lead to different 
agents describing differently what. to an observer. appears to be the 
same sort of action; or even to different descriptions given by the 
saxe agent on dIfferent occasions. 
Such uncertainty in action descriptions would run counter to Charles' 
detailed accmnt of Iristotlees philosophy of action, where he argues 
that the EX preserves the ontological system developed in the 
PhysiCV1. and that this ontology requires that action descriptions are 
to be deternined by the content of 
the best theory to explain the crganism, its inter=l structure, 
and its gcals. ýO 
Although Charles not that krIstatle did not fully develop such a 
theory for human agents", be does argue that Aristotle developed such 
a theory In sufficient detail to underpin tte account of agency and 
intentioual action contained in the EX. " 
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Putting aside Aristotle for the moment, it would be rather odd for 
just one theoretical account to underpin everything we would want to 
say about human agency. We might expect various accounts within the 
separate disciplines of biology, chemistry, anthropology, psychology, 
politics, sociology, law and theology with different focuses and 
different explanations for different questions. Since Aristotle makes 
clear that he does hold fairly strong views about the integrity and 
separateness of various disciplines (eg EX 13 109011-14), it would 
be surprising if there were just one theory of the human organism and 
its actions. Secondly, given Aristotle's remarks on the variability of 
human affairs (ibid 1094bl4-27), it would be surprising if any one 
theory of human agency were capable of exact formulation in the way 
to which Charles seems to aspire. 12 
Additionally, as Charles notes1: 3, any plausible theory of human action 
must place considerable reliance on the agent's own intentionality and 
own descriptions of his goals. Moreover, it is too simple to say that 
it is only the agent's own intentionality which determines the 
description under which he acts: as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, he may well accept the authority of other individuals and 
bodies in determining the descriptions of his actions. In her essay, 
'Under a description', Anscombe defends this term of art against the 
following objection: 
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Animals that have no language can have intentica3s too: baw then. 
it is asked, can it be rigbt to say that an intention is always 
'under a description"? Again I found the objection puzzling: 
another non-reason. But I suppose that one wbo offers it must be 
taking 'it was intentional under this description, not that" to 
imply that the first description is in S=e sense written into 
something inside the agent. "' 
Anscombe rightly reJects the suggestion that descriptions are in any 
sense written into the agent. But f or hu=au beings, there is =ore that 
must be said-, for what is Intentional for human beings is related to 
how the agent thinks of her action. In the case of animals, there is 
no question of the agent doing the describing Itself. In the case of 
human agents, there Is. But that this Is a possibility doesn't mean 
that acting 'under a description* Is always equivalent to 'what the 
agent thinks she is doing' -even If it sometimes is. Ve do acknowledge 
the right of others to def ine or debate how our own actions are to be 
described, and it is in this interaction between the authority of the 
agent to describe her own actions and the authority of others that 
much of the interest and richness of the tern %mder a description' 
exists. 
In assuming that it Is a theory of the crganism that is Sought, - 
Charles is almost certainly misdirecting our attention: in many cases, 
what we want Is a theory of the Individual agent or of a character 
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type, rather than of the human organism. How those theories are 
developed nay depend on the pragmatic aims of the theorizers, whether 
the agent himself, the pialig. within which he lives, or indeed, the 
species as a whole. Which of these levels of explanation -the 
individual, the character or the species- is relevant to the pragmatic 
purpose of the EX will only be demonstrated by the richness of the 
explanations of the text produced by the assumptions made. None of 
this necessarily results in subjectivism. Charles is therefore correct 
in taking the description to be determined by theory, or, perhaps more 
precisely, theory like reasoning; he is, however, incorrect in his 
attempt to link that theorizing purely to the organism rather than, 
say, character and in his assumption that there can only be one theory 
for human action. 
In what follows, I shall be arguing that what we have as the central 
f ocus of much of the EX is a theory of a certain character type -the 
virtuous agent- and how he regards his actions. I shall argue that he 
regards them under two descriptions: the first, prohairetic 
description, which is of the action under the description of a means 
directed at a temporally separate end; and the second, of the action 
as an activity and pleasurable, which supervenes on the prohairetic 
description. 
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Having argued that the prohalreals is to be understood as being 
identical with an action performed under a particular descriptiOUs I 
shall now argue that this description is norzally of the form of a 
neans to a future end. 
I shall argue this in two ways. In this chapter. I shall argue that the 
virtuous agent nornally acts for the sake of and that 
audaimnnIA is to be understood here as being a future state at the end 
of a lif e. 
As paradigm of human agency. the virtuous agent's life illuminates the 
lives of those who are not conpletely virtuous. Accordingly, in chapter 
five, I shall shew how human agency in general is informed by acting 
for a future goal. Taken together. I shall conclude that these 
arguments suggest that Aristotle understands huzan actions as being 
MA ePi ta p2lu performed under a description articulable as being of 
a structure of a neans f or a future end. 
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3.01: The virtuour. agent aims at he future 
-3 
Aristotle holds that all prohaireseis aim at a good (EN 11 1094al-2). 
He then postulates that there is a supreme good for which we perform 
all other goods and of which a knowledge is extremely important for 
practical purposes (EN 12 1094al6-26). This suggests, if the virtuous 
agent is someone who is getting his practical reasoning right, that he 
has and is using a knowledge of the supreme good to guide his life. 
Since the supreme good is audai"nia. this entails that the 
prohairaselcs= of the virtuous agent are for the sake of eudadn2nia (cf 
Eff 17 1097b2O-21). 
Accordingly, if I am going to argue that the virtuous agent typically 
acts for the sake of a future goal, I need to explain how 4-urialynonia 
can be taken as a future goal. The two main current interpretations of 
eudainLuILA are that it consists in the maximization of a number of 
different but compossible goods -inclusivism- or that it consists in 
the maximization of one particular type of good (the8ria) -the 
'dominant end' theory. 115 On both these readings, it is difficult to 
see how audatrnnniA could generally be a temporally separate end. On 
the inclusivist account, the doing of, say, a courageous action would 
be an immediate realization of PiAminnnipi. On the dominant end 
account, although many more actions would be directed to the bringing 
about of the8ria in the future, and thus directed at a temporally 
separate end, the temporal discreteness of the end would only be an 
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accidental feature of actions: for the virtuous agent who had attained 
the circumstances to practise the6ria freely, most of his actions -ie 
his actions of theirla- would be immediate realizations of his end. 
For present purposes, I shall not have to decide which conception of 
Pud, Rimm-niFt is correct. I shall instead argue that, whatever the good or 
goods which have to be realized in a happy life. those goods have to 
be contemplated and reflected an from the perspective of a completed 
life in order to make that life happy and thus realize the good of 
happiness: as a life is only complete at its end, it follows that for 
most of a life, that good lies in the future and is thus a temporally 
separate good. 
The primary source f or this interpretation is the discussion in EN 19 
1100a4-1101bg. Prompted by Solon's reflection that it was only at the 
end of a life that its happiness should be judged, Iristotle worries at 
the problem, apparently finally concluding that we should pronounce 
.. those of the living wbo possess and will go on possessing the 
good tbings.. to be blessed (EX 1 10 1101alg-21) 
Now, for any agent who wants to be happy, it accordingly f ollows that 
she should always strive to preserve her good things until her death; 
for however good the life during nost of its duration, if it ends 
badly, like Priam's. it will be an unhappy life CER 19 1100a5-9). 
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The oddity of this claim is not usually noted. Vhatever their view of 
the goods to be realized in a life, inclusivist or dominant end, 
commentators regard the advice Aristotle is giving to an agent as: 
Maximize the goods in a life. 16- But Aristotle seems to be privileging 
the end of a life. To see this, assume that Priam's life, goods all 
added up and evils subtracted, contains n goods. Ve now introduce King 
Mairp of Yort whose life is exactly like Priam's except that instead 
of starting well and ending badly, Mairp's life ends well and starts 
badly. Another difference is that Mairp's life contains only n-1 goods. 
Now, Aristotle seems to suggest that Xairp's life might be 
nevertheless be happier than Priam's because Mairp ends well and Priam 
ends badly. Unless such a view is tenable, I will have to drop my 
claim that eudaimnniA always requires an agent to look to his future; 
f or in most cases, the agent will be able to settle back into his 
ethical armchair in middle-age, content in the knowledge that, however 
awful the future, the deposit of his previous goods is likely to 
provide sufficient capital to cover any contingencies 1 7. 
It night be objected here that I have overlooked Aristotle's conclusion 
to the discussion of the effects of misfortunes an Puriallonnia: 
the bappy man [ho eudaim6n] can never become miser-able; tbougb 
It Is true be will not be blessed Inakarios] if be encounters tle 
misfortunes of a PrIam. (EN 1 10 110la6-8) 
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Aristotle has commenced his disussion, so the objection night go, by 
stating the commonplace opinion that Priam's misfortunes overturned 
his rudaim2nia; he has completed it, having improved on that 
commonplace, by distinguishing between being a malrarinq -which Priam 
certainly wasn't- and a udaix6a which, despite his losses, he 
remained. 
This objection, despite its initial plausibility, is almost certainly 
misplaced. Immediately following the supposed revised conclusion about 
Priam's eudai7nnnia, Aristotle restates his claim that PutlAiinnnia can 
indeed be lost by many severe disasters (ibid 110laB-13). Unless it is 
argued that Priam's misfortunes were not of the highest, which, from 
the textual context and, indeed, the nature of the misfortunes appears 
unlikely, it remains that Priam would no longer be makarim or 
, gutlAimAn. Moreover, throughout the argument, Aristotle seems to use 
nakArlns, udalnA& and their cognates interchangeably (see esp. the 
discussion 1100al4-bll). I therefore conclude that Aristotle is not 
contrasting here the state of the makarim and of the P_WJA. J=bII but 
rather varying his use for the sake of style. ' 8 
Given all this, what point is Aristotle naking? The clear central 
point is that the happy man is unlikely to be shaken out of his 
happiness. As to the marginal case of Priam, I think he is clear that 
this does constitute a counterexample, but only by its extreme nature: 
as a marginal case it does not detract from the central point. The 
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debate is left slightly inconclusive, just as the question on the 
happiness of the dead which follows it is also left inconclusive in 
its details, even if the central point that the dead are nornally safe 
fron post-mortem influences is certain (EN 1 11 1101a. 22-bg). 
Turning back to the main argument, can we make sense of the position 
that a life is Judged primarily by its end? 
One possibility is just to take Aristotle's teleological tendencies as 
a brute given. Now, if Aristotle does regard the end as in some way 
definitive of the period of growth leading up to that end. it shouldn't 
be a surprise that he regards the end of a life as in some way 
definitive of that life. In this thesis, however, I resist using 
teleology as a basis for argument unless that teleology can be cashed 
into the currency of moral philosophy. Teleological patterns nay 
underlie human life; but if they do, they will have to be demonstrated 
and justified from the phajnnnPna of moral discourse. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that Aristotle's emphasis on teleology does tend to 
make the attribution to him of the view that the eud&jmQiU& of a life 
depends on its end rather than on the sum of its goodness rather more 
plausible. 
Putting aside Aristotle for a moment, it does seen to be true that we 
regard the end of a life as rather more important than its beginning 
in Judging its success or failure. Indeed, it is very much the 
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stereotype of a good life that it begins badly and that success is 
achieved out of and despite early adversities: Dickens' life is thus 
made even more successful because of his childhood poverty and 
hardship. The explanation for this might appear to be that a life is 
assessed as a good story is assessed; and that unless there is 2L 
change of fortune, the story lacks Interest, and unless, for a good 
man, that change is from evil circumstances to good. the story 
dispirits us. "3 The suggestion that the goodness of a life is to be 
Judged by the standards of narrative has become a frequent one in 
modern philoSophy. 20 But Is it a good suggestion? Reflexion On 
Dickens' life might suggest not: a reversal of fortune might make a 
life more interesting, but it hardly makes it better -the best life 
night be one that neither ends badly nor begins badly, but which is 
of a dull, unexciting, constant goodness. 
So the sinple thesis that what nakes a good life is the same as what 
makes a good biography won't hold absolutely. But there is Perhaps 
this connexion between the two, in that both are wcrks of imagination 
exercised on actual events to create a unity. A biography which is 
just one damn thing after another isn't a good biography; and a life - 
which is just one damn thing af ter another isn't a good life. Both 
lack thereby an inter unity: 
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A plot does not possess unity, as sc=e people suggest, merely 
because it is about one man. Many tbings, countless things 
Indeed, may bappen to one man, and some of then will not 
contribute to any kind of unity; and similarly be may carry out 
many actions from whicb no single unified action will emerge. 
Poetics VIII 145lal5-19 
To create a unity in a life, the material must f Irstly possess an 
underlying unity. If Aristotle's ethical advice is followed, it will, 
because the agent's actions will be aimed at one object (EN 12 
1094a22-24; EE 12 12206-14). But just as no biography could ever 
attain a unity Just by reading off the facts of a life without any 
inaginative input, so no agent could ever regard her life as a unity 
without imaginative input, particularly in respect of the exercise of 
recollection, which, unlike memory, is an active, deliberate 
perfornance an the part of the agent. 21 
Precisely what goes to make a unity of life isn't completely spelled 
out by Aristotle, nor should we expect it to be. His remarks in the 
Poetics night suggest however that it should shew a purpose or 
purposes which were sufficiently simple to be comprehended as a unity 
in any reflexion on that life. In Poetics VII 1450b22ff, he talks of 
the need for simplicity of structure if the spectator is to comprehend 
a plot; whilst in XV, he goes on to say that good character (Athos) is 
manifested In a good prohairesis. (1454al6-17). Coupled with EN 12 
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1094a22-24, this suggests that unity of life consists in having a 
clear and constant purpose throughout one's life. But to possess a 
unity, it would seen that a life must be understood by the agent as 
having a unity not only in that an agent has to exercise imagination 
both prospectively in setting an objective, but also in that she must 
exercise imagination retrospectively in understanding her past. 22 That 
this is an essential -and overlooked- aspect of the happy life is 
suggested by Aristotle's point that happiness is essentially an 
initation of the divine life (EN X7 1177b26-1178a2). But God, for 
Aristotle. thinks about thought (Meta XII 9 107033-5). Assume that 
the best life is that of theoretical reason rather than practical 
reason or the nixed life. The divine life, as lived by humankind, won't 
then be Just the contemplation of good objects, but also the 
contemplation of the life devoted to the contemplation of noble 
objects, the contemplation of that life as an imaginative unity. 
Indeed, whatever the good life is found to consist in, it will consist 
not just in the performance of the good activities, but the imaginative 
working of them up into a unified life. 23 
Such an interpetation has a number of advantages. Firstly -and most 
inportantly for present purposes- it explains why happiness exists in 
the future for most of an agent's life: to contenplate a life, it needs 
to have actually been achieved in reality, not merely lived out in 
thought. Secondly, it nay make Aristotle's praise of the5ria more 
conprehensible. By placing an emphasis an the imaginative working up 
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of a life into a unity and the contemplation of that unity, the life of 
the8ria seems more achievable. If, for example, the8ri& Just consists 
in the contemplation of a system of achieved truths, this entails that 
Aristotle believed that, at some stage in the future, complete and 
final systems of knowledge would exist. This makes Aristotle seem 
both rather naive and a bit of a scholastic. But if he is emphasizing 
the scholar's thought about his thoughts, his -put cruidely- post 
retirement reflection on a life devoted to the service, of truth and 
beauty, Aristotle's position seems to combine realism -ie such lives 
are actually lived and livable- with that divine stability and 
timelessness which does not seen attainable during the actual 
contemplation of goods: even if human beings are unable to stick at 
one thing for long, the pride of a scholar in a life well lived does 
seem a state of mind which could exist stably (cf EY VII 14 115020- 
31); and also one which seems, in a sense, to exist outwith time 
rather than be reducible to clockable thoughts (cf Meta XII 9 1075a7- 
11). 24 
3.02: Objection to the goodness of reflecting on one's own life 
It night be objected at this point that reflection on one's own life at 
its end sounds like a terribly smug way of going on, that whatever 
else may be objected to in my account, its morality is rather suspect. 
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There are two main answers to this objection. Firstly, there is the 
admission that smugness is present in Aristotle's view of goodness. 
The megalopsucbm; has been described as a prig with the conceit and 
bad manners of a prig; and Ross remarks on the self-absorption of 
Aristotle's ethics. 215 So whatever the ethical dubiousness of my 
account, its smugness might be taken as a confirmation of its 
consistency with the rest of Aristotle's ethic rather than a criticism. 
Secondly, I think the smugness of such ref lexion can be overestimated. 
Just as the contemplator of divine objects surely does best when he 
concentrates on the objects rather than himself, so the contemplator 
of a life, even one's own, surely does best when he concentrates on 
the events rather than on his contemplation of them. In this case. can 
the contemplator really be said to be snug? Smugness seems to imply a 
satisfaction in one's current state: 'If I hadn't worked so hard, I 
wouldn't be the fine fellow I am now! '. Reflexion on a life, even 
reflexion that it has been good, needn't refer to the current state of 
the beholder. And in this light, it is less the smugness of the self - 
satisfied, but simply a fact about age: at the end of one's life, you 
look back on your life. That isn't an option, something to be indulged 
in only by the self-satisfied, but rather a fact about what it is to 
be near death. 2- 
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I have argued in this chapter f or two points. Firstly, that actions are 
to be understood as possessing an articulable structure; and secondly, 
that this structure is to be understood as being f or the sake of a 
future end, which, in the case of the virtuous agent is eudaimonla. 
In the next chapter. I shall adduce further arguments in favour of the 
view that human actions are typified by a structure articulable as 
aiming for a future good. In so doing, I intend to support two 
conclusions; firstly, that the Drohairetic structure is not of marginal 
interest but is central to an understanding of human life; and, 
secondly, that this structure is typified by aiming at a future end. 
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lates to chapter four 
In general, I shall assume the latter strategy to be the correct 
interpretation of the EX, although little of substance in this 
thesis will rest on this assumption. The claims of political 
leaders such as Pericles to be phron1noi and thus articulate 
about the good life has to be amended in the light of their 
failure to articulate fully the divine vocation of humanity (see 
chapter nine, esp 992.00ff. ) 
2.1 shall assume, f or the moment, that this refers to the means to 
achieving a temporally separate end. This assumption will be 
tested later. 
3. Broadie 1991, p180 regards the structure of the prohairesis 
C# for the sake of x') as being naturally applicable to the 
action, although she does not identify prohairesis and action, 
and offers liitle argument for this extension. 
4. See Sorabji 1980, pp42-44. 
5. Gauthier & Jolif 1958, ad loc. 
6. Cf DA 433a3l-32 where orPYI-q is said to be a di=mia. 
7. For a full discussion of bpxi-;, see Hutchinson 1986 ch 2. 
8. Charles 1984, pp57ff. 
9. ibid, p70. 
10. ibid. p68 and p70n. 
11. ibid, p62. 
12. ibid, p62. 
13. ibid, p6S. 
14. Anscombe, p209 (Vol II of the Collected Essays). 
15. Hardie, 'The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics' in Xoravcsik 1968, 
pp297-322. Cf Kraut 1989, p8. 
16. Eg Kraut 1989, p9; Engberg-Pedersen 1983, p47; JA Ackrill, 
'Aristotle on Eudaimonial, in Rorty 1980, pp32-33. Note that 
these commentators are aware that, given human life always 
involves some competition between goods, the advice to maximize 
goods cannot be applied mechanically. However, no commentator of 
whom I am aware acknowledges that Aristotle seems to suggest 
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that a life which ends well, but which, overall, contains less 
goods than a life which ends badly, might be the happier life. 
17. In case it is objected that there is always the theoretical 
possibility that the future evil will outweigh the past, consider 
the following: 'It is always a theoretical possibility that my 
savings will be insufficient to meet my needs in old age, but 
it's a pretty remote one; and, 'There's always the real 
possibility that, however easy my life up till now, my death will 
be a cruel one. ' If eudaimcnim is more like the first example, 
what you have done to date may compensate for the future. If 
eudalannia is more like the second, the goodness or badness of 
the end is a separate matter from and cannot be compensated by 
the goodness of the previous life. I shall argue that the 
position of eudainnnia is more like the second example. 
18. The interchangeability of makuloa and eudaim8n is also argued by 
Nussbaum 1986, pp318-72. Kenny's objection (Kenny 1992, p35) that 
the identification of makarj&za and eudaim6n makes nonsense of 
Aristotle's discussion of the fragility of happiness seems 
misplaced: what is poignant is that a bad end can destroy 
happiness, in the same way that a sin at the end of life can 
destroy its holiness. There appears a similar fragility, perhaps 
resulting from similar causes, in claims of knowledge. Annas 1993 
p420 cofirms that there is only a stylistic variation between the 
two words, but notes Antiochus as having probably construed the 
variation as a substantive distinction in the discussion in 
1100b22-1101a8. 
An alternative explanation night be that the TnAkarinq is 
distinguished from the eudaim8n only by being beyond the reach 
of changes of fortune and not by any other quality of the 
happiness (cf Liddell & Scott on mAlmr: '... the dead were esp. 
called za'knrPF-,, the blessed as being beyond the reach of pain). 
The difference between Pudainnnts and zakAr-ja would then be one 
accidental to the strivings of the agent: if, by chance. you are 
beyond change, you are mAl-rinq; otherwise. you aLre t-iirlAim8n. The 
aim of action would remain PudainAnja (EN 14 1095al7-20) 
although one might hope that this will prove to be makarla. 
19. Cf Poetics, XIII 1453al2ff: Aristotle's interest in tragedy which 
excites fear and pity causes hin to pass quickly over the change 
of fortune of a good nan in favour of the change of fortune of 
the evil or nornal nan. 
20. See eg XacIntyre 1985, ch 15. Cf Annas 1993 p346. 
21. De Nemorla, eg 453a9-14. 
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22. And also prospectively in imagining how that life will look 
retrospectively: the young man dreaming of the contemplation of a 
life from the standpoint of a success not yet achieved. Thus the 
virtuous agent will bring the goodness of the end of his life 
into the present by taking pleasure in that end (chapters seven 
and eight). 
23. The relationship between the divine activity and virtue is 
discussed in chapter eleven. 
An objection to the line of argument in this section is that 
contemplation of a life would not be the8ria in Aristotle's sense, 
because the contents of a life are variable matters CEN VI 4 
1140al-2) whilst the5ria is contemplation of the invariable (EN 
X7 1177al2-21; VI 6 1140b31-1141a20). At this stage, I would 
only make the general point that the word the5ria and its 
cognates in EN as a whole are used to cover much more than 
contemplation of the eternal (cf Kraut 1989, ppl5-16 n2). This of 
course nay be due to an ambiguity in the use of the word: I 
shall later argue that it in fact reflects a continuity in the 
practical life and the life of the6ria (see chapter eleven). 
24. Cf Aquinas: 'The intellectual soul is created on the confines of 
eternity and tine. ' (Summa contra gentiles, I III c lxi, quoted 
Underhill 1995, p65). 
25. Both cited Hardie 1980, p119. 
26. Another way of dealing with this sort of objection might be to 
emphasize the impersonality of the required reflexion. That the 
reflexion is on an agent's complete life doesn't entail that it 
has to be performed by the agent herself. This might suggest 
that the reflexion be carried out by one's fellow citizens, in turn suggesting links with the concept of fama in Classical 
thought and with my arguments concerning the social character of deliberation In chapter six. 
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Chapter five 
Prohairesis (ID 
In this chapter, I continue to argue that the prohairetic structure is 
typically for the sake of a future end, and that this structure is 
central to human action. I concentrate not on the claim that action is 
directed towards the f inish of a life as in the case of the virtuous 
agent (see previous chapter), but rather on other ways in which action 
for the future typifies normal human action. 
Given the means-end structure of the prohairesir.., it might not be 
found surprising that acting for a future end is central to Aristotle's 
account of action. As soon as means and end are separated and this 
model used as the paradign of action, it might be said, it stands to 
reason that some tine is going to elapse before an end is obtained. 
Accordingly the end is going to be standardly a future one. 
I shall more to say in the next section about Aristotle's adoption of 
a paradigm of productive actions to account for phron8sis. But given 
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that he does standardly have such a paradigm in nind, a future end is 
always likely to be central to his account. If, say, be had adopted a 
paradigm of play for his account, the question of a future end for 
action would be more problematic. 
Aristotle certainly believes that it is distinctive of human beings 
to possess a sense of the future. For example, even where he suggests 
that some animals may have a sense of the future, he links the 
possession of this ability with phrr-mdsI--: 
.. even some of the lower animals are said to be x2hranfira, namely 
those wbich display a capacity for foresigbt EdulumiL 
prono6tik9n3. (EN VI 7 1141a. 25-28; cf 1139b5-9. See also 
disussion, chapter ten 94.00. ) 
And he is widely recognized to have used a craft paradigm for 
practical reason: 
For bim Re Aristotle] as for Socrates and Plato, the Craftsnan 
is a favourite paradigm of pz'actical xationality. 
I 
Nevertheless, the foregoing general explanation might be doubted. 
Following Greenwood2, we night adopt the distinction between 
constitutive means and productive means: if Aristotle regarded 
constitutive means as eligible to form part of the prohairests., then 
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it would not have to be the case that the end of the prohairesis, was 
temporally separate from the means. 
It would be fair to say that the textual evidence for Aristotle's 
making a distinction between the two types of means is minimal. 
Allan's claims to detect the distinction in De notu animalium 701agff 
are criticized by Wiggins-, and, in general, it appears that Aristotle 
remains oblivious to the distinction in his account of practical 
reasoning. But it would be enough if some of the central cases 
envisaged by Aristotle were in fact cases of constitutive means; for 
this would suggest that my analysis of the paradigm human action as 
directed to a temporally separate end would be difficult to sustain. 
2.01, Negative argunent. - the RN doesn't associate constitutive means 
with the prohairegis 
It is necessary first of all to confine our examination of this point 
to the EN. Although Aristotle's account of animal -including human 
animal- movement remains broadly the same throughout the corpus, 
there are differences of detail and the structure of the 12rohairesis. is 
one such point of detail. (Whether the differences are simply the 
result of differences of emphasis, or whether they result from 
substantive differences, perhaps as a consequence of Intellectual 
development over Aristotle's career, is a matter I shall not consider 
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in this thesis. ) To take 'the passage from De ivotu anlmali= cited 
above, at least one of the examples cannot be directly interpreted as 
being for the sake of a tenporally separate good: 
For example, wbenever someone thinks tbat ever7 man sbould take 
walks, and that be Is a man, at once be talres a walk. (De Motu 
Animalium: 7 701al4-15) 
So at f irst sight, here is a counterexanple to my account. However, 
701a35ff should put us on notice that we are not in precisely the 
same world as that of the Eff; f or there it is said that the sources of 
action are appetite (PpitbuTda), spiritedness (thiingr-) and wish 
(boul9sis). Rot only is there no mention of prohalresis, but the claim 
that wish initiates action seems contradicted by EN 111 2 1111b19-30- 
Moreover, as given, the example is bizarre: what sense can be made of 
a man who suddenly thinks that every man should take walks, and 
immediately goes off and walks? To save such an agent from the 
clutches of the alienist, the example needs a context. And to give the 
context is likely to beg the question about what sort of good the 
agent is aining at. 
Turning to the EX, the paradigm for rational action is predominantly 
that of a productive means to an end. Even in those cases where rule- 
case reasoning is apparently in point, I suggest that if it is asked 
for what good the action is being performed, on any plausible account, 
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that good must be future. 4 The explanation for this is simple: only an 
example where the action could be understood as good in itself -say, 
as in play or, perhaps, virtuous action- could a present good be 
plausibly attributed. Since Aristotle doesn't adduce such examples, he 
must standardly have action for a future good in mind, and, hence, 
productive means rather than constitutive means reasoning. It night be 
objected, however, that this misses the point. Firstly, the objection 
would go, it is necessary to distinguish between constitutive means 
reasoning and rule-case reasoning: although the latter reasoning nay 
be a subclass of the former, constituent means reasoning is far wider 
than simply rule-case reasoning. Secondly, given the first point, if 
Aristotle didn't include constituent means reasoning as part of his 
account of deliberation, then his account is simply wrong: practical 
reasoning in most cases just isn't the sorting out of means to a 
temporally separate end. 6 
My response to this objection is to admit at once that deliberation is 
wider than the sort of productive reasoning which Involves reasoning 
about the means to a fixed, separate end. I shall say sonething more 
about the intimacy and interdependence of means and end later in this 
chapter. But, as is argued extensively by Sarah Broadie, Aristotle's 
examples of reasoning in the EN and, a fdr-tiorl, the structure of the 
prohairesis itself, are not accounts of the process of deliberation, 
but rather the articulated results of that process. 6 Nor should it be 
assumed that the point of such articulation is to provide a sort of 
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decision procedure by which to assess -the goodness or badness of the 
reasoning. Given all this, the admission that practical reasoning is 
nore extensive than productive reasoning does not necessarily conflict 
with my view, which is that the product, of that reasoning can be 
articulated as a piece of productive reasoning, where the end is 
temporally separate from the means. This is the explanation, I would 
claim, for the considerable textual evidence that Aristotle's interest 
is primarily centred on models of action which are for a temporally 
separate end (eg EN 111 1 111la5-6; 1118al8-19; 111 3 1112b32-3), 
actions which are thus productive rather than constitutive means. 
Even were it to be argued that some of Aristotle's examples in the EX 
were, contrary to my arguments, best understood as examples of 
constitutive means reasoning, this evident bias towards a productive 
means model would still require explanation. As always, we are talking 
16a epi tQ palu and some exceptions to the general case would not 
necessarily constitute a refutation. 7 
3.00: Xarginal cases: actions not preceded by deliberation 
At first sight, it might well seen that prohairespis only represent a 
relatively small subset of voluntary (hpkan) actions since 
prohaireseis are preceded by deliberation MY 111 2 1112a15) and 
nothing done inmediately (P3ra1pbmA-, ) is done according to choice (kala 
proairesin) (EX 111 2 1111b9-10; cf EE 11 7 1224a2-4). Since, clearly, 
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those actions which are immediately preceded by a period of 
deliberation are indeed a very limited subset of anything we might 
understand as voluntary actions, it would seen to follow that 
prohairetic actions are also a limited subset. Accordingly, whatever 
might be said of the prohairetic structure would have only marginal 
inportance for understanding human actions. 
I intend to shew how actions understood under the description of 
prohaireseis are the prime example of actions which are stamped with 
the character of the agent. Although I can afford to be agnostic over 
whether or not probairetic actions form a very limited subset of 
voluntary action, if they do form such a subset, it will be essential 
to shew how those actions which realize the character of the agent 
and which are not preceded by deliberation -and, which accordingly, 
on this hypothesis, are not prohairetic- are illuminated by those 
actions which are prohairetic. In sun, either prohairetic actions are 
the statistically normal case of virtuous voluntary actions, or else 
the prohairetic structure of means for the sake of an end illuminates 
statistically normal actions. 
I begin by addressing the question of actions done exaiphnds (eg Eff 
111 2 1111b9-10). If this just meant 'done without an immediately 
preceding period of the agent's conscious deliberation'. then it would 
represent the statistically normal case of voluntary actions. I am 
going to suggest that we instead regard this category as one extreme 
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of a continuum of voluntary actions, at one end of which stand actions 
done PxAlphn6s, and at the other end of which stands action done after 
a very long and careful period of deliberation such as the phronimos' 
pursuit of widalTannia. In the following chapter, I shall also argue 
that deliberation by other individuals in the past of a culture can 
count for Aristotle as deliberation, and thus contend that the number 
of truly undeliberated actions is relatively small. In any case. being 
a prohalresis would thus be a matter of degree: the paradigm of the 
prohairesis has a great deal to say about the heavily deliberated 
actions but rather less to say about actions done PTAiphmA-;. The model 
still has something to say about actions done PxphainAR, however. and 
it is what it does have to say in this marginal area that I shall now 
try to expound. 
There are actions we do suddenly, which are perfectly reasonable 
actions in the circumstances, but which are self-evidently not 
statistically normal: of this sort are jumping out of the way of a car; 
grabbing a child away from danger, holding up one's hands to avert a 
blow -what might be called colloquially 'knee-jerk responses' or 
Iref lex actions'. Such actions are voluntary and it is an extremely 
good thing that we have them; anyone who didn't have have the ref lex 
of avoiding cars wouldn't last very long. But they nevertheless aren't 
typical actions: prereflectively, we might want to say that they aren't 
fully under our control, that we do them without thinking, that they 
are somewhat nechanical and Inflexible and, thus, in some 
162 
circumstances, can be dangerous. (The sort of thing I'm thinking of 
here is the putatively correct advice that, when attacked by a bear, 
the best thing to do is to suppress one's flight reflex and to play 
dead. ) 
If actions done exalphmA-z are such 'reflex' actions, then the fact that 
they are not done kata prohairesln would have little consequence for 
the statistically normal case of voluntary action. But even here, there 
is an articulable structure of acting for a future end. Such knee-jerk 
responses, after all, serve purposes, purposes which, moreover, the 
human agent, unlike the aninal, is conscious of as separate from the 
action, even if, in the case of 'reflex' actions, this consciousness nay 
only arrive after the event. (Could a 'reflex' action still be an 
action, rather than a true reflex like the knee Jerking when struck, if 
there couldn*t be an explanation of what future end the agent had been 
trying to achieve? ) 
The acting f or a future end structure latent in sudden actions 
illuminates some comments of Aristotle on the comparative 
disgracefulness of okmaja in anger and AIrrAri; % in epithumial (EN VII 
6 1149a24-b3). 
low it appears that anger does to some extent bear reason, but 
bears It wrong, just as basty servants burry out of the room 
before they have beard the whole of what you are saying, and so 
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mistake your orderý and as watch-dogs barlr at a mere Anock at 
the door, witbout waiting to see if It is a friend. Simll3r*lY 
anger, owing to the beat and swiftness of Its nature, bears, but 
does not bear the order given, and rushes off to talre vengeance. 
(114ga25-32) 
What Aristotle seems to be driving at here is that angry actions, just 
like 'knee-jerk responses', can be misplaced. The prnbalrests. which 
anger, in a sense, minics, is that, say, fighting someone is for the 
sake of avenging an insult: there's nothing wrong in itself in such a 
neans-end reflection -fighting someone ran sometimes avenge an 
insult- it is merely that now is not the right time for it. EgIhUximi- 
on the other hand, operate an another plane entirely, the world of 
childish immediate gratification, heedless of ends. It is in this sense 
that 
.. anger follows reason in a m3nner, but appitbumis does not. 
(1149bl-2) 
In retrospect, the angry man can provide a sort of explanation and 
Justification for his behaviour: 'I thought he had insulted me so I hit 
him to pay him back', Just as the hasty servant can provide a sort of 
explanation and Justification: 'I thought you told me to get the paper 
so I rushed out of the room'. In both rases, it is not that the end is 
wrong or that the means adopted to that end is wrong. but rather that 
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anger or haste has made one mistake the situation. The akratin in.. 
PplthUmiai however cannot offer such an explanation or justification, 
but only an apology. The continuum of action of the virtuous man -the 
paradigm man- even at the pole of actions done PxaiphnAr,, thus 
remains interpretable in terms of the acting for a future end 
structure. 
4.00: The intimacy between mean-, Anfi P-nd in the prohairesis 
I have argued above that the putative prohairetic: structure of means 
for the sake of af uture end can illuminate human action including 
even the marginal case of actions done exaiphn6s. But is there 
anything more to the notion of a prohairesis. beyond the claim that 
human actions are characteristically done for the sake of future ends? 
If there isn't, why develop the notion of a 12rohairesis, which I have 
analyzed as a description under which an action is performed. which 
describes the action, not just as means, nor as end, but as means to 
an end? Why not just say that the reason or motivation for an action 
characteristically derives from an end? 
To understand the force of this possibility, consider Nagel's analysis 
of desires. He distinguishes between unmotivated desires -such as the 
desire to drink- which arise of their own accord, and motivated 
desires which arise from the force of reasons: thus, I desire to lay 
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in drink f or my round the world voyage because I reason that will be 
thirsty in the future. As Nagel puts it: 
Hunger is produced by lack of food, but is not motivated tbereby. 
A desire to sbap for groceries, after discovering notbing 
appetizing in the refrigerator, is on the other band motivated by 
bunger. 13 
Now, in Aristotelian terns, hunger is an epithumia (EN 111 11 1118b8- 
11): as such, it is a pathos, sonething which happens to someone 
rather than something which an agent does (EY 11 5 1105blg-23; EE II 
2 122Obl2-14). So the Aristotelian gloss on 'unmotivated' would be 
that the desire Just pops into an agent's mind unbidden. For an 
Aristotelian, the really interesting question Is: what does the agent 
do about this patt=? 
The point is that there is nothing that follows on naturally or 
innediately from this pathos If I am hungry, I still have to devote 
some thought to what I am going to do about it. It might be objected 
here that there is the f ollowing case: I see a piece of cake and am 
overcome with such a desire for it that I Just can't stop myself from 
snatching it. low it can't be denied that there are cases like this but 
they seem to fall under what Aristotle describes as bestiality (EN VII 
1 1145al5-17; 6 1149b26-1150a8): the complete heedlessness of the 
propriety of acting on the epithumia seems to belong to a morbid 
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character rather than to a sane one. Indeed, the only examples of this 
sort of behaviour in adults that readily spring to mind are all 
criminal: it is, for example, the sort of irresistible urge that 
rapists night plead. And as in most cases of rape, it is rather 
unbelievable as an explanation of behaviour precisely because it is so 
inhuman. Aristotle's understanding of animal movement is as a quasi- 
mechanical response to a stimulus: it is precisely because the 
response of a normal adult isn't quasi-nechanical that desire as 
epithunla is inadequate to explain paradigmatic human behaviour. 
So if we keep a very firm Aristotelian concentration on the action 
itself rather than any background to It, what Aristotle would seem to 
be saying is that human actions typically take account of what is to 
be achieved in the future: that, in Nagel's terms, all actions are 
motivated. The conclusion that human actions are normally for the sake 
of a future event is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, and 
my arguments in future chapters will build an this Interpretation. I 
think, however, Aristotle nay be saying rather more than this in his 
emphasis on the prohairesis as the paradigmatic description of action; 
and we can approach this strand by looking again at Nagel's account. 
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Nagel argues that if you have a reason to pursue an end, you thereby 
have a reason to pursue the means: 
Ve may say that if being thirsty provides a reason to drink, 
then it also provides a reason for wbat enables one to drink. 
That can be regarded as the consequence of a perfectly general 
property of reasons for action: they transmit their Influence 
over the relation between ends and neans: 9 
A related view is espoused by Charles in his discussion of neans-end 
reasoning in Aristotle. His argument goes essentially as follows. If I 
desire an end 'e' and I believe that if a means Im' exists, then le' 
will occur, I will desire 'n'. Thus, if I desire a republic, and I 
believe this will occur if the Queen dies, I desire that the Queen 
dies. Charles explains the transmission of desire from end to means 
by characterizing desire as a node of accepting a proposition with its 
own rules of inference separate from the rules of deductive reasoning 
which apply only to that mode of accepting propositions which is 
thinking then: 
If desire is a mode of accepting these propositicns ... the 
prppositions thus accepted stand connected in a way w-hich 
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explains bow the conclusion is valid17 inferred from the 
premisses. 1 0 
Thus, Bagel's general claim that reasons 'transmit their influence over 
the relation between end and means' is glossed for Aristotle as the 
claim that accepting propositions in the mode of desire is 
characterized by sui generls rules of inference which allow the 
validity of neans-end reasoning. 
It is important to notice what Charles is not arguing here. Charles 
adopts a common distinction made between two forms of Aristotelian 
practical reasoning: the means-end type referred to above and the 
rule-case type where Ja pica ta WA is understood to refer to 
Instances- of the rule. It is sometimes thought that there is a 
general problem in applying the rules of deductive logic to practical 
reasoning. This can't be Charles' claim here, however, for he accepts 
the deductive validity of rule-case practical reasoning. " So his 
problem is not with practical reasoning in general but purely with the 
specific 'means-end' form of it. 
It is very hard in general to know what to make of a claim that 
practical reasoning of any sort makes use of a sui generis pattern of 
inference and I would want to resist any suggestion that what we are 
dealing with in practical reasoning is anything else other than a 
particular application of common- or-garden logic. 12 But for present 
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purposes, my objection is rather to the Idea that, however it occurs. 
the goodness of a means simply follows from the goodness of the end 
and the effectiveness of the means to that end; for by stopping at 
this simple idea of transmission, howsoever glossed. we lose sight of 
a crucial aspect of practical reasoning, namely, that the goodness or 
badness of the means, in itself, will affect not only the means-end 
calculation -I may not desire a means if it is really shabby- but also 
our perception of the goodness of the end. 
It is undoubtedly characteristic of human beings according to 
Aristotle to use means-end calculation which indeed implies the 
transmission of goodness from end to means. But to stop there would 
undoubtedly be vicious: to murder someone to obtain money for a good 
purpose might be effective, but it is not virtuous. Just because 
Aristotle says that deinotlýs -the ability to find effective means- is 
a praiseworthy ability when devoted to good ends (EY VI 12 1144a23- 
28), this doesn't mean that the virtuous man will always pursue 
effectiveness regardless of all other considerations. If 101 represents 
the means described independently of its being a means to the end. 'X' 
the end and 'ý' the prohairesis of 'i-for-the- sake- of-x '. the virtuous 
agent will be good at balancing the claims of the following 
considerations: 
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1) How ef fective is 0 as a means to x? 
2) How good is x? 
3) How good is 4? 
His affirmation of 'ý as good' will depend on and itself condition his 
assessment and balancing of those three considerations. For example, 
if the only ways I can obtain great riches involve distorting my life 
-say, by trampling on friends; ignoring family etc- this really had 
better affect my view of great riches as a good: although there is 
some sense in saying that, though the end is good, the means to it are 
unacceptable, we end up living in a phantasy if we hold tight to the 
belief that the end is good if there isn't and couldn't be any good 
way to obtain it. To take two of Aristotle's own examples, professional 
soldiers and sailors face dangers that would daunt others because they 
possess the means by dint of their skill and experience to deal with 
them (EX 111 8 1116b3-15; EE 111 1 1230a4-14): this is one way in 
which the neans affects perception of the end, even, in such cases, 
changing the perception of what the end is. (Cf: 'The common problem, 
yours, mine, every one's, / Is not to fancy what were fair in life/ 
Provided it could be, -but, finding first/ What nay be, then find how 
to make It fair/ Up to our means -a very different thing! ' (Browning: 
Bishop Blougram's Apology. )) 
It is this balancing of considerations that is reflected in the 
description of the action as prohairer-la, and in the f inding of that 
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prnhalreaig good. Ind It nust be emphasized: there Isn't a bare action 
and a cluster of descriptions around it. vhat an action is is 
inseparable from the description under which it is performed'. and the 
description or descriptions under which it is performed are a 
substantive question for the agent, not a merely arbitrary ChOicm: 
thus, someone who does not regard herself as acting under the 
description of a prohalres1n. or who acts under the wrong sort of 
prnhalregis is acting differently fr= someone who effects the same 
changes in the world but who acts virtuously. Consider. for example, 
the case of the characters in the film the Seven Samurai. One fights 
in order to obtain great wealth -the wrong One fights 
because that is just the sort of purposeless fighting that S=urai do 
-not a prohalres1s. at all. The virtuous samurai -and perhaps it is the 
realization of this which forms the heart of the film- uses his 
fighting skills to allow the peasants to continue a life essentially 
foreign to his own -the correct prn1, n1rPF_Aq. 
It might be objected to all this that there is no point In worrying 
about how the agent herself understands her actions: all that is 
inportant is the effects in the world that they produce. So, the 
Objection might continue. the complexities of Aristotle's account Of 
action have no practical purpose and can be dispensed with. But 
Aristotle's analysis does at least have a prag=atic point: unless the 
agent has the correct understanding of her actions, in the long run, 
she will go wrong and produce the wrong effects. " Professional 
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soldiers, apparently courageous for most of the tine, differ in motive 
from the truly courageous, and, accordingly, will in some circumstances 
break when the truly courageous will stand (EN 111 8 111015-23). The 
point in discriminating descriptions under which the agent acts is 
that, in the long run, different effects will result. 14 
The intimacy of means and end in the prohairesis is of marginal 
importance to the main argument of this thesis. Part of its importance 
is simply in gesturing at some of the other aspects of Aristotle's 
account of practical reason which are not to be covered here. On the 
other hand, in addressing the balancing between the goodness of the 
means and the goodness of the end which Inform the goodness of the 
prohaires1s, I have introduced some of the issues to which I will 
return in chapters seven and eight, where I discuss the virtuous 
agent's enjoyment of her virtuous actions. 
I have again argued in this chapter for the claim that the prohairetic 
description of an action is for a future end. As a subsidiary matter, I 
have suggested that the intinacy of neans and end within the 
prohaires1r, reveals an important feature of human rationality: that 
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the goodness of a future end and the goodness of the present neans to 
that end are not completely separable. 
In the following chapter, my intention is further to defend the 
centrality of the probairetlc description to human action. Aristotle 
defines the prnhalrgnig as being preceded by deliberation; and I 
attempt to show how this quality of deliberation. which might 
otherwise be thought to limit the prohalrgmi-m to a very small class of 
actions, In fact illuninates a central feature of human culture. 
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Notes to chapter five 
1. Broadie 2991, pl8l. 
2. Greenwood 1909, pp46-7. 
3. In Rorty 1980, pp229-230. 
4. Charles 1984 lists five exanples of 'rule-case' reasoning in the 
EN (p262). I take these in turn. 
1142a2O-23: Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility 
of error., you may go wrong either in your general principle or in 
your particular fact., for instance, either in asserting that all 
beavy water Is unwholesome, or that the particular water in 
question is beavy. 
Colmynent: that practical reasoning may involve general 
facts and particular facts Is certain. But this example says 
nothing about actions and accordingly says nothing about 
constitutive means reasoning and the temporal discreteness of 
goods. 
1144a2g-34: For deductive inferences about matters of conduct 
always have a major premiss of the farm 'Since the End or 
Supreme Good is so and so, (wbatever it may be, since we may 
take it as anytbing we like for the sake of the argument) ..... 
Comment: it is not clear that this example necessarily 
concerns constitutive means reasoning or, indeed, rule-case 
reasoning at all. 
2147a5-7: .. for example, le rie the agent] mjy Irnow and 
be 
conscious of the knowledge that dry food is good for every man 
and tbat be bimself is a man... 
r-nTnynpnt: as 1142a2O-23 above. 
1147a. 29-30: For example, given the premisses 'All sweet things 
ought to be tasted' and 'Yonder thing is sweet' -a particular 
instance of the general class-, you are bound, if able and not 
prevented, immediately to taste the thing. 
Cmmment: the action suggested by this reasoning 
results in an end (eating) temporally discrete from the means to 
that end (reaching out to take it). 
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1147a3l-34: Vhen tberafore there Is present in the mind on the 
one band a universal Judgment saying 'All sweet things are 
pleasant, ' and a minor premiss 'Yonder thing is sweet' (and it is 
this minor premiss that Is active), and when desire 1ej21thumI I 
is present at the same time, then, though the lbrmer universal 
Judgment says 'Avoid that thing, ' the desire leads you to it.. 
rnTnmt-nt: as 1147a2g-30 above. 
Of all these examples, only 1147a2g-30 and 1147a3l-34 appear in 
any way likely to prove counterexamples to the claim that 
Aristotle is exclusively interested in productive rather than 
constitutive means. Even here, the emphasis is doing something to 
bring something else in the future about. I accordingly hold that 
at least the weaker and sufficiently strong claim that Aristotle 
is pr'edcninantly interested in productive means is proved. 
5. This, I take it, would be an objection made in the spirit of 
Viggins', 'Deliberation & Practical Reason', pp221-240 Rotty 1980. 
6. Broadie 1991 chapter 4, pp179-265. Cf p232: 
.. since the application of the decision can Itself be analyzed 
Into 'premisses'.. Its Is easy to slip into the error of 
confusing tbe process of deliberation witb the decision in wbich 
it results. 
7. Annas 1993 p91-4 argues that the model of practical reasoning 
especially in Book III of the EN reflects the pattern of the 
learner aiming at putting into effect a fixed end, whilst, 
especially in Book VI, Aristotle operates with a model of the 
mature agent being immediately sensitive to what should be done. 
(Aristotle also has some confused views about the role of rule- 
case reasoning in a mature person's thought. ) Annas summarizes 
the position in ancient ethics as follows (plOS): 
In general, we can see that there is no cme favoured paradigm Of 
moral reasoning; fdr all the schools it is more important to 
stress the d1fferences between the beginner and the fully 
virtuous.. 
My view is that, whatever the differences between tyro and 
expert in bow they reason, what they are reasoning for is the 
future, and paradigmatically for how their lives end; and it is 
this articulable aim, whatever differences may exist between 
different reasoners, which normally unites human agents. 
8. Nagel 'Desires, Prudential Motives, and the Present', pp154-5 in 
Raz 1978. 
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9. ibid p158. 
10. Charles 1984 p263. 
11. ibid pp262-3. 
12. For a defence of this sort of position, see GEM Anscombe, On 
Practical Infex-ence in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn. 
13. To avoid any possibility of misconstrual, it must be emphasized 
here that this understanding isn't itself an interior, purely 
introspectible act: what an agent understands herself to be doing 
is a public matter, answerable by the agent herself as primary, 
but not final or sole witness. (See chapter four, 62.02. ) 
14. The point made at EN 111 9 1117bl7-19 that soldiers who have no 
goods to lose other than life itself might face greater dangers 
than those who are more courageous but have do possess goods is 
a correction to the claim that the truly courageous will always 
resist greater dangers than agents who only possess ai variety of 
sham-courage. It is not, however, a counterexample to my claim 
that discriminating descriptions under which the agent acts has 
as its point discriminating long run effects; the truly 
courageous will act differently from the sham courage shewn by 
the destitute; that, on occasions, we night prefer to have those 
with sham courage fighting for us does not alter the fact that, 
in the ideal state, we would prefer to have the truly courageous 
as citizens. 
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Chapter six 
Prohairesis UID 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that the prohairesls is the 
articulable structure of an action and that this structure makes 
reference to a future end. 
In order to suggest that Aristotle's analysis of the prohairiesis thus 
understood lies at the heart of his analysis of human action, I have 
to explain how another feature of the prohairesis -that it is preceded 
by deliberation- can be a central feature of human action. I shall do 
this by arguing that the deliberation referred to is not necessarily 
that of the individual herself, but may simply be that performed by 
previous generations of her culture. My aim in this chapter is 
therefore to provide further evidence In favour of the view that the 
prnhairesis typifies human action and that an understanding of it is 
thus extremely important in articulating the audience's existing life. 
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Before presenting my account of the deliberation which precedes the 
prohairesis, I shall make a few general remarks regarding the process 
by which we learn to act under any sort of description. 
I have argued that Aristotle believes that actions hOa e; I ta RQ1U 
possess an articulable structure. The prohairetic structure takes the 
general form of for the sake of xI where 1#1 is an action under a 
description which does not refer to the end, and where 'x' is a 
temporally separate end. 
So how do we learn to act under such a description? A child, when it 
learns to act, learns pari passu to describe her actions. Sometimes it 
is through a running commentary on actions initiated by the child: 
'That's right, you pick up bunny and give him a pat. Yes, he likes 
having his ears stroked. ' Sometimes it is the parent who initiates the 
actions on which he comments: 'Now, off we go to bed, yes, that's the 
way. Let's put on our shoes and socks. there we go. ' Sometimes it is 
by learning to obey an order: 'Don't put that coin in your mouthl' 
which produces an effect, initially, as the baby Jumps at the sudden 
noise, latterly, as the child learns that what she is doing is putting 
a coin In her mouth and that she shouldn't. 
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Actions are accordingly learnt with their descriptions: unlike the 
world of objects -and even here we would have to make the point 
carefully- where there is some sense in saying that the object is 
encountered first and then the description. In the world of action, 
learning to act is inseparable from learning to describe those 
actions: for a child to learn to act rather than just move In the 
simple manner of a baby, she has to learn to become conscious of what 
she is doing, and that means learning to act under a description. 
For a child to learn to see his actions as being under a description 
is to learn to bring his behaviour under his own control. But to be 
able to describe his own actions, he has to learn to see himself 
through adult eyes: what the child nay think of as being great fun 
nay be seen by his parents as a violent assault on a younger brother. 
Getting the description right in childhood is a matter for much of the 
time of getting the same description as those adults in authority over 
you. It is important to see that the agent is never in the position of 
a radical translator: just as the child doesn't start out with a 
complete set of actions which he then learns to describe, equally, he 
doesn't start out with his own set of descriptions which he then has 
to translate into the language of the adult world. His learning to act, 
learning to act under a description and learning to act under the 
description others would give of his actions are inseparably linked. 
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Having argued that learning to act and learning to act under a 
description are inseparably linked, I now turn to those descriptions 
which are offered as reasons for acting. (Here I use the term 'reason' 
in a wide non-technical sense to cover any description for an action 
which would be offered as a justification to others for its 
perf ornance. ) 
Learning to act under a description isn't just a matter of reading off 
descriptions from a manual. Apart from the very earliest stages of 
childhood and the very simplest actions, how we describe our actions 
and what we do is a matter for dispute. And this isn't just an 
accidental f eature of modern liberal democracies: although the great 
variety and apparent deeply unresolvable nature of the disputes might 
be characteristic of a particular type of society, no society can exist 
without some conflict and disagreement. And given that we are 
particularly concerned with that large, complex and litigious form of 
social organization which was the Greek city state, we have no reason 
to believe that Aristotle expected that conflict and competing demands 
could be eliminated from social organization. 
If human beings are to work together with other human beings, they 
need to be able to agree, to some extent, on what they are doing. 
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Sometimes this agreement will be spontaneous. This will be 
particularly the case with families and friends where, living together 
over a long period, they have come to share an understanding of their 
actions. But in larger groups, spontaneous agreement will be lacking, 
and agreement will have to be obtained by discussion. To obtain 
agreement, actions will have to be characterized by descriptions which 
act as reasons ie descriptions which are persuasive to the other 
members of the group. For a group to exist, it needs ways of resolving 
conflict or disagreement without dissolving itself: the possession of 
a common language of reasons fulfils part of this function by placing 
boundaries an the dispute and guiding the gaze of the disputants 
towards the sane direction. 
So part of a child's learning to act is learning where the grey areas 
are, where there is a possibility of different views on what he is 
doing. Getting it right here isn't a matter of coming up with a 
uniquely correct description, but rather of using the right words to 
talk about what one is doing -'pursuing freedom and democracy' say, 
rather than 'pursuing my own enrichment at the expense of the 
country'- of staying within the boundaries of socially acceptable 
behaviour -eg disapproving of sex outwith marriage but not screaming 
abuse at anyone who indulges- and of looking to the right authorities 
to provide guidance and the correct characterization and descriptions 
of courses of action -asking and even delegating the power of deciding 
an action's description to, say, schoolteachers ar priests or parents 
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ar friends, all of whom may be regarded as legitimate authorities even 
when they disagree, but ignoring the advice of pederasts, criminals 
and bullies. 
In the light of these general remarks, I now return to Aristotle. 
Aristotle suggests that a prohalresir-I must be preceded by deliberation 
(EY 111 2 1112al5-17). It seems to follow that only a very few actions 
can be prohairesels because only a very few actions are deliberated on 
consciously before they are performed. 
If we want to argue that most actions either are prohaireseis or are 
closely related to prohaireselS, this presents us with a problem. One 
solution is to simply insist that for every agent there is a 
temporally extended process of deliberation immediately preceding most 
actions. ' The objection to such an account Is, bluntly, that it is 
untrue. Accordingly, unless we are to attribute a patently false theory 
to Aristotle, this interpretation is unacceptable. The commonest 
approach is to deny that Aristotle actually means that there is a 
process of deliberation preceding every action that is necessarily 
temporally extended, but instead to take him as meaning that there is 
a logical order In deliberation and the prohairesis that can be, if 
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required, set out over time. 2 Although this would be a less 
philosophically objectionable position, it does tend to sit ill with 
the textual evidence within the discussions in Books III and VI of the 
Ell, where a process taking place in time is suggested: thus. 
deliberation is described as a seeking and a calculating (ha d& 
bouleuumenos zAtpi kai logizetal EN VI 9 1142bl-2). 
Another position is hinted at in a paper by Sorabji3 where he argues 
that the agent develops her view of the good life by, in part, using 
her reason to reflect upon it. This conception then influences her 
actions, consciously or unconsciously. This suggests that the 
deliberation which precedes the prohalresir, is that process of coning 
to a view of a good life which is part of forming one's own character, 
and which can take place well before any action. To give a simple 
example, if I have thought long and hard about conjugal fidelity and 
come to the resolution that I will not be unfaithful to my wife, then 
the next tine I am of f ered the opportunity of a one night stand, I nay 
reject it without, at that time, having to deliberate about whether or 
not to accept it. 
Some such account may well be part of Aristotle's understanding of 
deliberation and 12rohairesls. However, I think it right to be more 
sceptical than is Sorabji about the amount of deliberation that is 
required by an agent, even over the course of her entire life. Thus, I 
would not think it true, as a philosophical or exegetical matter, that 
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an agent necessarily has to develop a conception of the good life in 
that fairly explicit and philosophical way that Sorabji requires. 4 That 
said, I am sure that the agent's own deliberation in the formation of 
her own character is part of what is to be understood by Aristotle's 
claim that deliberation precedes the prohairesis even if I am less 
convinced that this deliberation by the agent herself should be 
characterized in precisely the way that Scrabji suggests. 
Given doubts about the plausibility of an agent's explicit and 
philosophical deliberation, it seems sensible to consider whether 
Sorabji's account of the development of character by the agent's own 
deliberation can be supplemented in any way. Given my account in 
chapter three, one way would be if the agent stood in a relationship 
of philia to another agent, the phron1mos, who had indeed subjected 
his life to a fairly thoroughgoing scrutiny. Such an account would 
follow Sorabji's line of argument, in that the phronimos would have 
developed his character by dint of practical reason over the course of 
his life, but would gain additional plausibility in that it would be 
necessary to argue only that such deliberation was actually performed 
by a few individuals, with the relationship of philla allowing many 
others to share in it. 
In what follows, I shall pursue a further possibility. Ando6 revives 
the Averroist speculation that the active intellect referred to in De 
Anina 111 5 is single, eternal and immaterial and thus shared in by 
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human agents rather than being a personal mental possession such as 
the memory. A Hegelian twist is given to the speculation, however, by 
Ando's identification of active intellect with the Idealist objective 
mind', which is to say, the system of science and culture within a 
society. ', Such thoughts are likely to have analytical philosophers 
reaching for their guns. If such an approach were plausible, however, 
it might suggest that the deliberation which preceded the puLlimaia 
was effected by the society or culture within which an agent lived 
rather than by the agent herself. Such a possibility has additional 
p. rina facie attractiveness because deliberation within a society does 
seem more likely to be of a high level philosophical kind than that 
effected by an individual. I accordingly now turn to consider whether 
such a line is in fact defensible. 
Aristotle regards the existence of the pDlia as the outcome of a 
process of historical development. At the earliest stage of that 
development, human beings Just live in households: as he states, human 
beings are pairing animals even more than they are political animals 
in that the family is a more fundamental form of partnership than the 
p-gliz. (EN VIII 7 1162al6-19). Gradually, through the grouping together 
of families into villages and villages into polels, human beings nave 
from just living to living well (Pal 11 1252a24ff). As the basis for 
all such social life, there is friendship or philla (EN VIII 9 1159b25- 
32; ibid 12 1161bll-12). PhIlla isn't just a feeling, but involves 
prnhairesiR and virtue (EN VIII 5 1157b2g-32; ibid 1 1155a3-5). 
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Aristotle accordingly believes that human beings associate because 
they deliberate and come to the conclusion that their life will be 
better if they live together in a particular form of social grouping. 
Thus all social groupings are formed with a view to attaining some 
good (Pol 11 1252alff), the pajja for the sake of the human good 
61MPUCitez-, all other partnerships for some specific advantage (EK 
VIII 9 1160a8-30). 
The Aristotelian view of history is accordingly one where the present 
state of any society is the result of deliberation. But the present 
state of a society will include its language and, more particularly, 
the descriptions of actions which it regards as reasons and therefore 
as persuasive. As Aristotle points out, it is a sharing of the language 
of such reasoning which allows social groupings to exist: 
And why man Is a political animal in a greater measure than any 
bee or gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does 
nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses 
speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and 
pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well 
(for their nature has been developed so far as to bave awareness 
of wbat is painful and pleasant and to signify those things to 
one another), but speech Is designed to Indicate the advantageous 
and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for 
it is tbe special property of man in distinction from the other 
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animals that be alone bas perception of gDod and bad and riFbt 
and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in 
these things that makes a bousehold and a city-state. (Pol 11 
1253a7-18) 
low, the weak claim that our practices of reasoning are. in some 
sense, historically conditioned seems certainly true. It seems 
undeniable that, for example, the teachings of Christianity have 
affected the way we think and talk about our actions and our lives# 
whether or not we are Christians. But the stronger claim that these 
practices and, indeed, our history have been the result of a process 
of deliberation is certainly open to criticism. An alternative view 
would be that we inherit a collection of shards, an inconsistent 
combination of fragments of traditions that were coherent in 
themselves, but which have broken down under the accidental 
circumstances of history to form an incoherent ness. This. for 
example, would appear to be the view of Alasdair MacIntyre .7 
The issue seems to come to a head in the concept of a tradition. 
MacInytre, for example, seems to regard a tradition as something that 
is essentially an intellectual system, one which nay indeed, at any 
tine, embody unstated, unreflected practices, but which will constantly 
reflect on itself and subject itself to rational criticism under the 
tests of truth. Another conception is that a tradition is a collection 
of inherited practices which are only reflected on to the extent that 
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they conf lict, but then less under the tests of truth and rare in the 
light of achieving compossibility and avoiding acute conflict. 13 These 
conceptions of tradition aren't absolutely distinct: the 'inherited 
practice' view, for example, can't avoid all theoretical reflection on 
its inheritance; but they do nonetheless represent substantively 
different tendencies. 9 
Each of these conceptions will provide a different account of 
deliberation. The former 'reflective' view will equate deliberation with 
the search for rational coherence and truth in the inheritance. The 
latter 'inherited practice' view will equate deliberation with 
negotiation and the search for agreement rather than truth. The 
exegetical point at issue is this: if Aristotle understood deliberation 
on the reflective model, it is unlikely that the view that history is 
deliberated could be maintained: the present is just too intellectually 
incoherent and it is unlikely that much more could be said of. say, 
the Athenian p_C)]Ja. If, however, his concept of deliberation includes 
the inherited practice view, then, from the fact that, ex bypotbesi, we 
are dealing with nations and cities that have at least sufficient 
unity of lives to be recognized as nations and cities, there will at 
least be a prima facie cas6 for believing that history is a process of 
deliberation and, accordingly, our present practices and institutions - 
our objective mind- are the results of that process. 
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3.01. - Aristotle's view nf deliberation as a process of negotiati= 
The f irst point to make is that Aristotle's theory of practical reason 
is primarily concerned with those people who rule Cpol 111 2 
1277al4ff). " The reason for this is broadly clear. A person who is 
not a ruler has fewer of her own actions in her power: more of what 
she does will be the result of external compulsion. Since we only 
choose (proaireitai) what can be secured by our own efforts CEN 111 2 
1111b19-30), and, to the extent that the origin of an act is outside 
us, that act is not our own (EN 111 1 1110b15-17), it follows that the 
paradigm case of prohairetic action will be that of a ruler. 
Aristotle seems to assume that what happens in a society is, broadly, 
controlled by its rulers. " For every primary human social grouping, 
there are people who are rulers of that grouping (Pol 11 1252a6-23). 
Households and villages don't just drift into larger social groupings, 
but do so deliberately in order to achieve a better life (eg Pol 11 
1252b27-30). Xoreover, the actual uniting of villages into a city 
governed by law and Justice is attributable to human, indeed, 
individual action (Pol 11 1253a3O-31). That means for any change in a 
society that does not completely destroy that society (cf Pol 111 1 
1276al6ff), there will be a group of people or an individual to whom 
the change can be attributed. This would even seem to be the case f or 
changes resulting from external forces such as, say, famine or 
invasion; f or the response to such external f orces is still, in a 
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diminished but nonetheless important sense, still up to the agent (EN 
III I 1110a4-19). 
Before developing the consequences of this assumption, let us stop to 
consider whether it is at all defensible. It is, certainly, the case 
that it is defensible for certain specific states. The United Kingdom, 
for example, has enjoyed a continuous development of its forms of 
government for nearly a thousand years. Although the 'top-down' 
approach of traditional historiography with its concentration an the 
doings and sayings of kings and parliaments has been criticized and 
partially supplanted by a sociological approach which abandons a 
concentration an the rulers of a country as an engine of change in 
favour of, say, the consequences of developments within the economic 
base, the former approach was able to account for enough at least to 
appear viable as a method for understanding and explaining the 
present state of the Kingdom. So an Aristotelian history of the United 
Kingdom would appear to have prina facie plausibility and, similarly, 
would appear plausible for any society with a relatively long and 
continuous constitutional development. 
Now although Aristotle couldn't claim that every social grouping was 
necessarily the result of a consciously directed historical process, he 
could plausibly claim that any pDIJa sized society which had a claim 
to allow human beings to lead the good life would have such a history. 
Inagine a Year Zero pIL11a. One possibility would be the 'destructive' 
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Year Zero: a destruction of all that had gone bef ore and a creation of 
a society ab InItic (cf Bepublic 501c; 540e-541b). Another possibility 
would be the 'foundational' Year Zero: where, say, a new colony of 
necessity has to create a new constitution. Consider the foundational 
model. Although the institutional framework would be newly created, 
the characters of the citizens and, thus, the institutions themselves 
would be conditioned by history: thus, the creation of the Constitution 
of the United States, although a new foundation for a new society has 
a history largely traceable through British history. Turning to the 
destructive model, is it likely that any society created in this way 
would actually realize human happiness? Opinions might differ on this, 
but it is certainly at the least a highly plausible claim that a good 
society can only develop over the generations, and that all a 
destructive nodel could produce would be tyranny and human misery. 
Aristotle would accordingly only be unable to account for those 
societies which have arisen ab Initio from a destructive Year Zero 
past, or which tended towards such a pole. But this failure would be 
acceptable because the lack of historical influence would result in a 
thoroughly awful society: the goodness of a society would be in 
proportion to the extent that society's state was conditioned by its 
deliberated history. With respect to a society in which Aristotle had 
a direct interest -that of Athens- he evidently considered its 
constitutional history to have had sufficient influence an the 
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contemporary state of that city to Justify devoting forty-one chapters 
of sixty-nine to its developnent, in the Atbenian Constitution. 
Aristotle's notion of a historical process controlled by rulers; 12 and 
influencing the present state of a palia does accordingly seen to have 
prima facie plausibility. But would the bargaining and negotiation and 
dealing of constitutional history be regarded by Aristotle as 
deliberation? 
It should be noted f irstly that, when discussing deliberation in the 
EI, Aristotle's mind inmediately turns to political deliberation and 
the politician Pericles for paradigms (EY VI 5 1140b7-11). 
Now, there is considerable debate in the literature as to whether 
Aristotle's conception of deliberation in the EN is a narrow seeking 
after means to a pre-defined end or, alternatively, a broader process 
of practical reasoning in which ends can be reviewed and amended. 13 
The important question for the moment, however, isn't how Aristotle 
thought deliberation should be modelled, but rather to what he thought 
that model should be applied. If Aristotle thought that political 
debate and discussion counted as deliberation, then, even if he thought 
-erroneously, perhaps- that such debate could be modelled as a 
deliberation of means to end, this would be irrelevant: it would remain 
the case that he believed deliberation accounted for constitutional 
change and, thus, night be said to precede prohaireseis. 
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In fact, when we turn from the discussions of deliberation in the EN 
to the discussion of deliberative rhetoric in the Rbetaric, we find 
much that is immediately familiar. Firstly, we find that the same verb 
Qouleuomai) is used to refer to deliberation carried out by a group 
rather than by an individual (Rhet A2 1357al-7; cf BY VI 5 
1140a20.111 Secondly, we find the same rather perplexing emphasis on 
deliberation's being addressed to means rather than ends (Rhet A6 
1362al8-20; cf EN VI 9 1142b28-33). Thirdly, deliberation is said to 
be aimed at eudaimmia (Rhet A5 136Ob4-9). Finally, in view of my 
enphasizing the importance of the human sense of future time in 
practical reason, it is interesting to note that the orientation of 
deliberation towards the future is also emphasized by Aristotle (Rhet 
A3 1358bl3-14). 
Although Aristotle certainly emphasizes the rational, truth seeking 
aspects of rhetoric more than did some of his contemporaries' r-, 
rhetoric isn't just the art of presenting log-ically compelling 
arguments -although it involves this art- but rather the art of 
persuasion generally (Rhet A2 1355b25-26), even if this persuasion 
relies on non-rational means such as influencing the audience through 
their emotions (Rhet B1 13M20-1378a5). 
We can conclude from this that negotiation certainly would be covered 
by the tern 'deliberation' as far as Aristotle was concerned. So if 
Aristotle held a fairly commonsense low view of the to-ings and fro- 
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ings of history, he would still be entitled to conclude that the 
results of the present were preceded by deliberation. 
I have assumed, rather than argued, that the process of history is too 
messy to count as deliberation on a 'high' view which emphasizes the 
truth seeking aspects of deliberation: this I take to be the most 
plausible claim. I have just argued that, even on such a view, there is 
good reason to believe that Aristotle would have regarded historical 
process as deliberation. Say, on the other hand, that he did hold a 
high view of history. Two possibilities spring into mind which I shall 
mention, without pursuing in detail. Firstly, he could simply argue 
that, as a matter of fact, history had been directed by rulers 
consciously seeking out the truth about what they should do. Vhilst I 
take it that such a factual claim is implausible, if found true, it 
would provide a very simple and direct account of the role of 
deliberation in the historical process. Alternatively, it night be held 
that, even though the conscious direction of history by rulers was not 
particularly high minded, being aimed at, say, their individual 
satisfaction rather than at human good, the effects, through some 
'hidden hand' mechanism, were like the effects of a high notion of 
deliberation. Again in this case, although the deliberation would - 
unless we are to imagine some Hegelian-like 'Absolute Spirit' doing the 
deliberation- be 'as-if' deliberation had taken place rather than 
actually because It had taken place, there would still be a relatively 
straightforward sense In which the model of prohairesis as preceded 
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by deliberation would serve to illuminate our understanding of human 
action. Accordingly, although I would suggest that the 'low' view is 
the more plausible, both as an interpetation of Aristotle and as a 
philosophical Position, either of these high views would also, and 
indeed more straightforwardly, Justify the claim that the present is 
the result of deliberation. 
I havd argued that Aristotle holds that the history of a polia is a 
deliberated process, in which the aims and desires of the rulers are 
negotiated and agreements arrived at which have affected the present 
state of the palia. I shall now proceed to argue that this process of 
deliberation determines the prohairesela on which agents act and that, 
accordingly, it is this historical process of deliberation which, at 
least partly, explains Aristotle's contention that all prn'hRiregPis are 
preceded by deliberation and that prohairesels either represent the 
statistically normal case of human action or else illuminate that 
statistically normal case. 
In a very general way. it f irstly seens plausible that how an agent 
understands her actions Is, broadly, the result of a historical 
process (I except the case of a destructive Year Zero society). Take a 
perfeotly everyday example: 'I am going shopping at the supermarket to 
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buy chocolate'. Each of the words has an etymology which explains the 
changes in phonetics and semantics which led to the modern f orms. The 
existence of commodities such as chocolate and an institution such as 
a supermarket are also the result of a historical process: for example, 
the creation of empire; the inportation of cocoa for drinking; the 
invention of industrial processes to allow the creation of solid 
chocolate bars; the substitution of vegetable fats for cocoa butter - 
and so on. And what can be done for the trivial can be done with 
greater interest for ethical descriptions of action, MacIntyre's own 
work for example. Given that Aristotle's view of history is of it as a 
process directed by rulers after negotiation, it follows that how an 
agent understands her actions is determined by deliberation. 
I now need to argue how the peculiar structure of the prohairesis 
which I have identified -an action done under the description of the 
form '0 for the sake of x', where '#' is an action described 
independently from the end, and where 'x' is a temporally separate 
end- relates to this process of social deliberation. 
I have argued that the temporally separate end of a prohairesis for 
the virtuous agent is euelaimania. I have further argued that 
eurialmonia consists in a end of life reflection an certain goods of 
that life, the nature of those goods being left undetermined for the 
moment. Now, Aristotle argues that agents generally -virtuous or not- 
act for the sake of eudaim2nij, but that beyond this verbal agreement, 
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agents disagree on the substantive character of eudalmonia (EX 14 
1095al4-28). 
I shall go on to argue that, by dint of the authority held by 
phroninal in determining the meaning of the word =daimznia. it 
follows that agents generally act for a future end. They thus act 
under a prohairetic description. Given that it has already been 
suggested that the understanding of actions is a result of a 
historical process, and that history, for Aristotle, is a matter of 
deliberation, it would follow that LLý ppi tQ pcLju, actions are 
prohairigueja preceded by deliberation. 
By means of these arguments I hope to indicate a substantive 
philosophical position to underlie a claim that human actions are 
typified by a description which refers to a future end, that end being 
articulated as 'eudaimonia' or some equivalent in another language, and 
that description being the result of deliberation. By so doing, I 
intend to increase the acceptability of my interpretation of 
Aristotle's account of the prohairesis, by indicating its general 
philosophical plausibility. 
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It cannot be the case that all agents act f or something they call 
'eudaimonia': non-Greek speakers, for example, do not. So the claim 
must be altered to a claim along the lines of the following: all 
agents act for the sake of 'eudaimonial or an equivalent word in their 
native language. But to be identified as a translation of leudalmonia', 
a word would have to fulfil the same function, ie represent a unique 
and supreme end, on which there was verbal but not substantive 
agreement among agents. 
Now, although the translation of 'eudaimonia' as 'happiness' has been 
faulted' 6, 'happiness' has the advantage over other possible 
translations that it actually does represent a word which has prima 
facie plausibility in English as a supreme and unique end: thus, the 
utilitarian claim that 'happiness' is the ultimate end has a 
plausibility lacking in a claim, say, that 'eating' is the ultimate end. 
So why is it that there are at least two languages which have 
developed words which can, albeit with some roughness of fit. fulfil 
this role? 
I have already argued that sharing a language of reasons plays a part 
in establishing the unity of a society. But it might be objected that 
the unity required can only be established by a substantive agreement 
an reasons: ie, that people will not only agree on what words they 
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use to describe their actions and their ends, but also that what is 
described by those words is substantively identical. Since, ex 
bypothesi, there is only verbal agreement on 'happiness' and 
'eudaimonia' as reasons, the argument goes, no substantive advance in 
social unity is gained by the existence of a merely verbal agreement. 
On the assumption that there is a purely verbal agreement on 
'eudaimonia', an assumption I shall go on to attack, there would still 
be a point in everyone sharing a word even if they don't share a 
substantive conception. Butler, for example. notes the efficacy of 
merely nominal relationships: 
-relations merely nominal are sought and Invented... which are 
found sufficient to bold mankind togethar in little 
confra terni ties and copartnersbi PS. 1 7 
One explanation of the efficacy of sharing verbal agreement on 
'happiness' is that bringing people up to want 'happiness' is like 
bringing people up to follow a flag: where the flag goes, there they 
will follow; where the word is applied, that they will want. Nor is 
this word fetishism irrational. That one word exists within a society 
which is widely accepted as referring to the supreme good is evidence 
of an aspiration to agreement and same doing among the members of 
that society. (Consider the unity of a society which didn't even share 
the aspiration of sanedoing. ) Vhether this aspiration can ultimately 
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be fulfilled will depend on whether arguments such as Aristotle's are 
persuasive arguments; and this persuasiveness will not depend an word 
fetishism. 
When Aristotle begins his enquiry in the EN with the assertion that 
the majority of mankind agree that 'eudaimonia' is the greatest good 
achievable by action (EN 14 1095al4-22), and ends by apparently 
concluding that 'eudaimonia' is the8ria (EN X7 1177al2-18), he is 
following the practice of dialectic as laid out In the Tcpics which is 
to take the words used by the majority of people but to ignore the 
way that the majority apply then (Top 11 2 110al4ff); and such a 
method would lack a point unless words In themselves carried 
persuasive force. 
So the claim that there is verbal agreement on the status of 
'eudaimonia' as a supreme good indicates, at least, the weak claim that 
there is a shared commitment among the members of a pnlla to a 
common system of reasoning and to at least an element of samedoing. 
Although the truth of even this weak claim could be doubted, it has at 
least initial plausibility because a society which lacked even the 
aspiration -and, probably, at least some substantive agreement to 
boot- would seem to have lost all unity. Behind all the post-Kantian 
talk about universalization, there appears to lie this truth. Unless 
each individual or group with their own substantive conception of 
happiness were discontented with their being unable to share this 
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conception with others, they would be abandoning their claim upon the 
aid of other members of their society in common projects. And this 
claim will not easily be abandoned because to abandon it is to 
abandon any attempt to use the greater resources available to a Psaia 
as a whole when compared to any of its component parts. 
3.04 - Substantive agreement exists that the life must be a unjtýL 
An immediate point to be noted is that although at a p2lia wide level 
there is no agreement on how 'eudaimonial is to be applied, this isn't 
the case with respect to the groups which nake up the palia, such as 
fanilies. Moreover, even at the level of the pjaliga, there are three, and 
only three substantive conceptions of 'eudaimonial: the lives of 
pleasure, politics and contemplation (EX 15 1095bl4-19; EE 14 
1215bl5). So even if nothing else could be said, there is at least a 
neasure of agreement and, in consequence, an increase in social 
cohesiveness, in that only three conceptions are possible. 
'Eudaimonia' appears to be what I shall describe as an essentially 
contestable word"e, a word which marks an area of disagreement within 
a group of language users. But even so, we do have tests which allow 
us to say that someone is using the word correctly or not. Part of 
understanding the word is getting the target roughly right: we know 
that happiness is something to do with enjoyment and a good life, and 
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is not, say, a variety of cabbage (cf Rhet A5 1360b4-1362alO. 
Another way in which we can assess if someone understands the word 
correctly is if she looks to the right sort of expert in order to 
develop her substantive conception. Thus, someone who thought that 
health was something attained by drinking lots of milk and eating 
plenty of red meat might still recognize a doctor as the right sort of 
expert to consult on health, an expert. moreover, to whom he should 
defer his understanding of what he was doing. 
The case of expertise in eudaiMQiIJ& is, of course, rather trickier than 
expertise in health. But one sort of ability we look for in experts on 
this subject is the ability to talk about the problem (cf Meta 1 1). 
Whatever our view on abortion, for example, it is quite possible to 
agree that Roman Catholic moral theologians and feminist academics 
are able to discuss the issue well, and that, accordingly, they are 
experts in the subject. 
It is noteworthy that, as already stated, the only person whom 
Aristotle identifies as a j2hron1mos is Pericles (EX VI 5 1140W-8), a 
statesman. (Aristotle's status as an expert, and accordingly, the 
status of all philosophers, can presumably be taken for granted! ) A 
statesman, particularly in Classical Athens, is someone who has to 
have articulate views on practical judgments because he has to argue 
for those views: a statesman can't Just go out and act without having 
an articulated idea of what he is about in the way that a carpenter 
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can; he has to issue orders and convince other people to follow them. 
Analogously, an archltekt8n, a master-craftsman in the sense that he 
is a master of craftsmen, is not necessarily better at performing his 
craft than a man of experience (Meta 11 981al2-15) but is capable of 
directing others and teaching Ubid 981b7-9) because he can articulate 
reasons, that is, he has the ability to tell others what to do. A 
statesman -a practitioner of the supreme mastercraft (EX 12 1094a26- 
28)- is someone who has expertise in making practical Judgments, not 
in the sense that he necessarily makes good decisions, but rather that 
he is able to discuss such matters articulately. 
So even if there were an infinite aunber of substantive conceptions of 
eudalmonlm, Aristotle can point beyond them to those who are styled 
experts- -the phronizol to whom all agents would defer. 19 And from 
these experts -politicians and philosophers who hold their views QUk 
alo&8s, (EN 15 1095b15)- the number of options held is narrowed down 
to three sorts of life. Now the really interesting point here isn't the 
content of those lives -the pleasure, the politics or the 
contemplation- but rather that the choice is narrowed down to sorts 
of life. Vhy? Vhy is the option of Just living ruled out? Vhy does 
living have to be regarded as a life possessing, as a consequence, a 
unity? 
It night, of course, just be the case that, accidentally, the only 
options that the phronlnnl of Greece had considered were unif ied 
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lives. If this is the case, Aristotle would be entitled to his 
arguments in a way that we are not; for Dhronimoi known to us do 
allow the option of living that is not regarded as a unity. " 
I have already argued f or the coherence of the view that life is a 
unity; but should one hold such a view? On what basis would we as 
phroninol tell our eager followers that they should regard their lives 
as possessing a unity, rather than advising them to regard it as being 
made up of discrete parts? Here it may be helpful to note that 
Aristotle argues that noble actions benefit the community and not just 
the agent (EN IX 8 116ga6-11). 
Now a socially useful reason for seing life as a unity would be to 
ensure the flourishing of the state. Assume, with Aristotle, that a 
particularly good source of wisdom about living is to be found among 
old people (EX 13 1095a2-4; VI 8 1142a5-16; VI 11 1143bll-14. ) 
Accordingly, it would be sensible for the state to ensure that there 
is a constant supply of old people who are, moreover, treated with 
respect. To ensure their existence, children would have to be taught to 
regard their old age as at least as important as their youth: if they 
did not, it would seen unlikely that they would regularly achieve old 
age. And to ensure the good treatment of the old, the young would have 
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to believe that they too would one day be old: otherwise they would 
regard the treatnent as unfair (cf Fol VII 8 132gaS-18). This argunent 
can be generalized. If a state requires a constant supply of citizens 
of different ages, that supply can only be ensured if citizens are 
required to view their lives and the stages in that life as a unity. 
Taking the argument beyond the text, in any pre-industrial society, 
the sort of skills required in the crafts and arts, fine or practical, 
can normally be developed only over an entire and long life. If those 
skills are required by the community. children must be raised and 
educated to see that they should live a life which builds up those 
skills, aiming towards a maturity both of chronological age and skill. 
Now, arguably, in a modern society, the socially required skills are no 
longer developed over a long life by cumulative experience: the best 
computer operators nay be in their twenties; the most effective 
salesmen may be the young, aggressive and the most easily bent to a 
corporate mentality, rather than the mature, indolent and curmudgeonly. 
Whatever the truth of these factual claims, it is, I think, clear that 
the encouragement of seeing life as a unity has a pragmatic 
justification within certain types of society which it lacks in others; 
and that, accordingly, the claim that, for any given society. the 
seeing of life as a unity is a good is a substantive claim because it 
is a false claim in certain situations. 
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It night additionally be argued that such a unity would be 
insufficient to establish the particular type of unity required for a 
life to be that of pleasure or politics or contemplation. Indeed so: it 
remains to argue for the supreme goodness of the life of thedria and 
this I shall attempt to do in the rest of this thesis. But for present 
purposes, all that is required is for a life to be a temporal unity 
which, in order to be a good life, must also have a good end at the 
completion of a long time period: what that end is remains to be 
argued. Since, ex bypothesi, the universal opinion of the Greek 
phroninoi is that lives possess unity, even those agents who were not 
conscious of such a unity would, in deference to the experts whom they 
respect, assign such a unity to their lives, and, thus, regard any 
action which did not take account of this unity as less than 
paradigmatic. Moreover, since the source of the agent's understanding 
of her actions is that history which has been deliberated by the 
rulers (who are phroninni), it is likely that in fact the agent will 
regard her actions in this light. 
For Aristotle then it does seem to have been a Justifiable premiss 
that a life would have to be a unity viewed from its end in order to 
have been happy. In a demythologizing mood, additional confirmation of 
the socially pragmatic consequences of individuals' regarding their 
lives as unities might be found in the fact that many religions do 
regard the end of life of particular importance: in the absence of 
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some sort of social benefit, it would seem an unikely idea to have 
flourished. 
In this chapter, I have argued that human actions can standardly be 
said to be preceded by deliberation. Accordingly. the requirement that 
prnhalre-, eis-, be so preceded does not entail that they can only be a 
marginal case of human action. 
We have accordingly reached the following stage of the argument. I 
have argued that the aim of the Eff is to articulate the audience's 
existing good life by understanding the mind of the pbroninns 
(chapters one to three). In chapters four, five and six, I have argued 
that part of the articulation of the good life is that its actions are 
aimed at a future goal. The understanding of the 1ýhronimos is that 
this future goal is the reflection on life's goods at the end of life 
which IS Pudainnn4a. This understanding Is consciously shared by many 
others, at least to the extent that they would agree on the verbal aim 
of P11HAinnnIA, on that being assessable at the end of a life. and oil 
human actions being generally aimed at the future. 
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Notes to chapter six 
1. eg Hardie 1980, pp161-181. 
2. Cf Broadie 1991 p7g: 
These difficulties Isc. about deliberation] bave led many 
commentators to the view that deliberation In Aristotle really 
refers not to a psychological process but to the structure of 
reasoned explanation wbich is at least potentially present in the 
rationale of the agent's response. 
3. 'Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue', in Rorty 1980. 
4. Eg P209. 
5. In Ando 1958. 
6. op cit eg p176. 
7. A constant theme of his work since XacIntyre 1985 and 1988. 
8.1 understand something like this distinction to be the basis of 
MacIntyre's defence to attacks by, say, Coleman and Haldane (in 
Horton & Xendus 1994, pp65-90 and pp91-107; see also XacIntyre's 
reply pp283-304) who claim that XacIntyre's emphasis on the 
historical development of a tradition is a distortion of the 
perennial nature of Thomism. 
9. In view of MacIntyre's own movement from Canterbury to Rome, it 
is tenpting to describe the two conceptions as Roman and 
Anglican respectively. 
10. Cf EE 14 1215a35-36, particularly with the reading Imi pa; il 
exousias <ontes> tugghanonte. E. (See Rackhan 1952, textual note ad 
locum. ) 
11. On, say, the Marxist view of history, this assumption would be 
assailable. 
12. There is, I think, no need to take the notion of a ruler to be 
purely that of someone involved in the institutions of 
government. As I go on to emphasize the necessity for politicians 
to develop theory in order to argue their case, I would wish to 
emphasize the social influence of, say, poets and philosophers as 
the 'unacknowledged legislators. 
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13. Proponents of the narrow view include: Hardie 1980 (eg p217); 
Gauthier & Jolif 1958 (eg ad 1112bll-20). The predominant 
opinion among modern academics appears to be that ends as well 
as means are discovered. Examples include: Sherman 1989 (eg p83); 
Broadie 1991 (eg p226); Wiggins (in Rorty 1980 pp221-240). 
14. It should be noted, however, that when referring to deliberative 
oratory in the Bbetcric, Aristotle often makes use of the active 
sumbouleu5 (Liddell and Scott: 'to counsel') where there appears 
little distinction in meaning between the two words (eg 1359a35- 
37). Lawson-Tancred 1986 translates both indiscriminately with 
'deliberation' and its derivatives. 
15. Cf Lawson-Tancred 1986, p8. See eg Rhet A. 1 1354al-30. 
16. Eg by Cooper 1975, pp89-90 nl; Ackrill in Rorty 1950, p24. 
17. 'Fifteen Sermons' 1.10, cited in Duncan-Jones 1952. p33. 
18. The idea of essentially contestable concepts is a philosophical 
commonplace (see eg Hurley 1989, pp47-8). 
19. Given that some pbrnninni may ultimately prove to be advocating 
vicious lives, the claim of being a phronimos, like the one of 
being eudaln8n, is defeasible. 
20. Examples of such phronizol available to the modern Vest include 
Parfit (1984) and the Buddha (see Hiriyana 1985, p76). Annas 
1993 notes that: 
EtIbe Cy1reniacs alone among ancient schools rejected the 
impoz, tance of one's life as a whole for one's ethical perspective. 
(p230) 
Annas goes on to describe the Cyreniacs; as the exception proving 
the rule that the ancients regarded the ethical perspective as 
essentially involving seeing life as a unity. 
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Chapter seven 
The virtuous agent's enjoyment of probairetic action (D 
I have argued that the prohairetio description of action as 10-f or-the- 
sake-of-x' where IxI is a temporally separate end and the action is 
preceded by deliberation can be regarded as the paradigm of human 
action. 
In this and the following chapter eight, I intend to argue that it is 
characteristic of the virtuous to enjoy their prohairetic actions. I 
shall argue that, by enjoying an action, that action becomes performed 
under the description of an anericeia. Accordingly, the virtuous agent 
characteristically acts under two sorts of description: the 
prohairetic description which aims at a future good; and a description 
which supervenes on the prohairetic description and which is both 
enjoyable and an energala. 
This result will pave the way for chapters nine to eleven where I 
shall argue that the virtuous In their actions imitate the divine in 
its activity, which is eternal, perfect anergela and pleasure (cf 
Netap. bysics XII 7). 
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In this chapter, I argue that the virtuous agent normally enjoys his 
actions. I consider two cases where such a view might be thought to 
run into difficulties. Firstly, I consider those virtuous actions such 
as courageous actions where there appears to be a necessary 
involvement of pain. Secondly, I consider cases where a virtuous agent 
does the wrong action. In both cases, I hold that the view that 
virtuous agents normally enjoy their actions is able to cope with 
these difficult cases. In general, I note that the tendency to find 
actions enjoyable is reinforced when the virtuous agent considers his 
actions, not individually but from the perspective of aa whole life: 
the virtuous tend to enjoy their lives even when they fail to enjoy 
every moment of them. 
All actions aim at goods (EK 11 1094al). Now, unlike animals, human 
beings do not just act for the sake for the good of pleasure, but also 
for the sake of the useful -in the sense of the means to the end- and 
the noble MY 11 3 1104b3O-32; cf 111 2 1111b16-18, VIII 2 1155bl8- 
21). But all goods appear to human beings as pleasant (EN 11 3 
1105al). This would suggest that, since actions are for the sake of a 
good which appears as pleasant, actions are, In some sense, for the 
sake of the pleasant. 
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The sense in which this is so is made clear elsewhere by Aristotle 
(El 111 1 1110bg-13): 
To apply the term 'Compulsory' to acts done for the sake of 
pleasure or for noble objects, on the plea that these exercise 
constraint on us from without, is to make every action 
compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them supply the 
motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under 
compulsion and unwillingly is painful, but actions done for their 
pleasantness or nobility are done with pleasure [methheelnuds]. 
(Cf EN 11 3 110013-16) 
It seens then that just as actions done for the sake of the noble are 
noble actions, so actions done for the sake of the pleasant are 
pleasant actions. In any case, it appears clear from this passage that 
actions are normally pleasant. 
It is, however, as dangerous to rely on isolated quotations from 
Aristotle as it is isolated passages from scripture. Ve therefore need 
to provide further evidence that Aristotle here isn't just being a 
little slapdash, that what he really means is that acts done for the 
sake of the noble are done wholeheartedly or gladly rather than with 
pleasure. (Indeed, one might doubt that even acts done for the sake of 
pleasure are always pleasurable: in contemplating the careers of 
libertines such as Don Juan and Casanova, one becomes aware of the 
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amount of hard ef f ort, involved. ) As Broadie notes when commenting on 
109ga7-21, the view that the virtuous normally enjoy their actions 
appears counterintuitive: 
This position plays an Important role in clarif)-ing the aim and 
process of moral training and in pointing up the difference 
between virtuous action and right action that fails to manifest 
virtue, whether because motivated by fear of sanctions etc. or 
because done in the teeth of base temptation. But outside this 
context the assertion is dubious. Aristotle is Justified in taking 
It for granted so long as be means that the virtuous person 
takes the right course because it is right, and takes it 
willingly and ungrudgingly, being Identified with his action. The 
action must reflect not only practical Judgment and rational 
commitment, but the depth of of the individual's ethical 
personality. He is eager and glad to act well, because all of him 
is behind it. But this does not entail that what be does is 
pleasant in the sense In which, say, physical enjoyments are 
paradigmatically pleasures. A good person will do gladly many 
things which be finds thoroughly unpleasant, and .... not to be 
pained would not necessarily be to his credit, since it might 
show a less than virtuous insensibility if be did not mind the 
cost., 
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The distinction between acts done wholeheartedly or gladly and those 
done with pleasure is not, I would suggest, as clearly marked in 
ordinary usage as philosophers might like to pretend. That said, there 
does seen to be a central difference that is usually preserved in 
that, If one enjoys doing something, one thereby has a reason for 
doing it, whilst if one does something merely gladly or 
wholeheartedly, no further reason is added to the reason for which one 
already acts. 2 For example, if I have a duty to take my dog f or a 
walk, the duty is a reason for my action. If I also enjoy taking my 
dog for a walk, I have an additional reason for my action: this is 
evidenced by my still having a reason to take the dog for a walk -viz 
I enjoy so doing- even if I subsequently discover that I don't have a 
duty after all. On the other hand, if I only take my dog for a walk 
gladly or wholeheartedly, then if I discover I no longer have a duty 
to walk the dog, my reason for walking it disappears. Ve must 
accordingly see whether or not Aristotle thinks that when an action is 
done with pleasure, this 'with pleasure' does or does not indicate a 
reason. If it doesn't indicate a reason, then we nay indeed suspect 
that Aristotle means only that noble actions are done wholeheartedly 
rather than enjoyably. 
Consider EN 11 3 21003-4. Here Aristotle argues that virtue is 
measured by the pleasure and pain which accompanies our action (tAa 
aplglnnyunnAn hAdnnAn AL JUqAa tLLJ& erizois and that the temperate man 
enjoys -is e-hAir6n- about abstinence from bodily pleasures. This might 
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suggest that these locutions are being used to indicate gladness 
rather than enjoynent; however, later in the passage, Aristotle uses 
identical terns to indicate the reasons or causes -for now, the 
distinction needn't concern us- of our actions: pleasure QMmA) 
causes us to do bad actions while pain (jupA) causes us to avoid good 
ones; it is therefore inportant to like and dislike (nhalreln ta kA: L 
lupeisthai) the proper things (1104b8-12). 3 
I have argued that the enjoyment of an action provides an additional 
reason for doing it. Accordingly, where chalrein and lupelsthai 
indicate reasons for acting, they cannot refer to modes of acting such 
as 'gladly' or 'wholeheartedly': clearly, therefore, the use of words in 
11008-12 must refer to actions being enjoyed rather than being done 
wholeheartedly. But if this is the case, it becomes difficult to accept 
that Aristotle would have used the same words to refer to different 
concepts only a few lines earlier: this strongly suggests either that 
Aristotle does not mark the distinction between wholeheartedness and 
pleasure, or that he is aware of the distinction and means that 
virtuous actions are done with pleasure and not just wholeheartedly. 
Unfortunately for the f orner possibility, it is clear that Aristotle 
does appreciate the distinction between a willing or wholehearted 
pursuit of an end and a pleasant pursuit, In Eff 111 9 1117a2gff, 
Aristotle makes it clear that the actual exercise of the virtue of 
courage may involve the endurance of pain, pain moreover that is truly 
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painful even to the virtuous man (1117b7-16). Vhat one might expect 
to be said here is that the courageous man bears these unavoidable 
pains willingly even if he doesn't enjoy them. In fact, Aristotle is 
clear that the virtuous man bears such pain unwillingly (AMA 
1117b8y). Moreover, Aristotle also makes it clear that the end of the 
virtuous exercise of courage really is pleasant although the pleasure 
is obscured by the pains attendant an achieving the end (1117a35-b3). 
This is a dif f icult claim to understand completely, but I think the 
gist of it is clear enough. (I shall consider the matter in more detail 
below. ) Qua an action directed at a good end -say, winning a Lonsdale 
belt- courage is pleasant. Qua getting battered about, it isn't. It can 
be readily imagined that a boxer could enter a few hopeless f ights and 
still enjoy them. But if the connexion between the pain of the pursuit 
and the achievement of victory is ever completely severed -so that the 
boxer knows that however hard she f ights, there is never any chance 
of winning, that what she is engaged in is no longer validated by the 
good of victory, but simply a senseless pain- the action can no longer 
be seen as pleasurable. 
Given that virtuous action is an energaia the end of virtuous action 
is present throughout the energeia and not just at the time it ceases 
(see discussion in next chapter). This would seem to imply that any 
attribute of the end would also be present throughout the PnerKPIA. 
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Accordingly, the exercise of courage is pleasant throughout its 
exercise. 
I take it then Aristotle believes that haa epi t1a ; &IJIL virtuous action 
is found pleasant by the virtuous agent. 6 
I have argued that the virtuous agent finds his actions pleasant. I 
have also noted that the courageous agent who enjoys his acts Of 
courage may yet experience pains as part of that courageous act. 
In the previous chapters, I argued that the prohairetic action -an 
action done under the description of 'ý-for-the-sake-of-xl where Ix' is 
a future good- is a paradigm of human action. Accordingly, if the 
virtuous agent enjoys his actions he nust, paradigmatically, enjoy his 
prohairetic actions. 
In what follows, I consider what this e-njoynent of the prohairetic 
action involves. 
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3.01 - Pleasures of expectat [on and perf ormance 
I noted in considering the case of courage that although the 
courageous agent enjoyed the courageous action, he didn't enjoy 
everything about it. Thus, the boxer didn't enjoy the pains of the 
blows received during the bout even though he enjoyed the bout. This 
night suggest that the boxer's life would have been better if there 
had been no pains involved in the bout at all: he would then have had 
all the pleasure of victory without any of the pains of combat. But on 
reflexion, this claim ought to seen a little odd. If the best boxer's 
life was one where there were no pains involved, how would such a life 
embody the virtue of courage? 
One way in which victory could be found pleasant throughout the 
combat and pains necessary to obtain that victory would be by 
expectation: I can f ind pleasure in the hope that I will win the 
contest despite the pains required to win. For such a person, the 
pains of combat really are something better done without. Consequently 
he is someone who, although his behaviour might resemble the virtuous, 
is failing to get the point of courage by failing to have a proper 
attitude to the work involved in obtaining the desired end. 
The person who at least has the pleasure of expectation needs to be 
distinguished from someone who doesn't even have that pleasure in 
acting well. There are grim characters who just plough an regardless, 
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taking pleasure neither in the combat nor in the expectation Of 
obtaining the end. 
Both types are to be distinguished from the truly virtuous to whom 
the pleasure taken in the pursuit of the good end is not despite the 
pains involved in that pursuit, but whose pleasure rather involves an 
appreciation of the difficulties involved: 
And mothers love their children more than fathers, because tbe7 
think that the children are more their work; for people estimate 
work by Its difficulty, and in the production of a cbild the 
mother suffers mare pain. (BE VII 8 1241b7-9) 
The courageous boxer enjoys his f ight both because he expects to win 
and because of the eff orts he needs to make in order to win. Although 
nothing in my argument hangs on this -the types set out above are 
recogmizable even if Aristotle didn't consider them- I would 
tentatively identify the person motivated by the pleasure of 
anticipation despite the pains of the pursuit with Aristotle's enkratic 
and the person who just hangs an grimly with no pleasure at all with 
his kArterIkn--. The eukratic for example is described thus: 
a man exercising self-control both feels pain when be finally 
acts In opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of 
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boping (chalrel Ida A; L! ell2ldogs) that he will be benefited later 
on. (EE 11 8 122016-18) 
The kartpr1kn-- merely endures. His Is the grim world of the final 
words of Beckett's The Unnamable: 
.. I don't know, I'll never Irnow, in the silence you don't know, you 
must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on. 
For the enkratic there is light at the end of the tunnel -the pleasure 
of victory- whilst for the karterikos there is no f inal relief from 
the pain of struggle: 
.. for kartarein consists in witbstanding rantecleln] wbilst 
L-12kratela consists in mastery [kratelal, and withstanding and 
mastery are different, in the same way that not being defeated 
differs from victory. (EX VII 7 1150a33-1150bl) 
Vhatever the correctness of ny identification of these types with the 
enkratic and the kmrtprlkn-.:: t, it is at least clear that soneone who is 
virtuous, whilst looking forward to the future good, need not ignore 
the difficulties of the task but can rather take pleasure in the 
difficulties. He does not, however, like the masochist, take pleasure in 
them Just because they are painful, but because they are painful for a 
purpose; they are the painful means to a desirable end-' 
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In the previous three chapters, I argued that an action performed 
under the prohairetic description typified human action. I also argued 
that this description had a structure where a means was performed for 
the sake of a future end. 
On the basis of the analysis of pleasure in 0.01, the virtuous 
enjoyment of an action which had such a prohairetic structure would 
consist not only in the anticipatory pleasure of the future end, but 
night also involve taking. pleasure in the difficulty and pains of the 
means as means to that end. A virtuous lawyer who had to work through 
the night in order to win her case in the morning night thus take 
pleasure not only in the prospect of winning the case, but also in the 
pain of the sleepness night qua means to that desirable end. The less 
than perfectly virtuous lawyer -of the sort tentatively Identified with 
the enkratic above- works through the night, feels the anticipatory 
pleasure of winning the case, but simply refrains from giving into the 
desire to sleep rather than relishing the pain of sleepnessness for a 
purpose as part of. her virtuous action, The still less virtuous lawyer 
-tentatively identified with the karterikos does what she needs to 
do, but without any pleasure at all, either in anticipation or in 
perfornance. 
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If I am correct in the centrality of the action performed under the 
prohairetic description, the virtuous agent would accordingly enjoy 
such an action not necessarily by overlooking the labour involved in 
the means to the future end, but rather being of such a character that 
he enjoyed the pain of the means, not in itself as would a masochist, 
but qua means: pride in a difficult Job well done. 
It might be objected here that simply because an end is in the future, 
It does not follow that the means to achieving that end are difficult 
or painful. In one sense, this is certainly true. There is no a pr1cri 
reason why pursuit of a future good should involve pains. Certainly, 
there are virtuous actions performed by a virtuous agent which seem 
to involve no pain at all: for example, being able to help someone 
without damaging one's own life. Xoreover, as McDowell suggests7, 
the virtue of courage may sometimes entail that pains are not just 
overlooked, still less, as I have argued, that they are enjoyed, but 
rather that they are not even noticed. Thus, it may well be the 
perfectly courageous response to the question, say: 'Why did you rush 
out to save that man when they had a machine gun trained on you? ' to 
say, 'I didn't think about the danger: I just did what I had to do. ' So 
my claim can't be that virtue always involves the enjoyment of pains 
qua means. In some cases, the virtuous agent will just not notice the 
pains of effort while in other cases there will Just be no effort 
involved at all. But to claim that virtue depends on never noticing 
pains attendant on effort is both implausible and at odds with 
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Aristotle's account that courage does involve pain. Accordingly, a 
plausible view must somehow acknowledge that pains are actually felt, 
but in some way distinguish the virtuous agent from the non-virtuous. 
In what follows, I seek to develop my general account above that the 
virtuous sonetimes feel pains qua means. 
3.03- The painfulness of means jem typifyi-nir huynmn action 
One way of approaching this issue is by considering the nature of 
non-prohairetic action. Aristotle defines prohalrasls as being preceded 
by deliberation (EN 111 3 1113ag-12), and restricts deliberation to 
those natters which are LfLa e" ta pnLL (ibid 1112b8-11). These 
include certain technml such as medicine and business. This would 
suggest that prohairetic action nay include certain actions undertaken 
in crafts or arts. On the other hand, in the discussion in Book VI, 
prohalresis is taken as being the archA of prax1s (EIr VI 2 1138b30- 
35); and praxis is almost Immediately sharply distinguished from craft 
or art actions (polkels (EY VI 4 1140al-23)). 
Vhatever the precise relationship between prohairetic actions and 
polAsais, there is no reason to assume that light cannot be thrown on 
one category by the other: indeed, as previously noted, Iristotle 
constantly uses a craft model for phrongsis . For present purposes, 
the similarities are important. Crafts aim at achieving a finished 
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product in the future and I have argued that -probairetic actions also 
aim at a future good. The attitude of workers to their poiAseis nay 
I 
accordingly throw light on the attitude of, týd virtuous to their 
prohairetic actions. 
A slave or banausic labourer can be made to perform tasks, not, 
usually, in the way that a great fear can compel someone to act (Eff 
111 1 1110alg-1110bl), but in a sort of friendship (EY VIII 11 
116lb5-10), sharing a life with his master Tol 15 1260a39-40). 
Vhatever defects are present in Aristotle's views on slavery, he never 
denies that the slave is human (Pol 15 1259bl8-21), albeit of a 
character apt to be ruled. 
For Aristotle, all paid work is a form of slavery (Pol 15 1260a41- 
1260bl; 111 2 1277a37-bl). Accordingly, if we accept that human beings 
can find satisfaction In a (paid) Job well done -which we certainly 
should- then unless we have reason to believe that Aristotle just 
overlooked this aspect of life -and I would suggest that we have no 
reason so to think- hunan beings are apt to find satisfaction even in 
a job which is imposed on then as slaves. Vhy is this? Certainly, 
there will often be accidental features of the job which the slave will 
enjoy: thus, a slave might enjoy getting out into the fresh air and 
doing the gardening; or he might like pleasing his master. On the 
other hand, there will be some Jobs the accidental features of which 
it is Just beyond human nature to enjoy: working in the silver mines 
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at Laurium, for example. But apart from the accidental features of 
these tasks, it is surely the case that it is a feature of human 
nature to enjoy a Job, per se, that human beings are apt to welcome 
and take satisfaction in work or a challenge, Just because it is work 
or a challenge. 
This satisfaction can take two f orns. One f orn is analogous to the 
pleasures of anticipation which I have suggested above as a model f or 
understanding the enkratel& of ethical action: the slave enjoys the 
prospect of the completed work, but only endures the means leading up 
to the end. Another form is analogous to the virtuous agent's: one 
which also finds satisfaction in the means qua means to a satisfying 
end -the attitude that only values something when it is hard won: 
for, people estimate worlr by its difficulty fta g= ergon 
chalep8i d1nri, 7nucAjnI. EE VII 8 1241b8-9 
This aspect of human nature is overlooked by those who locate the 
meaning of life in giving people what they want. Taylor9 gives 
Sisyphus' endless stone-rolling a meaning by making Sisyphus want to 
do it. But this rather obscures what it is about stone-rolling that 
makes it apt for this sort of role. Consider the following three 
versions of Sisyphus' torment: Sisphus (1) is condemned to spend 
eternity staring at a stone; Sisyphus (2) is condemned to spend 
eternity rolling a small marble back and forth on a smooth surface 
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with his forefinger; Sisyphus (3) is condemned to spend eternity 
rolling a heavy stone up a hill which, just as it reaches the top, 
falls down and he has to start again (the original myth). Now. apart 
from developing highly esoteric forms of meditation, Sisyphus (1) is 
going to lack occupation. In the abstract, I suppose, there Is no 
reason to believe that staring at a stone for an eternity Is any worse 
than moving it from side to side for an eternity (Sisyphus (2)); but 
of course, we are not talking in the abstract but rather what are the 
empirical facts of human nature. Given that empirical emphasis, there 
is every reason to believe that in fact it Is worse. Prisoners in 
solitary confinement occupy themselves by inventing tasks -that is, 
things which they can complete, even if this is just marking the 
completion of each day on a wall with a piece of chalk. Polar bears 
walk backards and forwards in zoos. Alcoholics using Alcoholics 
Anonymous' method of abstinence concentrate on completing one day at 
a time abstaining rather than thinking about never drinking again. All 
this is important because it emphasizes that what is important here 
is not the labour of achieving the completion, but the temporal 
separation: there is really not any more effort involved in the 
torment of Sisyphus (2) than there is in that of Sisyphus (1); 
however, by dint of his life having an aptness to be regarded as a 
task, it would seen to be that bit more bearable. 
So one thing we might want to say about the prohairetic structure of 
a means to a temporally separate end is that, Just by virtue of the 
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end's being temporally separate, it takes an something of the quality 
of a task and is thus apt to be enjoyed. Vith Sisyphus (3). in 
addition to the simple persistence required in any action extended 
over time, there are real pains involved in achieving the end. These 
pains, provided they aren't of such an order that they become beyond 
human nature to endure, actually would seem to improve the life of 
Sisyphus (3) over that of Sisyphus (2). 
For any action which is very extended aver tine, such as the pursuit 
of happiness at the end of a life, for example, Aristotle gives us 
reason to believe that nere persistence involves pains. In conclusion 
to his discussion of pleasure in Book VII, Aristotle adds that hunan 
beings never feel unmixed pleasure in an activity because of the 
complexity of our nature (EN VII 14 115020-31). This should remind 
us that one of the typical difficulties that human beings have to 
overcome in completing a labour is Just sticking at it: that temporal 
separation of an end is, for human nature, a labour in itself. For 
Aristotle's audience and for most modern western workers the pain to 
be overcome in achieving an end isn't that of torn flesh and aching 
muscles, but rather that of overcoming boredom and distractions. 
So what might give Sisyphus and the craftsman some satisfaction in 
their lives Is by learning to enjoy the prospect of the completed end, 
and also in learning to enjoy the overcoming of the difficulties in 
achieving that completion. Xy clain here must not be misunderstood. 
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The life of the slave is still a stunted life and the life of Sisyphus 
is a torment. The life of the craftsman, though it probably involves 
less painful means, is devoted to a narrow end imposed by economic 
need. In these ways they differ from the ethical life. But the best 
that human beings can and do do in such circumstances is to f ind the 
brute fact of a task itself a satisfaction. The very fact of a future 
goal can allow a sort of minimal purpose to a life, in the way that a 
slave's life can in fact be better than the life of purposelessness he 
would lead without it (Fol 15 1254blg-20; 6 1255b4-15). 
In the same way, the best any human being can do is to learn to see 
the pains needed in any long tern task as enjoyable as means to a 
desirable end. Any long term pursuit of a good is going to involve 
persistence. We have good Aristotelian reasons -and indeed 
connonsense reasons- to believe that long term persistence will also 
involve pains. Thus, although it is undoubtedly true that virtuous 
actions need not involve the enjoyment of pains as means to a 
desirable end, it is also likely to be true that such an attitude of 
mind is going to be highly typical of any good life. 
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I have argued that taking pleasure in pains qua means to an end is a 
central case of human action, in that it typifies the virtuous agent's 
attitude to the efforts involved in the pursuit of a temporally 
distant goal. I have also argued that it typifies the attitude of those 
such as slaves or craftsmen who, while not virtuous, are making the 
best of a bad job. 
Aristotle specifically deals with some other categories of those who 
have to nake the best of a bad Job within his discussion of what can 
be broadly be described as voluntary action in the first five chapters 
of Book III. A crucial section here is EX 111 1 110MO-1111W. And 
within that section, it is clearly stated at 1110bll-12 that those who 
act hj&j kA; L akontes act with pain (luper8s . How consistent is my 
account on the enjoyability of pains qua neans to ends with 
Aristotle's account here? 
An initial point here is the context in which this discussion is to be 
understood. As Hursthouse suggests, Aristotle's central concern here is 
with the virtuous agent and, in particular, with those cases where 
virtuous people do what appear to be vicious actionsIO. Aristotle goes 
on to deal with a number of specific cases where virtue can survive 
the agent's apparently acting viciously. A general point is, however, 
clear; if Aristotle is only talking k6a epi ta pzOu in the EN, there is 
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no reason to suppose that a virtuous agent will always act virtuously. 
After all, we do not expect experts in any f ield always to get it 
right: Homer nods, and footballers have bad games. Much of Aristotle's 
discussion is concerned with actions that only appear to be vicious 
rather than with actions that actually are vicious; but in any case, 
part of being virtuous must involve the appropriate response to 
getting it wrong. 
Vhat should the virtuous agent do when she discovers that she has 
gone wrong? Again, still speaking generally, we would expect the 
virtuous to feel regret. This is why -another point emphasized by 
Hursthousell- virtue is said by Aristotle to be concerned with actions 
and fýeelings CEN 111 1 1109b30). A little needs to be said here about 
why feelings of regret are expected in the virtuous. For those such as 
Broadie who emphasize Aristotle's concern here with the continued 
ethical growth of the agent, the point of praising and blaming 
feelings is clear: a message is sent to the agent about how he should 
behave in the future and what he needs to alter about his, broadly 
speaking, affective makeup in order so to act12. Since I have 
emphasized the unchangeability of the virtuous, however, it night seen 
that feelings of regret are rather irrelevant: since the virtuous 
cannot get better, there is no point in getting the feeling correct in 
order to get the action correct next tine. 
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A number of replies can be made to this sort of point. Firstly, we 
night take Aristotle here as being primarily, but exceptionally for 
the EX, concerned with feelings in the immature and thus improvable. 
Secondly, we might Just simply insist that an ethics which is only 
concerned with actions rather than wider questions of character, 
including feelings, is just an inadequate ethics". Thirdly, there nay 
simply be a de facto link between the sort of person who cares enough 
to do the right thing and the sort of person who cares enough to feel 
the right thing even when nothing can be done: someone who doesn't 
regret a nurder may be the sort of person actually to perform a 
murder. A final non-exclusive possibility, and one I shall now explore 
briefly, is to argue that there is a continuum between how we feel 
about an action and what that action is; so that someone who regrets 
an action Is not just reacting to what has been done, but, to an 
extent, nay actually be revising that action. 
The technicality, 'acting under a description', doer. not entail that 
there is something which is an action and then various ways of 
describing that action: the point is rather that in some ways how an 
action iB described enters into what that action is. 14 Taking this 
broad point, if I dig the garden, I nay be described as doing it with 
or without enjoyment. Who or what has the authority to decide the 
correct description? 
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In the case of enjoyment, the f irst person perspective has primary 
although not absolute weight. If I claim to have enjoyed digging, I'm 
going to be taken at my word unless evidence to the contrary exists: 
'Well, if you enjoyed it so much, why did you go in so early? ' But 
there is a further question: wben does the agent have the authority to 
claim enjoyment? It might be thought the answer here is at the time, 
and, again, it is probably true that the agent's immediate perspective 
is weighty here. But there is nothing Incomprehensible about the 
following sort of exchange: 'Are you enjoying yourself? ' 'Well, 
actually, I'm not sure. Ask me when it's over. ' Or even: 'Well, when you 
asked me at the time, I thought I hated the holiday. But -looking back 
on it, I can see that I actually did enjoy it. ' So a reason for getting 
post -factum attitudes right as part of being virtuous is that it can 
affect what is actually said to have happened. The point is 
particularly acute in respect to long-term actions. "'- 'Did you enjoy 
your career as a lawyerV can only really be answered retrospectively: 
certainly, a considered retrospective answer here would carry far more 
weight than what nay have been said an particular occasions within 
that career. I have already argued that the virtuous aim for happiness 
from the perspective of the end of a life. We can now see that a 
similar point applies In relation to pleasure. Whether your life was 
enjoyable or not will depend on an assessment made after most of the 
events of that life are over. Even if that assessment is a natter of 
inagination -you imagine at tine to what your life will look like from 
the perspective of Its end at time t, - what your post factun feelings 
233 
are like or are imagined to be like will affect what your life actually 
was like. Thus, a reason for keeping one's post factum feelings 
appropriate to circumstances Is that, particularly over long term 
actions, what one feels retrospectively about the action nay determine 
what that action was. The difficulty in such cases about saying wben 
the pleasure was felt -only retrospectively or during the action as 
well? - may go some way to explaining the otherwise rather cryptic 
claim that pleasure may not exist In time (EN X4 1174b7-9). "' 
Given that, for whatever reason, the virtuous should feel appropriately 
after things have gone wrong, what precisely should they feel in the 
cases considered by Aristotle? Taking firstly vicious actions done in 
Ignorance, the virtuous should regret the action. thus making the 
action nkntigion rather than =11 hPknurjnn (EN III I 1110blBff). Then 
taking vicious actions done by force Qlainn), again we should say 
that the virtuous regret the action, when we are talking of things 
that are by force hapl8s (EN 111 1 1110blff), that is, when we are 
talking about cases where we have been blown off course or bound hand 
and foot and carried away. And again, by feeling regret here, the 
virtuous person makes the action ak6nu-qin-n rather than MM11 
bpOrmuginn. 1 7 Neither of these cases has any particular implications 
for my analysis of the enjoyment of his actions: in effect, the 
virtuous agent is denying these actions done blainn and m1musgion to be 
his actions at all. Certainly, the virtuous has done all that he could 
be expected do in the circunstances. 
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The really interesting cases for present purposes are those of the 
nixed actions. These fall into two types: those done through fear of a 
greater evil; and those done for the sake of a noble end (EN 111 1 
1110a4-5). Taking the first class, one case might be where there is a 
simple calculation of the least bad action, ceteris paribus. "I If the 
action in question were actually, all things considered, the least bad, 
the virtuous would seem, quite straightforwardly, to be required to do 
it. low, if it was a pretty hard decision, with pretty nasty 
alternatives, it might be quite reasonable for the virtuous agent to 
decide he had to act in a particular way, and yet to feel pain at his 
action. Undoubtedly, he would feel regret at being thus compelled by, 
say, the meagreness of alternatives, but seeing that the action was 
the right one, all things considered, might not stop him fron feeling 
regret at the action Itself, and not Just at the circumstances which 
brought him to it. '-- 
Does this contradict my analysis that the virtuous agent takes 
pleasure in his actions? I don't think so. The virtuous agent who 
regrets the act itself and not just the necessity of the act nay only 
encounter such cases rarely in his life. So, provided we remind 
ourselves that Aristotle is only ever talking hLa W, ta p2lu, such an 
isolated incident shouldn't be taken as destroying the general claim 
that the virtuous enjoy the difficulties of achieving their end. 
Assume, however, that this sort of necessity became a commonplace in 
the virtuous man's life. Take for example Aristotle's sailor who is 
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forced to jettison his cargo in a storm (EY 111 1 1110a8-11). For 
someone for whom such an event was a rare experience, regret at the 
action and not just its circumstances might be expected. But imagine 
the care of a captain regularly sailing an extremely stormy route. 
Part of his normal duty would be to decide when to jettison cargo to 
save both lives and ship. Although he might continue to regret the 
circumstances which compelled him to throw the cargo overboard, it 
night also be expected that he would take pride in having developed 
the sort of professional expertise and character which enabled him to 
come regularly to the correct even if hard decision. Analogously, the 
general who has to weigh victory against a cost in lives might regret 
the circumstances which forced him to sacrifice lives, but not the 
decision taken: it is, after all, his job. All this seems to shew that 
regret at actions rather than regret at circumstances doesn't survive 
in the virtuous character in the long term: JL6a U1 ta p. Cju, the 
virtuous man isn't pained at his actions and enjoys his competence in 
difficult cases. 
Another case of the class of mixed actions which are done out of fear 
of a greater evil are those where there isn't a calculation of the 
least bad act, but rather where a fear just compels an action. Thus, 
Vinston Smith in 1984 is compelled to treachery by his fear of rats, 
not because he calculated that treachery was the least worse option, 
but because the fear drove out any calculation and just forced him to 
act. This would appear to be the sort of action which is pardoned 
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because it goes beyond what human nature can stand (EY 111 1 1110a23- 
26). But as an act which is pardoned, it is not a virtuous act or part 
of the normal behaviour of the virtuous agent: thus, although the 
virtuous agent would undoubtedly regret having given in to the fear, 
because it is again an exceptional case, it does not affect the general 
characterization of the virtuous as enjoying his difficult actions. 
The second class of mixed actions mentioned above are those which are 
done, not out of fear of a greater evil, but f or the sake of a noble 
end. In essence, this class would seen to fall under the same analysis 
as the first type of the f irst class: these actions might be regretted 
on isolated occasions, but if perforned regularly by a virtuous agent, 
would have to be enjoyed as successful instances of virtue triumphing 
in difficult circumstances - 'She did the right thing'. But a 
particular type of this class of action should perhaps be considered 
in further detail here: that of so called 'dirty hands'. The sort of 
case envisaged here is one where, as in Sartre's play Les mains sales, 
a virtuous person commits terrorist acts in order to achieve a great 
and noble end. low, one thing that can be troubling about such 
terrorism is its high moral tone: its pride in its own dirty hands and 
in its assuned ability not to be corrupted by its methods. If such 
violence is required, the least one might expect from a virtuous agent 
is regret, not just at the circumstances, but at the act itself. On my 
analysis, the virtuous agent will normally take pride in his difficult 
acts qua means to an end. And just such a tendency to extend the 
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virtuous agent's normal attitude to pains into an inappropriate area 
is part of what makes us suspicious of the regular terrorist: go on 
doing dirty hands actions, and you tend to reach sane sort of state in 
which you begin to enjoy the dirtiness of the action and being the 
sort of person who can do it. If the means are really horrible, then 
the virtuous man has two alternatives: he stops being virtuous and 
becomes complacent in his bloodiness -he begins to enjoy the pains 
qua means; or he continues being virtuous and lives much of his life 
in pain. 
This point brings in Stocker's analysis of mixed actions in which he 
claims that the point about nixed actions for Aristotle is that they 
are just those actions which, unlike the normal action where there are 
costs which are balanced by the goods achieved, the evils of the mixed 
action result in a permanent diminution in the happiness of a life; 
but the mixed action is nevertheless performed because the alternative 
would result in losing all chance of eUdgLjMgMJZL. 20 Stocker's detailed 
point seems dubious: to take Aristotle's own example (EN 111 1 1110a4- 
8), why should letting one's children and parents die result in a 
permanent loss of P"dalrunia any more than the case of performing a 
base act at the order of a tyrant? Each alternative 'tells against 
Pudaimnnin' to use Stocker's phrase; but while one tells against it ex 
bypotbesi more, neither seems necessarily to tell against eudaim=JA 
absolutely. But Stocker's general point seems well-placed. There are 
some cirumstances which rule out eudainnnia however good the 
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character of the agent reacting to them. It might be that terrorism is 
the proper life in some circumstances; but the proper reaction to such 
a life is not pleasure but regret. It cannot a happy life, any more 
than the life of slave can be a happy life. (That is not to say, 
however, that there is not a virtuous response to finding yourself as 
a slave: merely that such a response will not make you happy. It nay 
even make your life less pleasant if, as seems plausible, Aristotle's 
conception of virtuousness would make it impossible for the agent to 
give up and enjoy whatever base satisfactions the life of a slave nay 
afford. ) The life of dirty hands is a bad life, though it may be a 
necessary one. Equally, if unforeseen accidents keep happening to your 
ships, this may exclude eudal=ia: all the virtuous can do in such 
circumstances is to feel regret -anything else is inappropriate. But 
there are perhaps few things which can so destroy alldalmmniA on a 
single occurrence: it takes repeated catastrophes or a great 
catastrophe at the end of a life when nothing can be done to repair or 
compensate for the damage to rule out PiidAi-rnnniA. 
The virtuous agent may therefore on occasions get it wrong and feel 
regret, not just at the circumstances which compelled him to an 
action, but at the action itself. A further point, however, Is that, 
taken from the perspective of a whole life, the virtuous agent nay 
take pleasure in the regret felt at a mistake: to an extent, getting it 
wrong nay be a Mix culpa which allows the display of appropriate 
feeling. Thus, someone who has badly treated, say, a brother during his 
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life may be glad that she felt after his death true remorse, even 
though the opportunity of putting things right by action has, let us 
assume, passed: although we are suspicious of displays of emotion 
after the possibility for action has passed, such suspicion nay 
directed rather at the possibility of a sham display rather than at 
the ineffectiveness of actual remorse. 
Sometimes, but perhaps rarely, circumstances may be such that the 
whole of a life nay be poisoned by regret, not just at the 
circumstances, but at the actions so compelled. It may well be that 
the appropriate feeling about some types of life is regret. Although 
friends and comforters may try to reason the agent out of bis regret 
-'You did everything you could in the circumstances. Don't blame 
yourself '- it may be that the virtuous agent resists such 
blandishments, that he persists in feeling regret at a type of action 
even though he may acknowledge that he had no real alternative. 
Aside from such extreme cases, the broader picture that is taken of a 
virtuous agent's actions, the more he will tend to take pleasure in 
them. Isolated errors may be redeemed by the pleasure felt in the fact 
that the appropriate feeling of regret was felt at them. Portions of 
life which were misdirected nay be likewise redeemed by regret or by 
recognizing that such periods were an essential part of a growth 
towards virtue. In such ways, the virtuous can absorb -whilst not 
overlooking- the pains unavoidable in any life into the pleasure and 
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enjoyment of a life well lived. Accordingly, Aristotle's claim that the 
virtuous enjoy their actions need not be understood as a smoothing 
over and ignoring of the difficulties involved in any normal life, but 
can rather be understood as involving a certain attitude of mind to 
such difficulties which integrates then into the virtuous and pleasant 
life. 
I have argued in this chapter that the virtuous agent's actions are 
hAa epi ta Ralu enjoyed. I have argued that this enjoyment may involve 
rather than ignore the sort of pains involved in a normal life, 
enjoying them qua means to a desirable end. In particular, the 
prohairetic action, as aimed at a future end, is apt to be enjoyed. 
This is because it is temporally extended and, thus, according to 
Aristotle, painful, at least in the sense of requiring efforts of 
persistence, For the virtuous, since it is aimed at the happiness at 
the end of a life, it also requires a broad picture of the agent's 
actions to be taken, thus making the occasional mistake, even by the 
virtuous, easier to integrate into the enjoyed life. 
In the next chapter, 1 shall argue that it f ollows as a consequence of 
the virtuous agent's enjoying his virtuous actions that those actions 
are anergeiai rather than kiml-is. 
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Notes to chapter seven 
1. Broadle(1991) pp316-7. Broadie in fact goes an to argue that 
not only does Aristotle indeed hold that the virtuous perform 
their actions with pleasure rather than Just gladly, but also 
that such a view is defensible. However, her final view 
(pp425-427) is that the perfectly virtuous agent does not 
enjoy her virtuous activity, but only does It gladly, and 
that she instead reserves her pleasure for the6ria 
2.1 owe this characterization of the distinction to Broadie 
1991, p318. 
3. Cf EY VII 11 1152bl-8 where chairgIn is linked with 'W-A- 
4. Eff X6 1176a35-bg; 11 1094a3-18. For the view that prazeis 
are not anargaial see Broadie 1991 eg pp42ff, p260 n17, 
pp426-7. The general point that virtuous actions are 
enereeiai in the narrow sense is supported by Charles (in 
Voods 1986 p120 n15), Reeve 1992 (p102) and Gauthier & Jolif 
1958 (eg ad 1094a4). See chapter eight of this thesis for a 
more detailed discussion. 
5. Jaffa in accordance with his account that the EN contains a 
development away from common or garden ethics regards Eff III 
1117bl-20 as the popular view that courage is painful and Elf 
IX 8 1169a17-26 as the advanced view that courage is always 
pleasant (pp54-55). Vhilst agreeing that the latter passage 
should be construed this way, it will be evident that I find 
nothing in the earlier passage which requires such 
correction. 
It night be objected here that the masochist takes pleasure 
in pain qua a neans to sexual arousal. Vhatever the precise 
frame of mind of a masochist in the strict sense of a sexual 
pervert -and I would argue that such masochism can involve a 
view of pain as itself a sexual fulfilnent rather than as a 
means- In a loose, not necessarily sexual sense, a masochist 
is a recocognizable type who does pursue pain as itself 
fulfilnent. 
7. In 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? ', The 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 52, (1978) pp13- 
29. 
8. Chapter five, S2.00 of this thesis. For a discussion, see eg 
Broadie 1991, pp190-198. 
9. R Taylor 'Good and Evil', New York, MacMillan 1970.1 follow 
Viggins' summary of Taylor's work an pp92-5, 'Truth, 
Invention and the Meaning of Life' in Viggins 1991. 
10. Hursthouse 1984,. p253. 
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11. ibid p252. 
12. Broadie 1991 ppl27-128. 
13. In eg Stocker 1990. 
14. See 'Under a description' in Ansconbe 1981. 
15. Annas(1981) p309 makes a similar point about the assessment 
of the pleasantness of a life in the Republic: 
It is important that this Is an argument about the 
pleasantness of a life; for wbat gives it Its plausibility Is 
the fact that the pleasantness of a wholelife is not 
sonetbing that can obviously be autboratively settled by 
anyone's leg the agent's own] say-so.... 
16. Ackrill (in Banbrough 1965) adnits that he is not sure what 
fact Aristotle is pointing to when he says that enjoyment or 
pleasure may occur 'not in a time' (pl30). 
17.1 follow here the analysis in Hursthouse 1984 (pp254-6). 
18. To avoid misunderstanding, I an talking here of 
,a 
calculation 
which would involve all relevant moral considerations and am 
not prejudging whether this would be consequentialist or 
deontological. If. say, the act in question was taken to be 
always absolutely wrong, regardless of its beneficial 
consequences, then it could not be the least bad action. 
19.1 take *regret' here to be synonymous with paiu felt with 
respect to a past action. 
20. Stocker 1990, ch 3. 
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Chapter elght 
The virtuous agent's enjoy3ment of prohairetic action (11) 
I argued in chapters four, five and six that the prnbairer-IS 
which typified human action was an action done under the 
description of a temporally distant goal. In chapter seven, I 
argued that virtuous agents enjoyed their actions and attempted 
to explain how the virtuous agent hDa rpi ta pallL enjoyed the 
prohairetic action in a number of difficult areas. 
In this chapter I shall continue this analysis of the enjoyment 
of the prohairetic action. I argue that the virtuous agent's 
enjoyment of his prohairetic action constitutes the performance 
of that action under the description of an energaim. Whilst it is 
not the case every energala is a pleasure, nor that every 
pleasure is an action, it is the case that the way that the 
virtuous take pleasure in a prohairetic action leads to that 
action being done under the description of an energeia. 
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Aristotle uses energela in two senses. Firstly, there is that 
sense in which it stands opposed to -actuality as against 
potentiality. 
RnaZggla means the existence of tbe thing, not In tbe way 
wbicb we express by 'potentially' Idun-fl; we say tbat 
potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is In the block 
of wood and the balf-line is in the whole, because it might 
be separated out, and even tbe man who is not studying we 
call a man of science, if be Is capable of studying. 
Otberwise, actually [energeiall. 
Meta IX 6 1048a3O-35 
A further distinction is then drawn within the concept of 
energeia between klmARIA and energela: 
Of tbese, tben, we must call the one set kin6sels and the 
otber eneZgelai. For every k-Inds-gig is incomplete -=king 
tbin, learning, walking, building; these are Hadlael-, and 
incomplete 11n6sel . For it is not true that at tbe same time 
we are walking and have walked, or are building and bave 
built, or are coming to be and bave come to be -It is a 
different tbing that is being moved and that has been moved, 
and that is moving and that bas moved; but at the same time 
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bas seen and is seeing, or is tbinking and bas tbougbt. The 
latter, tben, I call an enez: gela and the former a IrIn6si . 
ibid 1048b28-34 
It is this latter narrower sense of the word that I shall be 
interested in for the remainder of this chapter and to which I 
shall be referring whenever I use the tern lenergeia'. I shall, 
following Ackrill, use the tern 'activity' to refer to the 
broader concept containing both energalat and klngseis. ' 
In his classic paper on the distinction, Ackrill analyzes the 
texts bearing on the distinction between IcInActia and anergela and 
identifies a number of possible bases for that distinction. He 
notes that the central and philosophically useful basis for this 
distinction is as follows: 
It is a necessary and sufficient condition for X's being an 
activity verb that at every noment in a period of Xing it is 
true to say 'he has Xed'. 2 
Having noticed this central basis, he considers various other 
bases and the examples that Aristotle gives and concludes that 
although Aristotle has noted an important distinction 
[wie seen... forced to conclude that there is a serious 
confusion In Aristotle's exposition of the energeia-kinesis 
distinction.: 3 
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In this chapter I shall be attempting two tasks. Firstly, I shall 
attempt to explain why Aokrill's central distinction -which I 
shall hereafter style the tense test- is important in the EN. 
Secondly, I shall attempt partially to resolve one of the 
confusions of which Aristotle stands accused by Ackrill. 
Ackrill notes of the discussion of pleasure in Book X of the EM 
that although it is stated that 
enjoyment somebow perfects energeia Cratber than that it is 
an energela) it is fair to say.. that be classifies enjoying 
on the energeia side of the energeia-Irin&sis distinction-4 
This inpression of an intimate link between energeia and pleasure 
is compounded when in the Book VII discussion, one reads: 
For pleasures are not really processes Egeneseis], nor are they 
all incidental to a process: they are enezgeiai, and therefore an 
end (EN VII 12 1153a9-10). 
Having argued in the previous chapter that the virtuous enJoy 
their prohairetic actions, I shall argue that at least part of 
what Aristotle is addressing in his treatments of pleasure is 
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that by enjoying their actions, the virtuous transforn a 
into an energela in terms of the tense test set out above. 
If I try to rescue a wounded comrade in No Xan's Land, my action 
under one description will be, say, 'I am rescuing Fred. ' At any 
stage in the rescue, it is true that I am rescuing Fred, but it 
is not true that I have rescued Fred until the rescue is over. 
Thus, the action of this rescue would appear, on the tense test, ' 
to be a klngsls. Generalizing, it is of course unsurprising that 
any prohairetic action should be a kingril-i since I have argued 
that it is aiming at a future goal: while pursuing a future goal, 
it is true that I am pursuing the goal whilst it is not true that 
I have attained the goal. 
low I have argued in the previous chapter that the virtuous enjoy 
their prohairetic actions. What is the description under which 
the virtuous would enjoy Fred's rescue? Taking up some of the 
analysis In the previous chapter, his enjoyment is not just a 
pleasure of expectation. The virtuous undoubtedly do hope that 
the rescue will be successful and will take pleasure in this 
hope. But this isn't taking pleasure in the action but in the end 
of the action: one might take just as nuch pleasure in the hope 
of success even if one's own efforts were not involved in that 
success. 
As noted in the previous chapter, a virtuous agent may take 
pleasure in the effort directed at the future good: thus, a boxer 
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may take pleasure in the discipline and self-control required to 
train for a bout. Analogously, Fred's rescuer may enjoy the 
danger of the rescue, not in itself -the attitude of the 
masochist- but as a necessary danger for a desirable end. In this 
case, he night enjoy the action under the following description: 
II am engaged in a difficult and dangerous rescue'. Again. he 
may self-consciously regard himself as acting bravely: 'I am 
engaged In a brave act'. It might indeed be the case that 
regarding oneself as acting bravely might make us rather 
suspicious of the virtuousness of the action: someone who is so 
conscious of his own bravery in a case which demands immediate 
action might be regarded as rather less than virtuous. On the 
other hand, an action which requires a great deal of forethought 
and which is extended over tine might demand that degree of self- 
consciousness in order to be performed. Thus, a wife who stays 
with an abusive husband for the sake of her children's welfare 
might need to think of it as a duty or act of self-sacrifice in 
order to steel her resolve. 
The general point is here that although, as argued, the virtuous 
agent takes pleasure in her perhaps painful pursuit of a future 
good, there is no one description which that agent has to be able 
to articulate to herself in order to take that pleasure. The 
virtuous man does not have to think of his action as actually 
being virtuous and enjoy It under this description, but his 
enjoyment of a prohairetic action constitutes acting virtuously. 
Sometimes he will articulate the action as virtuous to himself 
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(ef the self -sacrificing wife above). Sometimes he will not (cf 
the soldier rescuing his comrade). 
Returning to Fred's rescue, let us assume for the sake of this 
argument that Fred's rescuer is enjoying his action under the 
description 'I am engaged in a difficult and dangerous rescue'. 
At any stage in this rescue, the rescuer can truthfully say 'I 
have been engaged in a difficult and dangerous rescue'. 
Accordingly, the rescuer has been performing a prohairetic action 
-the rescue of Fred- which is a kingsts, but enjoying it under. a. 
description which is an engreela. 
The above suggested analysis provides an account of how a 
virtuous agent might enjoy an action which is a iclnAgis under the 
description of an eneritela. It might further be suggested that 
such an analysis provides an account of the nature of pl=g= 
which begins to reconcile the apparently contradictory claims in 
Aristotle that virtuous actions are done for their own sake (EN 
11 4 1105a32ff) and for the sake of something separate from the 
act (EN 111lb26-30). 
An obvious and important objection here however is that it all 
depends on the precise wording used. Thus, while the above 
wording in the rescue example indeed produces an enjoyed 
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energaia, alternative forms of wording produce enjoyed IrInARPI---. 
For example, it will not be the case that at every moment during 
my rescue of Fred it is true that II have rescued Fred' . 
Nonetheless, it nay still be true to say that I enjoy my rescue 
of Fred. 
This difficulty is related to one noted by Ackrill. 
Suppose I bave enjoyed bearing a sympbony ...... 11 bave 
enjoyed the sympbony' is riot sometbing I can say 'witb 
respect to any time wbatever' -at the end of any sub-stretch 
of the total period... If called away In the milddle of the 
sympbony I could not say that I bad enjoyed bearing the 
sylapbony or tbat I bad beard tbe symphony (any more t1an the 
players If Interrupted could say tbat they bad played the 
sympbony). 1- 
Ackrill thus concludes that Aristotle is unjustified in his 
blanket classification of pleasure as an energela . Charles 
argues on the other hand that it is always possible to redescribe 
actions which are processes as energelai : 
Suppose that Farooq Is walking up K2, and derives bis 
enjoy2wnt both from walking and from approacbing the summit 
Ue froz seeing each step as contributing to reacbing bis 
goal). In this case, the confirmed 'praxis-bunter' could spot 
the folloWng activities Eanergelail : 
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Farooq's walking. bis doing sojw exercise of bis anbulatory 
abilities; 
Farcoq's seeing tbat bis walking is leading to the end be has 
set for bimself; 
as well as the process of bis walking up to the sumdt. 1 
Given Charles' argument, it is therefore always going to be 
possible to detect an enargeta within what night otherwise appear 
to be a kInAn1s: thus in Ackrill's example, it would be possible 
to detect the enerstela of hearing music within the k1n6sis of 
hearing a symphony. The crucial question, however, as Charles 
realizes, is what would be the motivation for so doing? 9 It is to 
providing such a motivation that I shall now turn. 
2.03: A tentative AnA partlml --nItitinn 
Let us consider Ackrill's example of the symphony in more detail. 
As Charles notes'O, Aristotle seems entitled to classify hearing 
as an anercreia rather than a kingsts since he would regard a 
symphony only as an incidental object of perception rather than 
the proper objects of perception such as, in the case of hearing, 
sounds (DA 11 6 418alOff; cf Eff X4 1174b26-8). Techicalities 
aside, there is clearly a prIma facie case for insisting that 
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what one bears is sound, and that it is, roughly. by dint of so 
hearing, that it can be said that one hears a synphony. In the 
case of perception, therefore, there does appear to be sufficient 
prima facie motivation for supposing Aristotle to be entitled to 
claim the priority of energefai rather than kln6sls descriptions. 
This leaves pleasure. Vhat is it to say that 'I am enjoying this 
synphony'? For those of us with a strictly linited 3musical 
education, there may be little more than the immediate 
attractiveness: one is Just swept up in the immediate nusic, with 
little sense of what has been before or what is yet to come. For 
those with a developed musical knowledge, the future unheard 
portion of the synphony may already exist in the imagination, the 
present sound being imaginatively heard as part of the whole. 
Broadie notes this point: 
.. although a passage [so of music] is executed, beard and 
enjoyed in the light of what follows and what precedes, this 
is not at all only in order that what follows should actually 
follow and be enjoyed. In fact, if the work is familiar, one 
could be said to be enjoying wbat follows before it 
pbysically arrives, and tbis is not mde false If it falls 
to. Hence one may find It wortb wbile to play or listen to 
sometbing even knowing that one will bave to stop before the 
end. II 
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Ackrill would nevertheless Insist that. if there were a bomb 
warning at the end of the first movement and the concert aborted, 
I could not truly say that 'I have enjoyed the symphony'. I am 
less sure about this -at the least, it seems rather to be an 
amplification, rather than a straightforward contradiction to 
say, 'I have enjoyed the symphony -at least, up till now' - But 
Ackrill's substantive point would remain: since it Jr. possible 
truly to say, 'I am enjoying the symphony, but I can't say that I 
have enjoyed it until the end', Aristotle cannot apparently 
insist that all pleasure is energala. 
My argument is accordingly not that all enjoyment is an ftnergliAt 
still less, to avoid any misunderstanding, that all angrZEJAL 
even when actions, are enJoyments. My point is simply to shew how 
a particular sort of pleasure regards an action as done under an 
energaim description; and also to suggest why this sort of 
pleasure, at least as far as the Ell is concerned, may be 
Aristotle's paradigm. This will not be sufficient to JustifY 
Aristotle's general claim an energelal; but it will be sufficient 
to explain the claim that pleasure is an energeia at least as far 
as the EN is concerned. 12 
Returning to the enjoyment of the symphony, it seems to be the 
case that the enjoyment of the symphony as an energeia represents 
a particular recognizable attitude or attitudes to the music 
rather than a merely artificial rewording as Charles' examples 
earlier may have suggested. Moving on to actions, It is certainly 
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possible to say, 'I enjoy walking from St Andrews to Leuchars' . 
Since walking from St Andrews to Leuchars is a kInAr-Is, this 
suggests that the enjoyable activity here is also a k1nAsis. But 
is it? Assume that it takes from time t, to time t2 to get from 
St Andrews to Leuchars. If I enjoy arriving at Leuchars, I get 
that pleasure at t,. I may have a pleasure of expectation at ti, 
but, as I have argued in the previous chapter, the pleasure of 
expectation is not the same as enjoying the activity. (You may 
hate the walking but still enjoy the expectation of the good of 
arrival. ) There is, however, an attitude to walking which finds 
the good of walking, to borrow Ackrill's phrase, somehow 
equally and fully present throughout'13. 
To be exact, there are a number of different possible 
descriptions under which the walk may be enjoyed equally and 
fully throughout, in the same way that there are, as I have 
argued above, a number of different descriptions under which a 
virtuous action may be enjoyed: the determination of the 
appropriate description under which the walk is enjoyed as an 
energei& will vary according to circumstances. One may enjoy the 
walk as a ramble, or as arduous exercise in which the point is to 
overcome one's painful desire to stop. One may take pleasure in 
the walk as a pilgrimage or as a meditation, as an exercise of 
athletic skill or as a way of shewing off to spectators. Finally 
-and I shall argue in chapters nine to eleven that this is of 
central importance in the EX- one may take pleasure In actions on 
earth as a mimicking of the divine movement. What unites all 
these various possible ways of understanding the underlying 
klnAqlrý and transforming it into an anergela is that by enjoying 
the activity, a good is found in every moment of the activity 
rather than merely in its successful completion. It is that 
substantive attitude of finding a present good in activities 
which is, I shall claim, typical of the virtuous; and the 
articulation of this attitude is, I am going to suggest, the 
point of Aristotle's account of pleasure in the EN. 
Ve return therefore to the question as to why Aristotle would 
regard such an attitude as being the normal case of enjoyment. 
Before answering this directly we need to note that what is In 
question here isn't just, as Ackrill argues, a case of arguing 
about the facts of concepts, but rather about what conceptsýwe 
are to use. 
That house-building is directed to the production of a house# 
has a house as its aim or goal, is, surely, not put forward 
as a fact about the motivation of builders, but as a -fact 
about the concept of bouse-building (a fact that can* be 
expressed by the formula 'it is not true that at the same 
time one builds a house and has built it'). There =7 be 
logical, psycological, or ethical connections between the 
question whether Zing is an energeia or a kinesis and the 
question whether people can, do, or ought to X for its Own 
sake. But Aristotle does not seeza to advocate answering the 
latter question as the way to discover the answer to the 
former question. " 
low whilst the above may be true of Aristotle's treatment of 
examples such as walking, it is not absolutely clearly true Of 
his treatment of pleasure. In the two cases where he discusses 
pleasure in the Eff, whilst the status of pleasure as enerzeia is 
only partially nade clear, its status as something good and 
desirable is clearly argued for. 
In any case, the concept of pleasure is nowhere near so clear cut 
as that of housebuilding. It is simply a fact that, so far as we 
go by what people say about pleasure and how they use the word in 
everyday life, it is unclear whether Aristotle's claim that 
actions are enjoyed is correct or not. Some say that people only 
do what they enjoy doing, others do not use 'pleasure' and its 
cognates in this way. We should also note that Aristotle fails to 
draw distinctions within the hedonic area that certainly could be 
drawn. He regards pain as the contrary of pleasure and thus 
synonynous with unpleasant, whilst there is certainly a case for 
distinguishing these concepts. 16 He regards enjoying (chairaln) 
an activity as being synonymous with deriving pleasure from it 
(see EN X5 1175blff; 11 3 1104b3ff). Unlike Aquinas, Aristotle 
does not clearly distinguish spiritual pleasures from bodily 
pleasure (STh Ia Ilae q31 a3ff). Moreover, although there is the 
glimmer of a distinction between doing an action with pleasure 
and doing an action for the sake of pleasure (see eg Ell 111 1 
1110bll-13), he ultimately refuses to pronounce on whether we act 
well for the sake of pleasure or seek pleasure in order to act 
well: 
The question wbetber we desire life for the sake of pleasure 
or pleasure for the sake of life, need not be raised for the 
present. In any case they appear to be inseparably united; 
for there Is no pleasure without activity and no perTect 
activity witbout pleasure. (EY X4 1175alB-21) 
As already noted, the two main discussions of pleasure in Books 
VII and X of the Eff appear to disagree on whether pleasure is 
identical to the activity which is enjoyed, or merely intimately 
related to it (cf EN VII 12 1153al2-15 and X4 117031-33). 
Finally, Aristotle himself appears to concede that at least 6 me 
people do regard pleasure as a kinAMR when he notes that almOst 
everyone (rchPdnn. . hat pleistol) wants to enjoy rather than 
to 
cease to enjoy (Top VI 8 146b15-20). 
So not only is the common or garden use of hedonic words subject 
to conceptual confusion, but Aristotle's own analysis seems 
confusing. But despite, or perhaps because of all this lack of 
analysis, the general shape of the EN suggests that pleasure 
performs a central function within Aristotle's account. I have 
argued in the previous chapter that enjoyment is the normal 
response to virtuous action: I accordingly owe an explanation as 
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to why Aristotle should be concerned to make this perhaps 
counterintuitive claim. Quite apart from the details of my own 
account of virtuous action, however, it is certainly clear that 
pleasure does occupy an important place in the EN. A good part of 
Books VII and X is devoted exclusively to the subject and I have 
already noted how, outwith these discussions, Aristotle 
constantly refers to pleasure's place as both one of only two or 
three possible ends of actions, and also in some way the constant 
end of all actions. 16 The fact that a discussion of pleasure 
leads in to the culmination of the whole work in the examination 
of the6ria in Book X, even allowing for the possible vagaries of 
ancient redaction, should give further pause for thought. In the 
headlong flight from the ethics of utilitarianism, it is easy to 
overlook this centrality. 
Vhat seems to follow from all this Is that Aristotle is not 
simply concerned to analyze a concept named 'pleasure' which is 
in common-ar-garden pre-philosophical use, but either to 
construct such a concept or to find a philosophical concept of 
pleasure underlying everyday use. As Annas notes, Aristotle does 
not always maintain his considered, philosophical view of 
pleasure, but sometimes slides back into the common-or-garden 
view that pleasure is something misleading of which we should be 
suspicious and even flee. 17 Nevertheless, it is the central 
considered view at which we should be aiming. 
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Given that the correct measure in the EN is the virtuous man (eg 
EN X5 1176al5-19; and cf chapter four, 91.01), that the ain of 
the Eff is practical and that its concepts are intended for 
practical use (EN 17 1098a26-33; cf ibid 13 1102a23-32), and 
that the prime purpose of pleasure as a concept is to aid the 
political philosopher (EN VII 11 1152bl-8), it is not surprising 
that Aristotle's prime concern with pleasure is in respect to 
virtuous action. -On the assumption -to be justified in the 
following section- that the virtuous agent views his actions as 
realizing a good which is somehow equally and fully present 
throughout their performance, and since I have already argued 
that the point of the EN is to get inside the mind of the 
virtuous, Aristotle would possess a motivation for his 
understanding of enjoyed actions as energeiai. 
Even if it is accepted that Aristotle's account of pleasures as 
energeimi might be motivated by the attitude of the virtuous, 
this leaves that attitude itself as rather mysterious. 
Xy argument throughout this thesis is that Aristotle is 
articulating the life of the virtuous in order to make the 
passing on of a virtuous way of life to future generations nore 
likely to succeed. So the finding of a present good in the 
pursuit of a future good should represent a facet of the virtuous 
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man's character that we need to articulate. In fact, I suggest, 
the sort of character who has such an attitude isn't odd at all 
but does indeed represent a recognizable conception of the 
virtuous agent's attitude to life. 
I shall argue in the following chapters that the virtuous agent's 
attitude to his actions mimics the divine activity. So one thing 
that we should say about the virtuous agent's attitude to his 
actions is that constitutes an imitation of the divine even if 
the virtuous might not yet be able to articulate this. The 
evidence for this will be given in those chapters, but it is, I 
take It, perfectly comprehensible that someone should wish her 
life to imitate God's as closely as possible. 10 
On a somewhat less elevated level, Aristotle's megalopsuchos, who 
is, in some sense, the type of the virtuous man (EN IV 3 1124al- 
2)19, displays an aristocratic insouciance about the effects of 
his actions. Although he is concerned to win honours, to 
paraphrase Aristotle, he rather expects then as his due rather 
than as something to be grubbed around for (see esp Eff IV 3 
1124a4-20). It is not that the megmlopsuchos is unconcerned with 
honour -his actions wouldn't make sense without being directed to 
this end. But once he has done his bit, he stops worrying about 
what is outwith his control. 
There is nothing very strange in the notion of the virtuous 
agent's regarding her actions as successful, even if the end 
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desired is not obtained: at the least, the attitude is perfectly 
comprehensible. (Cf: '"But try, " you urge, "the trying shall 
suffice: / The aim, if reached or not, makes great the life. / Try 
to be Shakspeare, leave the rest to fate! "' (Browning: Bishop 
Blougram's Apology. )) Moreover, if, as I have argued, the 
motivation for the EN is political, namely, more to do with the 
creation of good people than the provision of a guide for those 
people to act once created, then it might well be the case that 
the best character, that is, say, the character who is most 
likely to produce the best results. might be one who is rather 
careless about things she cannot directly affect rather than 
neurotically concerned with events outwith her power (EN 111 3 
1112al8-31): effectiveness night not be dependent upon depth of 
concern. 
In general, I understand the virtuous agent's attitude to failed 
prohairetic actions as Stocker sets out the matter: 
Our intentions were not realized. But our values were 
actualized in making tbe effort -eg those involved in pusbing 
ourselves to the limit, using our skills, and the like. It is 
their actualization that is pleasurable and this 
actualization is also uninpeded and perfect. 20 
To this I would add that sometimes just the attempt at achieving 
an end is enough for us, say, to feel pride: if something is 
worth doing, it's worth failing at. But would it be possible for 
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an agent to have no chance of attaining the future good and yet 
for her to enjoy that action as directed at that good? Although 
nothing hangs on this for the sake of my main argument, I think 
it would be possible. The war hero who sacrifices himself in what 
he knows to be a futile mission to obtain an unobtainable goal 
still acts to obtain that goal and may still enjoy the pursuit of 
that goal and there seems nothing strange or remarkable about 
that. Indeed, given the political purpose of the EX, if the 
philosopher's concern is to produce good people rather than 
directly to produce good events, it seems quite plausible that 
only the sort of character who is capable of acting bravely in 
the face of futility on at least some occasions would be capable 
of acting bravely when there is a chance of obtaining the goal. 
Part of the reason for this is covered by the tern 'moral luck' - 
the inadequacy of our ability to be able to tell what actually is 
futile: perhaps recklessness as Judged by the standards of bard 
headed men of business is an essential element in courage -a 
persistent underestimation of the difficulties of what, taken 
coldly, is futile. Nevertheless there will be a limit where there 
is a complete severance between action and goal and where the 
action can no longer be truly considered to refer to the goal or 
be enjoyed in the light of the goal -at which point the virtuous 
may decline to perform it. 
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2.05. - Is p easure the ctinn mr thp Attitude to the actlon? 
An objection to the above analysis might be that I have failed to 
distinguish between the feeling of pleasure itself and the action 
at which it is directed. Thus, whilst It nay be conceded that the 
feeling of pleasure is itself an energela, no where does 
Aristotle suggest that this alters the object -in this case the 
action- in which the pleasure is taken. Just as it would be 
absurd to suggest that taking pleasure in a chair makes the chair 
an enerizeia, so, it might be argued, it is absurd to claim that 
taking pleasure in a virtuous action makes a kinAgig into an 
enereeia. 
The problem with such an objection is that overlooks the fact 
that Aristotle denies not just that pleasure is itself a IrInAqzI9 
but also that it supervenes on a kInAs-gig. Thus, in his discussion 
of pleasure felt on the occasion of a cure, he attributes the 
pleasure not to the becoming better (kingsls) , but rather to the 
energaia of something which has remained healthy (Elf VII 14 
1154bl5-20; cf X4 11709-14). 
Xoreover, throughout the discussion of pleasure in Book X, 
Aristotle talks of energeial being enjoyed (eg EN X4 1175a3O): 
although, as noted, there is a broad sense of lenergeia' which 
covers both anargela proper and kInA,; Ig:, given the inportance of 
the distinction in the discussion (1174al3ff), such a confusion 
of terms would, to say the least, be highly misleading in this 
264 
context. Consequently, it seems reasonable to understand 
Aristotle as referring here to anergeiai in the strict sense. 
Since I claim to have given an account as to how and why actions 
which are apparent kInA---eIR can be performed under a description 
such that they are energeial, and also to have given an account 
as to why this should be of focal importance in the EN, the 
burden of proof is accordingly an anyone who would assert that 
Aristotle in the EN would paradigmatically allow kin8sels to be 
enjoyed as 
Annas 1993 contrasts Aristotle's view of happiness with that 
espoused by both Stoics and Epicureans. Annas argues that 
Aristotle respects the common or garden intuition that happiness 
involves both virtue and external goods -such as bodily health- 
and thus opposes Epicurus and the Stoics: 
Ve see clearly in Epicurus and tbe Stoics that bappiness, 
tbougb they construe it very differently, is taken to be up 
to us or in our power -not of course In tbe sense that I can 
bere and now decide to be virtuous, but in the sense that 
virtue turns out to be an internal state, one wbicb, once I 
ac-bieve it, depends only on me and not on the success of my 
efforts in the outer world . 21 
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Aristotle, on the other hand: 
... finds the tbesis that virtue suffices for bappiness 
grossly counterintuitive. Hence, even if we seek virtue for 
its own sake -wbicb Is, after all, the point of being 
virtuous- we also seek It for the sake of bappiness. wbicb 
includes not only virtue but also otber kinds of thing - 
bodily and external goods, and luck or fortune . 22 
As I have noted in chapters four to six, the prohairetic aspect 
of the virtuous agent's character does depend, in part, on 
success: aiming at a future good, the agent can fail to achieve 
that good, a failure which, ceteris paribus, will be a cause for 
regret. On the other hand, I have argued in chapters seven and 
eight, that the virtuous tend to find a present good even in such 
conditions of failure. I am left with the broad position, 
therefore, that whilst the virtuous need not be thwarted by 
failure to achieve their goods, they are not immune to having 
their lives ruined by external circumstances. 
low, if what is sought from Aristotle is a decision procedure for 
good action, such a position is totally inadequate: we need an 
account of what sort of failure can be overlooked and what sort 
of failure cannot. But if what is sought is an articulation of 
virtuous agents' general approach to life, such a position is 
actually quite informative: roughly, the virtuous will tend to 
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make the best of a bad job, but sonetines will not succeed in so 
doing. 
Xoreover, it is arguable that the best attitude to external goods 
is essentially paradoxical. For example, it might be perhaps 
rational for an examination candidate, whilst there was an 
opportunity for revision, to believe that examination failure 
would be disastrous and thus provide herself with an incentive to 
work; yet, on the other hand, once there was no further 
opportunity to prepare, for the same candidate to believe that 
what was important was simply doing one's best, no matter what 
the result, in order to remain calm. That these beliefs are in 
tension does not entail that, practically, such a varying 
attitude mightn't be the proper one to have, Accordingly, any 
theoretician who attempted to articulate the virtuous attitude 
for the purpose of passing it on, would have to reproduce that 
tension in his account: 
Aristotle seems to bave boped that be was articulating the 
core of our everyday beliefs about bappiness, but 
unfortunately our beliefs are more in tension than be seems 
to realiZe. 23 
Once again, it is inportant to note that, given the clains about 
the purpose of the EN argued for in the first three chapters of 
this thesis, vagueness and even paradox may In fact be an 
ineluctable feature of the EX; and indeed may be regarded as 
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making the Eff more plausible as an account of the good life than 
theories which note distinctions and conflicts which are 
overlooked by the virtuous thenselves. 
I have argued that, under the tense test, the virtuous act under 
a description such that their prohairetic actions are energeiai. 
But it should be noted that, in addition to the tense test, which 
he considers the primary basis for the distinction between 
kindssis and energeia, Ackrill also considers other bases and 
aspects of the distinction. 
One such aspect, found in Netapbysics IX 6 1048bl8-35, is 
discussed by Ackrill as follows: 
The earlier distinction between activities which bave a limit 
and those whicb bave not naturally suggests the distinction 
between activities whicb are indefinitely continuable and 
those wbicb are not: I cannot go on building a bouse once .1 
have built it, but I can go on thinking of sometbing tbough 
it Is already true to say that I bave tbought of It. This is 
certainly one thing that Aristotle means to bring out by bis 
present and perfect tense formulae. For after saying I at the 
same time one is living and bas lived well, and is happy and 
has been bappy' be goes on: 'otberwise it would bave to stop 
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at some time'. Thus be takes the propriety or impropriety of 
combining present and perfect tenses as tied to the 
possibility or impossibility of going on witb the activity 
indefinitely. 24 
Now it is clear from the above passage that we are here talking 
of logical rather than practical possibility: it may be a logical 
possibility that I go on living indefinitely, but it is not a 
practical one. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the desirability of the 
practical possibility of going on eternally has often been 
regarded as an aspect of human motivation. Thus Plato in the 
La ws: 
.. the desire of every man that be may become famous, and not 
live in the grave witbout a name, is only the love of 
continuance. Yow mankind are coeval witb all time, and are 
ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and 
so they are immortal, because they leave children's cbildren 
bebind tbeiv, and partake of immortality in the unity of 
generation. (Laws 721) 
And Cicero: 
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For the aim of city's continuance sbould be eternity. Cicero 
De RepublicA, Book 3 (quoted by Augustine, City of God, Book 
IXII, ch vi). 
Finally Augustine notes that all creatures would prefer an 
eternity of misery to annihilation (City of God, Book XI, Ch 
xxvii). 
Rorty clains that it is only the exercise of an essential 
attribute which counts as an energela: 
Sbowing that an action (it is of course action-types and not 
action-tokens that are in question) qualities as an energela 
Involves sbowing that It Is a specification of the exercise 
of an essential attribute (1170a16-19). 215 
Although the EN passage referred to does not seem quite in point 
here, given Rorty's understanding of energaia, seeing one's 
actions as forming part of a life, and seeing that life as 
contributing to the eternal continuation of the species would 
all tend to contribute to the seeing of one's actions as 
energeiai. Since the business of the citizen is the safety and 
thus the continued existence of the state (Pol M2 1276b26-29) 
and the goodness of the good citizen who is a ruler of the state 
and the goodness of the good human being simpliciter are 
identical (Pol 111 2 1277al2-25), the virtuous will tend to see 
their actions as contributing to the eternal continuation of the 
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city and thus to man's essence as a political animal (Pol 11 
1253al-5). They will thus, on this test, indeed tend to see their 
actions as energeial. (Aspects of this thought will be developed 
in the following chapters. ) 
4.00: Connlurlmn 
In this chapter I have argued that, given the virtuous enjoy 
their actions, they perform them under the description of an 
energein. Such a conclusion does not support Aristotle's apparent 
view that all pleasure is an energeia, but it does provide a 
motivation in the EN for making such a view the paradigm of 
pleasure. 
I argued at the beginning of this thesis that the point of the Eff 
is to make easier the transmission of the present generation's 
good life to the following generation. Part of what is required 
to effect this transmission of values is to articulate the life 
of the virtuous. 
The argument of the previous and present chapters have been 
directed at laying bare one aspect of the virtuous agent's life: 
that he tends to direct his actions at a future end. but finds an 
imnediate good in then rather than having to wait for the 
realization of that future end. In the following chapters, I take 
these conclusions and attempt to shew how they are linked to the 
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ergon argument by arguing that the virtuous agent's life, 
includng the project of passing on that life, Is to be understood 
as an imitation of the divine. 
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Chapter nine 
The ergon argunent (D: the background 
I have argued in previous chapters that the intention of the EN 
is to provide the audience with the ability to pass on their 
virtuous life to future generations. 
That skill consists in the ability to articulate the good life. 
In previous chapters, I have argued that the virtuous agent is 
characterized by the enjoynent of the prohairetic description, 
that is, the enjoyment of an action which is performed under the 
description which has a structure of being aimed at a future end. 
Vhen an agent enjoys his prohairetic action, he performs it under 
the description of an energeia. 
In the following three chapters, I shall argue that the aim of 
the erion argument in the EX Is to be understood as part of the 
political project of the work as a whole. This project is to 
articulate the life of the virtuous so that it can passed an more 
easily to following generations. 
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The specific part the ex. &= argument has to play in this project 
is to shew how the virtuous life imitates the divine. This 
imitation is of course imperfect, but exists whether the life 
concerned is that of the8ria or of practical virtue. Such an 
analysis articulates the ergon, the task of the virtuous. By such 
an articulation, not only is the task made easier in the same 
indirect way that articulation of the constituent goods to be 
passed on in the good life (eg courage, magnanimity) makes their 
passing on easier, but in the direct way, that the articulation 
of the task of passing on human life eternally itself constitutes 
a contribution to the self-awareness of the task and thus to its 
effectiveness and divinity by making it more pleasurable. In this 
final self-awareness of the ergon, what has previously muddled 
along through private ventures is transformed into a fully self- 
conscious attenpt to achieve eternity through the organization of 
the polls: 
In the Spartan state alone, or almost alone, the legislator 
seems to have paid attention to questions of nurture and 
occupations; in most states sucb matters have been neglected, 
and eacb man lives as be pleases, Cyclops-fasbion, 'to -his 
own wife and cbildren dealing law'. Now it is best tbat there 
sbould be a public and proper care for sucb matters; but if 
they are neglected by the comzunity it would seem right for 
each man to belp bis cbIldren and friends towards excellence, 
and that they sbould be able, or at least choose, to do tbis. 
(EN X9 1180a229-32; of Pol VII 2 1324b5-9). 
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For man's ergon to be achieved, that task has to be fully self- 
conscious, for it is an aspect of the divine to be self-conscious 
(Meta XII 7 1072b2O-25). 
In this chapter, I attempt to put forward a plausible background 
for understanding Book X of the EX. I argue that it should be 
understood as articulating the life of a plirmnimns, such as 
Pericles. Such a life has already fairly high degree of self- 
understanding In that it acknowledges the claims of theoretical 
learning and practical life: as such, it will in itself represent 
sonething of an advance in articulateness over the lives of the 
audience. Pericles himself typifies the tendency of the 
megalopsuchos to overlook the detailed work of providing for the 
goodness of the next generation: the discovery of such a flaw 
should not however upset the highly developed amour propre of the 
inegalopsunhos who will perhaps regard such detail as outwith his 
concern. 
In the f irst three chapters of this thesis, I argued that the 
audience of the EN were already fully virtuous, but lacked the 
political skills to pass on their good lives to future 
generations. I argued that the lacking skill consisted in the 
ability to articulate that good life and that the EX was intended 
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to enable the audience to gain the skills of articulacy which 
would allow them to explain and defend their existing good lives. 
In my discussion of prohairesels, I argued that the virtuous 
agent acted with a view to af uture good, in particular, to the 
end of his life (chapters four to six). At the end of the 
previous chapter, I argued that the virtuous, in their politiqal 
ain of the continuance of the city, were aiming at eternity 
(0.00). Before going any further, I shall bring some of these 
strands together. 
megalop-suchos 
Jaffa argues against Aquinas, understanding of the EN as setting 
out a consistent theory of ethics in a logical structure, 
claiming that the EN Instead 
.. my be ratber Uke the organism, disclosing its intention 
and meaning througb successive stages of grDwtb, ratber than 
tbrough the fitting togetber of its parts., 
For Jaffa, the EN embodies a dialectical progression from the 
inadequate ethics of common or garden Greek life, towards a 
superior reflective understanding which amplifies and corrects 
the existing ethics. 
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Xy reasons for rejecting such a view of the EN are those given in 
the first three chapters, namely, that Jaffa's view would entail 
that the existing ethics held by the audience of the EN were 
inadequate and that they were thus not fit students of the 
lectures. Revertheless, the understanding of the EN as a 
dialectical progression does hint at both the existence of a 
hierarchy of error within the ethics of the polls as a whole and 
at a hierarchy of adequacy of articulation among the virtuous. 
Although human beings normally display a tendency towards acting 
for a future goal, they may differ in the temporal distance of 
that goal. Thus, the banausic tailor of Gloucester looks towards 
the finishing of the Xayor's suit and the virtuous man towards 
the end of his life. The politician, however, who stands as 
phroninns to the ordinary and inarticulate virtuous as paradigm 
or interpreter of their good lives (see chapter three, §§2.06ff), 
looks towards the Judgement of history. In a sense, of course, 
even the politician looks to how his life ends: whatever his 
contribution to history. he himself will be Judged by his life; 
and, as I have argued, this will be assessed at its finish (see 
chapter four). However, when engaging in the assessment of his 
life from the perspective of its end, the politician, unlike the 
less virtuous or the less articulate, also looks forward to his 
achievements outlasting the life. 
This all suggests that, even if the substantive ethics of the EN 
shouldn't change within the work, there might be room for a 
development in terms of how that substantive view is articulated. 
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Having noted such a possibility, I shall now use it to explore 
the relationship between the different parts of the EN. 
Criticism of the Eff has long identified two apparentlY 
incompatible ideals within the work: 
And even if BE I and NE 10 are reconcilable, the NE as a 
wbole seems to have two different beroes: the contemplative 
of I and 10, and the great souled man of 2-4. Both cbaracters 
are difficult to make palatable for twentletb-century 
reader6.2 
A sinilar fault line is of course also found In Book 11 itself in 
the relative merit of the theoretical life against the practical 
orie (EN X8 1178agff). 
But is Aristotle advising us to spend as little time and 
effort on otber tbings as possible, and to attacb no 
importance to any practical or moral concerns or claims in 
comparison witb the value of tbecretic activity? Should we, 
ideally, neglect our friends and falidly and community# and 
concentrate on our private intellectual life? zt is licit to be 
supposed that Aristotle would make so eccentric a 
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recommendation, but it is not easy to explain low the claims 
of man-in-action and zan-at-tbougbt are in principle to be 
recanciled. 3 
I have already noted that the character of the rwggalnpgýue, 12a is 
such that he is unlikely to accept that his essentially active 
political life is any whit inferior to that of a philosopher 
(chapter two, 94.02). Vhat he may be able to accept, however, is 
that he has not fully articulated the goodness of his own life. 
As Aristotle notes, politicians lack the ability to teach the 
political skill that they possess (EN X9 1180b35-1181ag) and I 
have already noted the connexion between lack of such a teaching 
ability and the inability to articulate the goodness of an 
agent's own life (eg chapter three, S2.04). If, as argued in the 
first three chapters of this thesis, it is possible for an agent 
to be already leading a good life but to be unable to articulate 
the goodness of that life, it is possible that the megalopsuchos 
can already be leading a good life without being able to explain 
why it is good. In essence, then, my claim is that those parts of 
the EN which sound like 
.. the opinions of Atbenian gentlemen, wbicb 
Aristotle ta-kes 
for granted witb no proof' 
are articulating the good life on the level of the negalopsuchns. 
I have no wish here to be exact about whether the mexalopsuchos 
would already be able to articulate his life in these terms or 
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whether even this level represents an advance in articulateness: 
at any rate, say, what is set out about the virtues in Books II 
to IV of the EN are not very far removed from what the 
3negalopsuch= would already think and say about his life. The 
dialectical advance an this level towards the life of thedria of 
Book X should not, accordingly, shake the megalopsuchos's faith 
in the goodness of his life, but rather cast its existent 
goodness in a new light. Precisely how this is done I shall 
attempt to argue by a detailed consideration of the erzon 
argument in Book X. 
In general, therefore, my claim will be that the inarticulate 
virtuousness of most of the audience will be made more articulate 
by considering how a PhrOniz- such as Pericles talks about his 
life; and, further, that even the articulacy of a Pericles may 
fail in regard to the passing an of that life and needs to be 
supplemented by the descriptive work of someone like ARistotle. 
The provision of such additional information about the existing 
goodness of their own lives will not affect the amour, pr'Opz-e of 
the megalopsuchQi-of the audience, since they will regard It as a 
mere filling in of details (cf EX 11 1098a20-26). 
There are two main interpretations in the literature of what 
Aristotle means to acconplish by the argon argument. r- Firstly, 
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there is the straightforward intepretation that Aristotle intends 
to persuade people to change their lives by offering good reasons 
for adopting a new way of life. The reasons offered will tend to 
be found desirable by all human beings because the desires of 
human beings will be 
-manifestations of a fairly stable and universal buman 
nature, susceptible of investigation Independently of 
adopting one of the disputed tbeses about eudaimonia. 6 
Secondly, there is the view that Aristotle isn't really trying to 
persuade people of his view of the best life by appealing to 
their desires, but is simply stating what the best life is: 
The life according to excellence Is the best life for me, but 
not from the point of view of ivy interests especially, or' 
even of morality, or Indeed from any point of view at all. It 
simply is the best life for me, for it is the best life tbat 
a creature like me can live.. 7 
low the obvious objection to the first intepretation is that, 
Judged by the standards of what people actually do desire, by 
advocating a life of tbABriA, whatever the exact nature of that 
proposal, Aristotle suggests an undesirable life. Xoreover. an 
enterprise of this kind seems fatally flawed in that, by resting 
an what fits In with people's desires, it misses the categorical 
nature of the demands placed on us by norality. 8 
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The second Interpretation emphasizes the objective, categorical 
nature of the best life. Such an emphasis appears particularly 
appropriate to Aristotle in view of his acknowledged use of 
medical nodels in his ethical views. A sick human being needs 
treatment. Children need calcium to ensure correct growth of 
bones. All of this is quite separate from what the patient wants 
or thinks she requires; and the wise patient will learn to 
accommodate her desires to the required treatment rather than 
change the treatment to fit in with her desires. 
The problem with the second interpretation is that it makes a 
virtue out of what would appear to be a vice in that, unlike the 
ain of the medical regimen which is to cure, at least part of the 
ain of any moral philosophy which aims to be practical must be to 
persuade. If the point of Aristotle's arguments is not to 
persuade and convince, or, at least, to provide the material 
which can persaude and convince, what is their point and how can 
they fulfil the practical purpose of the EN? One line here is to 
assert that the arguments are intended to be persuasive, but so 
to function, they must be read and understood against the 
background of Aristotle's teleological philosophy of nature. 9. 
The obvious rejoinder to that is to note that, since we have no 
reason to regard the philosophy of nature as anything but 
outmoded, we have no reason to accept any conclusions based upon 
it. I C, 
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In what follows, I shall attempt to argue for a third position. 
The arguments used by Aristotle do not attempt to persuade the 
audience to change their lives, they only attempt to articulate 
the pre-existent goodness of those lives: so much I have already 
argued for at the beginning of this thesis. " However, a human 
nature will be revealed in the acceptance of these arguments and 
of the goods identified in the pre-reflective life of the 
virtuous by a wide circle of humanity, although the nature 
revealed in that acceptance will not figure itself as a preniss 
in the argument. So far as the categorical claim of morality is 
concerned, this will be found not In the categorical claim of 
being a certain sort of human being, but rather in the 
categorical claim of divine activity. The megalopsuchos will have 
found his life revealed as good under the same standards of 
divinity as the life of t'hp6ri; %, both actual politician and 
actual philosopher falling short in different ways from the 
ideal. 
3.014 ExplaInIng a life: the pnint nf Ayplanation 
I shall be arguing then that the primary point of the argument is 
articulating good lives rather than, say, providing a recipe for 
such lives. I have already suggested at the beginning of this 
thesis that the point of the EN as a whole is to improve the 
passing an of one generation's life to the next by means other 
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than lawgiving. Something more now needs to be said about this 
framework for understanding Book X of the EN. 
Imagine an accountant trying to bring up a child to inherit the 
fanily practice. She might bring him along to the office, let him, 
cone into the room while she was working, generally let him see 
what she did. Perhaps later, she would involve kin in doing 
certain aspects of the job: adding up figures, checking the 
spelling in reports, working in the office during school and 
university holidays. But another way would be by talking about 
and explaining her actions, this involving responding to 
questions and criticism. 12 Some of the skills required in 
preserving the accountant's way of life are accordingly the 
skills of argument and analysis involved in any sort of debate. 
Vithout these, the child will be unlikely to see the sort of 
goods involved in the accountant's life and thus be unable and 
unwilling to adopt it. In fine, human beings, even when they are 
trying to imitate another human being, cannot do so slavishly, 
but need to use reasoning skills. 
Taking this thought beyond the narrow range of a profession, in 
general, no good way of life can be passed on without seeing its 
point. (This is to be contrasted with bad ways of life which seem 
depressingly easy to pass on -child abuse, for eaxample. ) As has 
already been noted, the Republic has been understood as pointing 
out the inadequacy of Cephalus' unreasoned conformity. 13 But 
while Cephalus at least knows enough to withdraw from the debate 
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to continue his daily round, his son, Polemarchus, stays to argue 
and be led from conclusion to conclusion, almost unresistingly, 
by Socrates. 14 So to pass on a good way of life within those 
spheres of life too intimate for legislation, there must be an 
ability to articulate that life. 16 But over and above this need 
for articulation within spheres lower than the palia, the skills 
of reasoning and debate required for lawmaking and deliberation 
in the political sphere will also shade into the skills of 
reasoning and debate required, say, In the family; it is thus 
that Aristotle can claim that anyone who wishes to make others 
good would do well to acquire the science of legislation. 16 Being 
able to explain a life is accordingly useful for passing on that 
life both within private and public spheres. 
One of the major failings which is often attributed to the argon 
argument is its incompleteness. Although it is obviously intended 
to support some sort of life of the8ria, it is unclear precisely 
what is to count as the8ria. Again, it is unclear precisely what 
place the activity of thp8rfm Is to hold within the good life: is 
it to be the sole good, or is it to be part of a portfolio of 
goods? 
A partial explanation of this incompleteness is the political aim 
of the EN and Politics. Since the implementation in the polis of 
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the conclusions of the argument must await, to an extento the 
studies of the Politics, the argument is incomplete because it is 
unfinished. To learn that the6ria is of vital importance in the 
good life is to learn something of importance, even if further 
argument about the polis in general and in particular cases will 
be required for that conclusion to have practical effect. 
An additional explanation. however, is that the incompleteness is 
only apparent. To return to the example of the accountant and her 
child, if all that we possessed was the record of what the 
accountant had said to her child by way of argument and 
explanation, we would have only a very patchy view of her life 
since we would lack that experience of the details of her life 
which the child would possess by observation and participation. 
In other words, the explanations given by the accountant require 
the detailed experience of the life to be explained in order to 
be completely comprehensible and convincing. Moreover. what one 
child may need to have explained will not necessarily be what is 
required by another child: explanations will take account of the 
audience to which they are directed. 
4'004 What " the "'t Of PUS-On WbORP life Is to be explained? 
I have set out above various considerations about how a certain 
sort of person's life could be explained and thereby passed on to 
another. Now, it is a major and well-known feature of the account 
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of goodness in the Eff is that it is what it seens to be to a 
certain sort of individual -the phronimos. 17 My argument is that 
it is this sort of person -the phronimos whose life is going to 
be explained by the ergon argument. There is, however, this 
striking disanalogy between, say, an accountant and a phronimos. 
Vhat an accountant does is clearly an uncontentious matter. What 
a phronimos does is not so clearly uncontentious. Vhilst learning 
3nore about what and why an accountant acts will not alter our 
belief that someone is an accountant, learning more about what 
and why a putative phroninns acts may well alter our assessment 
of what it is to be a phronimns: 'Vell, if that's what she does, 
she can't be virtuous after all! ' 
If a phroninor, is simply someone who performs good actions and 
can only be identified through those good actions, there is a 
certain redundancy in the account: the agent can be struck out 
and our concentration focussed on what is really doing the work - 
the conception of the good action. So, if we are to pursue an 
agent-centred account rather than an act-centred account, we need 
an access to a good agent which is not wholly dependent on our 
understanding of good actions. 18 There are a number of ways such 
an account might be attempted. A genetic account night be 
advanced where the agent is Identified via the history of his 
education and upbringing. Some such strategy might, for example, 
explain what Plato is doing for much of the Republic: by 
sketching the history of the upbringing of the virtuous agent, he 
is defining the constitution of the future ideal state without 
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specifying how exactly it will be run by defining causally the 
character of those who will run it. Another account might be 
attempted by arguing that it is possible directly to see the 
goodness of an agent: 
.. I bel ie ve itis possi bl e tha t we ca n see the goodness of a 
person in this rather direct way. She may simply exude a 
'Slow' of nobility or fineness of cbaracter, or as I bave 
occasionally seen in a longtime member of a contemplative 
religious order, there may be an inner peace that can be 
perceived to be good directly.. 19 
A third possibility is that we already know, as part of our stock 
of common ethical knowledge, that certain people are phrnnimoi. I 
have already suggested in chapter three one possible explanation 
for this: we live in a relationship of philia with certain 
authority figures, to whom, roughly, we defer part of the 
substantive ethical direction of our lives and also to whom we 
defer the articulation of the goods of our life. But even putting 
aside the details of ny argument about phllla and authority, it 
can surely be plausibly asserted as a fact that there are certain 
people who are moral authorities or phrnnInni, even if the 
explanation for this fact is not given: as Aristotle points out, 
in ethics, to know that something is so is frequently enough 
without knowing why it is 60.20 In principle, one no more needs 
an account of bow one knows that Pericles is a phrnninna than one 
needs an account of bow one knows that courage is facing death in 
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battle. Accounts will be revired only if the aim is to defend 
such claims rather than simply to advance them. That his audience 
know the identity of at least some phron1moi is suggested at EN 
VI 5 1140a24-25, where the definition of phrongsis is arrived at 
via an examination of people whom we call phron1moi. If the claim 
that Aristotle's audience know who some phronlmol are is found 
odd, consider the titles 'hero' or 'saint'. Most of us would be 
able to produce a list of those whom we call 'hero' or 'saint' 
without necessarily being able immediately to explain what 
Justifies such a title. 
I shall now suggest Pericles as an example of one of the 
phronlnol whom Aristotle's audience nay have had in mind, and 
whose character and life we nay do well to consider if we are to 
understand the background to the argon argument. That Aristotle 
did have Pericles in mind as a paradigmatic phronimos is 
indicated at EN VI 4 1140b7-8.21 
There are three aspects of Pericles' life and character that 
appear relevant to the audience's understanding of the EN. 
Firstly, there is what nay be described as the non-transcendent 
character of Pericles practical rationality. Vhen Pericles 
appears in the EN, he is con nded as a phronimos because he had 
the ability to discern what things were good for himself and for 
men in general (EK VI 4 1140b9-10). This remark can usefully be 
compared with the assault on Pericles in Plato's Gorgias, where 
he is attacked for giving the citizens what they want rather than 
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telling them the truth-" Pericles is a suitable example of the 
practically wise man for Aristotle precisely because Aristotle, 
unlike Plato, is not trying to reform his audience: Aristotle, 
like Pericles, is giving then what they want; but that giving of 
what they want involves practical wisdom in discerning and 
revealing unarticulated desires. It is precisely because 
Aristotle thinks that the ground on which Pericles was criticized 
by Plato is in fact the ground of his goodness as a PhX=== 
that the choice of Pericles is noteworthy. 
Secondly, there is the overriding role of rationality in 
Pericles' life, appearing not only in his political activities 
but also in his non-practical interests. Famous not only for his 
political success, he was also important in the development of 
the sophistical movement in Athens and, more generally, in the 
development of the arts and philosophy in the fifth century". 
His interest in science and philosophy was, moreover, not 
confined to what nay broadly be described as the human sciences# 
but extended to the natural sciences as well. His Intimate' 
Anaxagoras, whose view was that a man would choose to be born in 
order to study the heavens and the whole universe"# was a 
natural scientist who not only indulged in grand Cosmic 
speculations analogous to those of the sixth century Ionians, but 
also engaged in scientific observation26. 
A related historical point is the connexion between the 
repression of various philosophers and intellectuals in fifth 
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century Athens and political opposition to Pericles. Kerferd puts 
the matter thus: 
There is no need to doubt that in attacking philosopbers at 
Atbens those concerned were attacking Pericles. This is 
simply evidence of the close Involvement and patronage of 
Pericles in relation to the sopbistic movement. But the 
evidence is strong indeed that there were a wbole series of 
prosecutions brougbt against pbllosopbers and otbers at 
At. hens in the second half of the fiftb century BC, usually on 
the cbarge of Asebin or rmpiety2r- 
Of particular interest is the trial of Anaxagoras who, despite 
the support of his friend, Pericles, was fined for breaching the 
decree introduced by a religious fanatic called Diopeithes 
against 'those who do not acknowledge divine things or who give 
instruction about celestial phenomena"'. 
To sun up this second aspect of Pericles' life and character, he 
combined clear-headed calculation in politiCS20 with an abiding 
interest In the non-human sciences. He Is therefore peculiarly 
well placed as a model of a life which combines and acknowledges 
the claims of phron&sis and the8ria. Now, it will become clear as 
my discussion progresses, that I do not think that Pericles 
should be regarded as the ideal at which the Eff points -primarily 
because I do not think that the EN really points at an ideal life 
at all, but rather at an ideal activity which is only ever 
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partially realized in actual lives. He does however serve as an 
example of the sort of person whom the audience would already 
regard as a hero and to be imitated, a life moreover which I 
suggest that they are trying to understand in order to pass on to 
the next generation. 
That final comment about passing on lives to the next generation 
brings out a final aspect of Pericles' life and character which I 
suggest forms the background to the erzon argument: unlike the 
two previous aspects which were strengths, this third aspect is a 
flaw. Pericles was notorious for having failed to bring up his 
children properly. He is said by Plato to have been unable to 
impart his political wisdom to them, but to have left them '. -to 
wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would 
light upon virtue of their own accord' (. prt)tagoras (319d-320b)). 
That the failure of politicians to make their own sons statesmen 
is noted in Book X (EX X9 1181a5-9) is perhaps a : further 
indication that it is Pericles who is on Aristotle's mind at this 
point. 
The inability to pass on one's own virtuous life to one's 
children is, of course, in itself not admirable. But as we have 
noted (chapter eight, S2.04) the megalopsuchns has an 
aristocratic disdain for effectiveness. He might also be 
interpreted as having a certain emotional detachment from his 
children. Children owe a debt to their parents (Ell IX 2 1165a2O- 
24) whilst the megnlopsuchgLga, although delighted to have people 
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indebted to him (EN IV 3 1124bg-18), is loath to need to repay 
debts including, perhaps, the debts incurred towards one's 
parents (ibid esp 1124blO; cf b12-15). Parenthood certainly has 
cost the father trouble though rather less than the mother (EN IX 
7 1168a23-26), and he will in any case perhaps seek to disguise 
the pains of any effort involved from his children (EN 1X 11 
117lb5-12). All this provides the material for a recognizable if 
stereotypical father figure: the sort who just wants his children 
to grow up and be independent without any thought of their adult 
lives being bound up with his own. If all this is the case, the 
inegalopsuchns, may tend to regard the success or failure of his 
children as of no concern to him, particularly as he is only 
concerned with great honours and thus presumably not the trifling 
respect of a handful of children (EN IV 3 1125a34-35; cf Eff 12 
1094b7-10): 'I only did what any parent would do -it's up to then 
now,. 
It is therefore possible that Pericles may typify the tendency of 
the megalopsuchal and thus the virtuous to be thriftless 
parents. Part of what Aristotle may be attempting to do in the Ell 
and the Politics is to make the mundane detail of passing on 
virtuous lives pleasant to the magalopsuchna. Instead of 
regarding the detail of legislation and the school curriculum as 
beneath him, the rather haughty magalopsuchos nay have something 
to learn from the perhaps more humble philosopher with whom, as 
Pericles and Anaxagoras. they nay stand in a relationship of 
philla. Just as in humble lifeforms, the expert can discern that 
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I there are gods here too' (PA I 645al7-23), so in the mundane 
detail of, say, Book VIII of the Politics, the philosopher can 
point out to the megalopsuchns that here too the divine task of 
passing on hunan life through eternity is effected. I shall have 
more to say about the relationship between the life of politics 
and the life of the6ria below, but it should be noted that this 
gentle prompting of the megalopsuch=' attention to points of 
educational detail shouldn't offend the =gaImpsucbnr_ sense of 
self-importance any more than the tax adviser's chiding of her 
client to fill in a tax return should offend the client's: in 
each case, the chiding, if anything, serves to reinforce the 
inegalopsuchos view of himself -'Yes, that's exactly the sort of 
detail I need you chaps to remind me ofl' 
Xy suggestion is therefore that Pericles is the sort of life we 
should have in mind to fill in the substantive detail of Book X. 
It is not a life which is smugly plunged Into practical affairs: 
it already straightforwardly acknowledges the claims of the8ria 
both in an amateur interest in the heavens and in the sponsoring 
of professionals such as Anaxagoras. It is a life which also 
acknowledges the role of reason throughout human affairs whilst 
remaining effective in the day to day wheeling and dealing of 
political life. Finally, it is a life flawed by a certain 
fecklessness in the detailed provision for the next generation: 
whilst clearly interested in building up and passing on a 
glorious city, there is a failure to establish the detailed 
structures and even the detailed attention within a family to 
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allow this to occur with any great probability. In a reversal of 
roles which has the initial appearance of paradox, the politician 
in this area perhaps has his mind fixed too much an the obviously 
important and grand, and needs the nudging of the philosopher to 
bring his mind down to the nitty gritty of detail and to realize 
this level too In its way has importance and grandeur. 
4.01- Ts failurp tn bring up children W,. Il A nharActer flaw? 
It might be objected here that the failure of Pericles to bring 
up his children well is a character flaw. The virtuous cannot be 
unable to perform their virtuous tasks: since bringing up 
children well Is a virtuous task, the failure to do so 
effectively indicates a failure in virtue. A really lousy soldier 
just can't act with that degree of effectiveness to be even 
eligible to be classed as courageous; a really lousy parent Just 
isn't effective enough to claim, 'Well, I tried'. 
The most important thing to note here is that the failure to 
bring up children well isn't primarily a personal failure, but 
rather a political one: to bring children up well, one needs 
state not personal action (EX X9 1180a25-32). 
So the first thing to note is that, even if Pericles is 
personally thriftless in the education of his children, that 
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would only be a failure on the nargins of his duty: bringing up 
children isn't really his Job, but the polis's. 
The second thing to note is that thinking one's children will 
acquire virtue off their own bat isn't the sane as thinking that 
virtue doesn't matter: it is a Judgment of means that, arguably, 
Pericles has got wrong. Now, whatever the precise relationship 
between means and end in practical reason -and I have suggested 
it may be very intimate (chapter five §4.00)- there must be room, 
particularly in the highly complex and variable field of 
politics, for getting the means wrong without losing virtue. the 
right end is put by Broadie thus: 
.. tbose wbo rear cbildren in the noral virtues are aiming to 
produce a generation of autonomous moral agents capable of 
relaying the same values to their own cbildren. 29 
The 'hands-off', laissez-faire approach is a possible means to 
that end: indeed, in a properly run society, it would be the 
correct approach; for the family should leave well alone and 
allow the state primary responsibility. 
In fine, if the failure to educate children is typical of the 
3applopsuchns -and it is, of course, only a claim of marginal 
importance to my thesis- such a failure need not be regarded as a 
failure of character. 
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In this chapter I have argued that the ergon argument is to be 
understood against the detailed background of the actual lives of 
ph-ronInnil specifically, against the life of someone such as 
Pericles. Without prejudging the results of my examination of the 
detailed ergon argument, a life such as Pericles articulates and 
combines, in a broad sense, the goods of theoretical learning and 
practical life. For the mass of the audience, to understand life 
as Pericles understands it is to achieve a considerable advance 
in articulating the good life. However, phronimo i such as 
Pericles are unable to pass an that good life to their children, 
even though the continuation of that good life in the form of the 
polls is their aim. 
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Chapter ten 
The ergon argument (ID: rational activity as the erson 
In the previous chapter I have argued that the ergon argument is 
to be understood as an attempt to articulate the life of a 
phronimns with a character analogous to that of Pericles rather 
than as an attempt independently to Justify such a life. 
In this chapter, I build on this general conclusion about the 
nature of the argument to begin to provide a detailed account of 
the argument itself. I argue that the point of finding the ergon 
is to see whether or not it will reveal a substantive unity 
beneath the verbal agreement an eudalmonla as an aim. Aristotle 
does not assune that because an activity is an ergan it will 
necessarily be the right sort of activity to help us understand 
the life of the virtuous. The activity proposed is action 
directed towards a future goal. This proposal fits the current 
articulated understanding of phrontmol such as Pericles who work 
towards the creation and maintenance of a polis. 
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In the EX, Aristotle first brings in the concept of the human 
ergon in the following passage: 
To say bowever tbat the Supreme Good Is bappiness will 
probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit 
account of wbat constitutes bappiness. Perbaps then we may 
arrive at this by ascertaining wbat is man's function. For 
tbe goodness or efficiency of a flute-player or sculptor or 
craftsman of any sort, and in general of anybody wbo bas some 
function fergonl or business [pzaxi I to perform, is tbougbt 
to reside in that function; and similarly it may be leld that 
the good of man resides in tle function of man, if be bas a 
function.. EN 17 1097b22-28 
Two points should be noted from this passage. Firstly, Aristotle 
thinks that he has already proved that human beings have a 
Supreme Good: happiness. Everyone agrees that their actions in 
life may be described as being aimed at the attainment of 
happiness. But this is a mere verbal agreement, an agreement on 
how the problem may be stated rather than bow it may be resolved. 
Vhat they do not agree about Is in what happiness consists; and 
it is here that the ergon argument is thought to be of help. 
Secondly, Aristotle does not assume that human beings have an 
erson: he thinks that it is arguable that they do not. 
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Aristotle goes on: 
Are we then to assume that, wbile the carpenter and the 
sboemaker bave definite functions or businesses belonging to 
t. hem, man as sucb bas none, and is not designed by nature to 
fulfil any function? Xust we not ratber assume tbat, just as 
the eye, the band, the foot and each of the various members 
of the body manifestly bas a certain function of its own, 60 
a buman being also bas a certain function over and above all 
the functions of his particular members? Vbat than precisely 
can this function be? Ell 17 1097b3O-33 
That, apparently, is the extent of the argument for man's having 
an ergon. Indeed, it is hardly an argument at all, consisting as 
it does of two unanswered questions. The temptation is simply to 
answer both questions in the negative and to conclude thereafter 
that whatever philosophical edifice is erected,. its foundations 
are of sand. 
low it is normally assumed that the origin of Aristotle's Pr&Qn 
argument Is to be found at the end of the first book of the 
Republic'. Indeed, the line of argument there appears at first 
sight similar albeit given a fuller treatment. Both Aristotle's 
argument and Socrates' begin by enumerating cases where 
(putatively) there is no disagreement about the existence of an 
er4Qn; they both conclude by induction from these cases that the 
soul or man also has an ergon. However, there is at least one 
304 
important difference: in the Socratic version, the instances from 
which the induction is made are all items which can be used: 
horses, agricultural implements, parts of the body under 
voluntary control. In the Aristotelian version of the EE, this 
restriction to items that are used Is repeated and, indeed, made 
explicit in that ergon is equated with chNýeis (EE 11 1 1218b37- 
1219a6). In the EN, however, as well as items which can be said 
to be used, Aristotle also includes craftsmen and equates argon 
with praxis. This difference nay well be crucial and should, at 
least, put us an our guard against assuming that the argument of 
the Republic and of the arguably Platonizing EE is identical to 
that of the EN. 
low it is well known that the translation of lergon' as 
'function' is unsatisfactory and that an alternative such as 
'characteristic activity' is often preferableý. Xoreover, it 
might appear from the passage cited above from the EN that 
Aristotle himself is uneasy about attributing an argon to a human 
being, even qua craftsman, perhaps feeling that 'business' 
(Praxir-) sits more naturally, even in Greek. There is at this 
point a dilemma looming. If man could be said to have a function, 
then, we might think, various conclusions about what he should or 
should not do would follow. You can use a tool wrongly, someone 
can put you right. Vithout Judging the merits of the arguments in 
the 'ought-is' question, we can say that the attribution of 
'function' to something, whether a matter of cognition or 
emotion, is 'action-guiding' in a fairly strong way3. But it is 
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precisely because the attribution of function is action guiding 
that it appears inappropriate to apply it to human beings. 
If, then, we turn to 'characteristic activity' or some such 
expression, we are perhaps less unwilling to attribute such a 
quality to mankind. Ve night reflect that sciences exist which 
do make generalizations about human behaviour, such as sociology 
and psychology: that human beings do things which mark them out 
from other animals such as the use of tools and language. NOW, 
though, the action guiding force of the expression appears 
dininished. If a given person does not perform the putative 
characteristic activity, so what? Perhaps this is just one of 
those exceptions which exist in respect of most general izatiOns - 
Perhaps it falsifies the generalization. In either case, it seems 
hard to understand what action-guiding consequences follow. 
This dilemma exists for those views which regard Aristotle as 
seeking a definition of happiness which will alter the actions of 
the audience. It must therefore be strongly action-guiding. 
However, the more strongly action-guiding it is, the more 
implausible its attribution becomes. 
I believe the way to avoid the dilem-ma is simply to grasp one of 
the horns. Let us accept in principle that it is possible to find 
one or more characteristic activities of mankind. This discovery 
is not, ex bypotbesi, action-guiding. But does it need to be? 
Quite apart from the arguments which I adduced in chapters one 
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and two in favour of the view that Aristotle is not out to change 
his audience's values, it is important to remember where the 
ergon argument enters the EX. It has already been accepted that 
human beings want, and pursue their lives with the ain of 
achieving, what they consciously and explicitly describe to 
themselves as 'happiness': the opaque description of the Supreme 
End is the word leudalmmniAl. Now, so far, we have merely verbal 
agreement. The ergon argument enters at this point to discover if 
there is any one thing to which this word refers. Aristotle, we 
have seen, accepts that it is possible that there is not. But if 
there is a transparent description of the reference of 
'eudai=nial, if there is something at which all human beings 
ain, even if they are not consciously and explicitly aware of 
this, then there is a human ergon. The discovery of this argon 
will make explicit what human beings already do; it will not 
provide then with reasons for pursuing what they do not already 
pursue. 
The stage Aristotle has reached In the ericon argument at line 
1097b33 appears to me this. Human beings pursue In their actions 
what they describe to themselves as le-dal-monia'. In the case of 
tools or parts which are used in actions, or craftsmen or 
professionals who perform actions, we can make some 
generalizations about what those actions are like. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that we might be able to make some 
such generalization about human actions simpliciter. It might 
prove that we cannot, in which case we are left with verbal 
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agreement about what people pursue but nothing else. However, we 
cannot know until we examine possible candidates for this 
position. 
3.00. - Why Ig ;% unique ergnn gmug'ht'? 
The previous section might leave us with the thought that 
generalizations might be made about what human beings do, but 
Aristotle appears to believe more that this: that the 
generalization will either characterize all apparently different 
hunan activities as one type of activity; or that one activity 
will be privileged above all the others. 
low it would be possible to reach such a conclusion afte-r 
considering all possible generalizations about human beings: it 
might Just be the case that one generalization does sum up in 
sone way all human activity. But Aristotle seems to approach the 
problem from the other end: he assumes that there will be only 
one argon and then examines possible candidates in the light of 
this assumption. low if Aristotle does make this assumption, we 
need to know why, because making it would seem to suggest that 
there is something about the ergon argument that makes it 
stranger than a simple search for general truths about human 
beings. It is also likely to put us an our guard against the 
generalization proposed: It appears intuitively unlikely to a 
modern that one attribute alone could sum up human nature and we 
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are likely to suspect that any unique solution would be adopted 
at the expense of distorting the evidence. 
So what are Aristotle's arguments for the uniqueness of the 
er4La? Starting from the beginning of the EN, 1094al-1095al3 deal 
with identifying the subject matter of the EN as the subject 
matter of the science of politics -whatever that is. Now, 
Aristotle might here be arguing from the existence of a science 
to the existence of a cohesive, homogeneous subject matter of 
that science: so the argument would go that because there is a 
science of politics, there would have to be some one unifying 
attribute of all the things studied by that science. Since 
Aristotle believes that the subject matter of politics is human 
nature, he would therefore conclude that there is a unique 
attribute of human nature. 
Such an argument, though tempting, would appear f linsy. Some 
sciences Indeed study what may be regarded as objects falling 
into natural kinds, particularly what are today described as the 
natural sciences. Even here, however, it is rare that one natural 
kind is assigned one science. Other sciences study entities which 
fall into socio-legal kinds, such as sociology or anthropology. 
Still other sciences study areas which appear related only by the 
historical accident of falling under the same university 
department: perhaps philosophy itself is an example of such a 
science. low it is possible that there is something about the 
subject matter of any science which makes it one and only one 
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science. However, that is a position which appears generally 
implausible, the links seeming to owe more to family resemblance 
than a unifying attribute in many cases. Accordingly it is a 
position to be argued for with respect to any science, rather 
than an assumption which can be relied on to form the basis to 
further argument. 
Accordingly, if we are to assume that Aristotle has any sort of 
reasonable argument, we cannot read EN 1 1-3 1094al-1095al3 as 
assuming that, because there is a science of politics, there nust 
be a unifying attribute to the subjects studied by that science. 
However, it can be read as providing defeasible evidence for that 
conclusion. If the same people successfully study a number of 
subjects, finding that knowledge and skills gained in one subject 
help them in their studies of the others, that does suggest 
something about the unitary nature of the subjects. Ve might not 
want to argue that it proves that there is one common attribute 
of the matter of all those subjects, but we might feel that there 
was something looser, perhaps an affinity, between the subject 
matters. If we could then prove separately that, indeed, there 
was something in common to all the subject matters, then we would 
be less surprised than if, say, different types of people studied 
the various subjects, enjoyed them, performed successfully in 
them. The existence of a science is therefore evidence of the 
unity of subject matter in a sense, though it is a weak, scene 
setting sort of evidence: the sort of evidence that serves more 
310 
to direct enquiries in a certain sort of direction than to 
provide answers. 
Quite apart from the weakness of the argument that the existence 
of a science implies the existence of a homogeneous subject 
matter, it does not in fact appear from the text that Aristotle 
thought that such a conclusion could be reached; for instead of 
concluding from the existence of the science of politics that 
there is some substantive unity to the subject matter of that 
science, he goes on to examine the various opinions held on the 
nature of the Supreme End for mankind, concluding that they all 
point to 'audalmonial as the description of that End, but provide 
no indication that this agreement is more than verbal (EX 1 4-7 
1095al4-1097b2l)4. It is at this point that the ergon argument is 
adduced. 
3.01- The explanatory power of a uniqup tgrgon 
However ergon is translated, whether as 'function' or 
'characteristic activity', it is more than a simple 
generalization about the activities of that object or creature to 
which it is attributed. Putting aside the question of the amount 
of 'action-guidance' to be found in an ergon, an ergon Is an 
attribution generalization which, in some way, explains other 
characteristics of the subject. The function of my heart is to 
punp blood: identifying this function correctly allows the 
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muscularity of the heart, its place in the system of arteries and 
veins, its chambers and its rhythmical movements to be explained 
and put in the correct light. The profession of Dr Kildare is 
medicine: this explains why he spent three years in pre-clinical 
training studying anatomy and the effects of drugs, why he 
subscribes to the New England Medical Journal, why he is well 
off, why he is mare likely to be an alcoholic and a suicide than 
other people. In fine, the characteristics of a taken are 
explained by having an ergon or praxis attributed to it. 
low, it is rather beside the point at this stage to ask how the 
attribution of an ergon, in general, explains. There might be 
such a general explanation but such an explanation would only be 
required in the present thesis if the human erzon, once 
identified, could be seriously denied to be explanatory: if it 
does explain, then it is of little moment whether that node of 
explanation is common to all function or craft attributions, or 
is sui generis. The point at issue is less bow in general the 
attribution of an ergon explains, but, in each case, wbetber and 
wbat it explains. 
lot all attributions are explanatory. What other characteristics 
could be deduced from the fact that I have brown hair? Very few, 
and of little importance. It is here, I suggest, that the 
difference between the Platonic version of the erzon argument and 
the Nicomachean version is crucial. Attributing a profession or 
craft to somebody is an explanation because to act effectively as 
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a professional or as a craftsman, the agent has to develop 
attitudes of mind and skills to perforn the craft which then 
shape her entire life. Consider here the difference in 
explanatory power between a 'profession' and a 'Job'. That 
someone works as a typist might tell you some things about her, 
but very few: it is a job which does not engage the emotions and 
the whole character of a person. On the other hand, the 
professions demand more of the character to be engaged. A typist 
needs, perhaps, a certain agility in her fingers. An advocate, on 
the other hand, needs to enjoy public speaking, have the ability 
to think on her feet, have a good memory, be sociable etc, 
perhaps most importantly to take a pride in her professional 
status and to identify with it. 
The important thing about an Argnn is, therefore, Its status as 
explanation. But to have that status as explanation, it must tend 
towards the position where one attribute explains many others. 
The power of an explanation depends an its range and depth: the 
more things it explains and the more completely It explains them, 
the more powerful that explanation. low, of course, most 
explanations fall short of the ideal; but to aim at an 
explanation is at least to aspire to such power, whether or-not 
the achievement of such finality appears likely. 
Aristotle brings in the notion of mail' s erzon in an attempt to 
f Ind a substantive unity beneath the verbal agreement on the 
description of the Supreme End as 'PiMminnnim'. If there Is an 
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ergon, there is one or, at most, a few generalizations to be made 
about nan's nature: to count as an ergon, the generalization must 
be explanatory; and to be explanatory, the generalization must 
explain quite a nunber of things about human beings. 
None of this proves that man has one ergon. Aristotle has argued 
that there is verbal agreement that there is one thing at which 
all people ain: happiness. As I have argued (chapter six, 0.03) 
this suggests an aspiration towards co-operation within the 
polls. If there Is some one thing which explains many of the 
attributes of human beings, this may throw light on the nature of 
happiness. But the aspiration may fail. There nay be Ila 
explanatory generalizations at all. There nay be several things 
that explain the nature of human beings. In both cases, the 
apparent unity underlying the agreement on the ain of happiness 
will prove merely verbal. It is even possible that the 
identification of the ergon, even if unique, will not throw any 
light on the Supreme End for man. It is possible that the way in 
which the argon explains man does not make it a candidate for the 
substance underlying the word 'eudainnnIaI6. But it may do. All 
this can only be considered once a candidate for the human erg= 
is identified. This Aristotle goes on to do. 
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If the EN is taken as a whole, then the proof that happiness is 
thedria appears to run along the following lines. Up to EN 17 
1097b33, we have reached the position that examination of the 
characteristic activity of mankind may throw light on whatever 
substance underlies the description of the Supreme End as 
eudaimonla.. In 1097b33-1098a2O, the argon of man is identified as 
rational activity. Ve then turn to Book X. There (EN X6 
1176a3Off) it is argued that the best form of activity is 
contemplation (the6ria) with the life of practical reason being 
only second best. Happiness is accordingly tbi-Sria, (EY X7 
1277al2-18). 
Now it should be noted that it is arguable that the only clear 
conclusion of the ergon argument proper is that happiness is the 
use of reason in action (praktiU tMIL logon echontos) -the 
purposeful activity of the rational part of man (EN 17 1098a3- 
4)). That happiness is later identified with the theoretical part 
of rational activity is not obviously deduced fron theoretical 
activity's being the erjon of man, although there are arguments 
in Book X which seen to suggest such a position as well as a 
possible hint of those arguments in Book I (see below). Vhatever 
the precise scope of the ergon argument, the argument that 
happiness is the6ria does seen to fall into two stages: the first 
being that rationality is happiness; the second being that 
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theoretical rationality is happiness; and I shall accordingly 
examine the argument assuming such a division. 
To dignify the first part of the argon argument -that which 
concludes that rationality is happiness- with the status of 
argument is perhaps generous. It runs thus: 
Wbat then precisely can this function be? The xiere act of 
living appears to be sbared even by plants, whereas we are 
looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore 
set aside tbe vital activity of nutrition and growtb. Next in 
the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too 
appears to be sbared by borses, oxen, and animals generally. 
There remains tberefore wbat may be called the practical life 
of the rational part of m3n. EN 17 1097b33-1098a4 
low there is no argument here that nutrition and growth, 
sentience and rationality are the only possibilities for the 
ergon: this is assumed, not argued. Once it is assumed, it does 
follow that the only thing which characterizes human beings as 
hunan beings rather than non-hunan animals or plants lies in what 
way human beings differ from the other categories, vizo 
rationality. To discover the force of the ergon argument, 
therefore, it is necessary to look elsewhere for the 
identification of rationality as the distinctly human activity. 
Unfortunately, such a search appears vain. As Hutchinson puts it: 
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There are many things characteristic of man..: making fire, 
or killing for fun. How does Aristotle think he bas a warrant 
for isolating this one feature, rationality? There is no 
direct answer to this question in the Aristotelian corpus. 0 
Hutchinson, however, goes on to suggest a solution which. in its 
essentials, appears correct. 
Rational activity is not to be conceived eitber as a species 
of activities among otber species or as a genus of activities 
among otber genera. Ve ought to conceive it as a forA of 
activity wbich buman beings display In the course of their 
specific activities. It Is conduct ratber than animal 
movement; rationality is the mark wbicb distinguishes conduct 
from mere behaviour. Doing things w1t. h reasons is a different 
sort of activity because almost any species of activity could 
be conceived as an instance of It ... Aristotle's claim is that 
mants single ergon is conduct-' 
Now, whatever else may be said about what it is for human beings 
to be rational, I have already argued in chapters four to six on 
prohairetic action that action for the sake of a future goal is 
the paradigm of human action. For Aristotle, one of the 
characteristics of human rationality is foresight, either in that 
animals fail to have a sense of the future at all, or, if they do 
possess such a sense, that they possess it in some attentuated 
and imperfect form. Sorabji, whilst arguing that Aristotle does 
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credit non-human animals with forward looking capacities by way 
of expanding perceptual content, notes that he excludes the use 
of reason from such capacities. Animals are thus incapable of 
deliberation, hope or expectation for the future. * If my earlier 
account of the prohairetic stucture of action is correct. 
however, rational human beings act with at least a view to the 
end of their life in death. That much Aristotle's audience should 
already have been aware of before they reached the lectures of 
Book X. Moreover, the audience should already be dimly aware that 
their actions have ends which exist beyond their own death. The 
desire to pass on goods, of whatever sort to their children, the 
desire to live In the memories of the living, the urge to perform 
the monumental public works which characterized Pericles' 
career9, all these testify to the fact that human beings in the 
exercise of their rationality tend to aim at the distant future. 
To sum up, Aristotle's audience should have felt comfortable with 
an understanding of rationality as typified, roughly, by 
planning. Throughout the corpus and the EN in particular, 
Aristotle relies an rational foresight and acting for the future 
as characteristic of human beings. So much is a given, a given. 
moreover, that the audience will accept and even use to define 
themselves. What Aristotle then has to do is to move his 
audience's understanding of their own lives from this 
acknowledgment of and even pride in rationality as a IrInAsir- 
operating to produce future effects, to an appreciation of it as 
an enargela imitating the divine. 
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The arguments directly in favour of th, -SrIR as a pursuit are 
located in Book X6 1176a3O-1179a32. 
The first point to be noted about this argument is that it 
follows the discussion of pleasures which begins Book X. Nor does 
this placing appear simply an editorial accident since the 
thedria arguments follow hard an the heels of the question: 
But among the pleasures considered respectable, wbicb class 
of pleasures or wbicb particular pleasure is to be deemed the 
distinctively buman pleasure? EX X5 1176a24-5 
This suggests that we are looking for a pleasure. low I have 
already remarked an the link between finding an action 
pleasurable and regarding it as an anergeia; accordingly, putting 
the question in that forn already suggests we are looking for an 
energela, a suspicion confirmed when at 1176b6-7, It is concluded 
that we must be looking for an anergeia in the narrow sense, that 
is, an activity which is desirable in itself and not as a means 
to something else. 
That the result of our search for happiness must be an energela 
is a conclusion that is connected with much of the discussion of 
the EN as a whole. I have already argued that enjoying one's own 
actions is to regard them as energeiaf; and Aristotle ushers us 
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Into the argon argument with a discussion of pleasure. Indeed, 
Rorty argues that the entire discussion of pleasure and 
friendship spread between Books VII and I forms a whole in which 
we learn to regard our friends' lives and our own 
as forming a unity, itself one complex energeia-11 
Aristotle goes on to reminds us directly that virtuous actions 
possess this quality of being desirable in themselves and not 
being for a discrete end (EN X6 1176b7-9). Vhatever other 
insight we are supposed to have gained into the life of the 
phroninos, we should know that phronlnol understand their actions 
and, more broadly, their lives as energelal, and it is with this 
knowledge that we enter this part of the argument. Lines 1176a3O- 
bg must therefore be taken as what indeed they are claimed in the 
text to be: a linking of the argument in Book X to earlier 
passages rather than new arguments in themselves. 
Lines 1176bg-1177all consider and reject the view that happiness 
consists in amusements. The arguments in favour of this rejection 
are based an common sense, what people who are held reasonable 
judges commonly believe. Princes believe that amusements are the 
Supreme Good; but princes are not very good models because they 
do not use reason and are commonly thought to be worthless 
(1176bg-29). Quite apart from the badness of princes as models, 
common. opinion is that happiness consists in serious things 
rather than frivolous (lines 1176b2g-1177all). Given this fairly 
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short dismissal of amusement, it may be found surprising that 
Aristotle even raises the possibility of its constituting 
happiness. Amusement, however, is an important rival to the8ria 
for the title of happiness because of its paradigmatic status as 
a pleasure desirable only for its own sake. For Plato in the Laws 
803b-e, a passage Aristotle almost certainly has in mind", human 
beings should accept their status as playthings of God and Join 
in with the divine game. Finnis accepts Plato's analysis: 
For if we simply said that we act for the sake of God, we 
would suggest that God somebow needs us, needs creation, the 
success of creation, the achieving of the creative purpose. 
But [God] needs and lacks notbing... So if we ask wby God 
creates, no answer is available otber than the one implicitly 
given by Plato: play -a Yree but patterned expression of life 
and activity, meaningful but wit. h no further point. Hence, 
even one who goes beyond Plato to accept that man is called 
to a friendsbip of devotion to God will grant that sucb 
friendship takes the form of sbaring, in a limited way, in 
t. he divine play. 12 
low there is something bizarre about both Plato's and Finnis' 
analyses. Vhat we want, ex bypothesi, to say about God's action 
is that it is for its own sake -that it has no extraneous 
purpose. Vhat we end up by saying is that God plays, which 
suggests that God acts like the baser sort of human being (cf EN 
16 1176bl6-28); that he is recuperating (ibid 1176b28-1177al); 
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and that he is being frivolous Mid 1177al-11). It is no answer 
here to say that paldin in Plato's sense is 'practically 
synonymous' with paideta Cthe most serious thing' for men Laws 
803d5-7) and has 'nothing to do with Aristotle's notion of 
play, . 13 That theology requires a certain extension of the words 
of human action is certain (cf Sumza Thealogiae Ia pars q13 a6). 
but given that, why choose 'play' rather than other actions done 
for their own sake? As Aristotle points out, if we want actions 
done for their own sake, we need look no further than actions 
done kalL arpt6n Ubid 1177al-2), which are free from extraneous 
purpose but also free from the unfortunate connotations of 
paidia. 
Xoreover, as I argued above, when seeking the human erzont 
Iristotle entertains the thought that the ergon discovered night 
prove unsuitable as a way of understanding the life of the 
virtuous. If the erzon were discovered to be that human beings 
were God's toys, such an ergon might indeed prove unacceptable. 
Just as Ivan Karamazov rejects God whilst believing in him, SO 
the proud megalopsuchos would seen likely to reject his status 
as plaything, even if be were convinced that this was the human 
ergon. Such a rejection might make virtuous life ineluctably 
tragic, but Just as it might be the right thing for an enslaved 
virtuous agent to be miserable rather than base, so it might be 
the right thing for a virtuous human being who discovers his 
status as a divine plaything to refuse to co-operate with his 
master. 
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So if we are looking for a way of describing the action of God, 
we would do better to begin in the area of virtuous actions 
rather than play. And at this stage, although Aristotle is about 
to point us in the direction of thp8rla, this must suggest a life 
in accordance with practical virtue rather than theoretical 
virtue since it is JLIJ k&tL Ar, -tAn 12raxeis that Aristotle has 
just held up as the paradigm of actions performed for their own 
sake in contrast to paidia (ibid 1176b7-9). 
In this chapter I have begun the detailed examination of the 
erzon argument against the background assumption that it is 
intended to articulate the mind of the phroninns. I have argued 
that Aristotle has begun with the assumption that human beings 
are creatures who act for the sake of future ends, an assumption 
which is already articulated by phronimoi such as Pericles. 
In the following chapter, I shall argue that Aristotle's aim is 
to move such men to an understanding that their planned actions 
are being done under the description of an energela, such an 
understanding existing already imperfectly by dint of being 
unarticulated, but relying on articulation to be perfectly 
realized. This understanding depends on the awareness of the 
connexion of the6ria with their actions. 
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Notes to chapter ten 
1. Eg Hutchiason 1986, p4l. 
2. Cf eg AVH Adkins, 'Aristotle*s Etbics and Politics, in Keyt 
Xiller 1991. 
3.1 borrow the term 'action-guiding' from P Foot, 'Moral Beliefs'. in 
Foot 1967. 
4. In a sense, the existence of a science does imply the unity Of its 
subject-natter; the subject-matter of, say. communication studies 
possesses the attribute I that-studied-by-con-inication-studies, . Th 
interesting question is whether this merely verbal unity reflects a 
underlying, substantive unity. Thus, the subject matter of the 
science of politics can be unified under the description 'that 
studied under the science of politics' and, a fortlcri, 'the scienc 
of human nature' . The question remains, however. as to whether 
this 
verbal unity does or does not reflect a substantive unity. 
5. This possibility explains, 1 suggest, the apparent hesitation in 
identifying A11dalmonla and erzon In EY 17 1097b22-25. 
I think this possibility of an argon which fails to fit the concept 
of happiness is related to the distinction drawn by Kathleen Wilkes 
between I the good nan' and 'the good for nan' . (K Wilkes, 
I The Gool 
Xan and the Good for Man, pp341-357, in Rorty 1980.1 shall have 
more to say on this distinction below. 
6. p59 Hutchinson 1986. 
7. ibid. 
8. Sorabji (1993) esp, pp54-55. The passages cited are: RA 11 488b24-6; 
DA 3 11 434a5-12; and PA 36 669alg-21. 
9. Cf Harvey 1937: 'Pericles is also famous for the great public works 
constructed at Athens under his direction, notably the Parthenon anc 
the Propylaea... and the additional "Long Vall" between Athens and 
the Piraeus. ' p313 
10. p390 Rorty 1980. 
11. See Gauthier & Jolif 1958, pp867ff. 
12. Finnis 1980, p4O9. 
13. Lord 1982, p55n. 
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Chapter eleven 
The ergon argument QID: imitating the divine 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that the arzon 
argument is to be understood as articulating the life of the 
virtuous, as articulated by the phronl7nos. As argued at the end 
of the previous chapter, Ptitlajynnnix might still be expected by 
tbeý audience to be practically virtuous activity. In this 
chapter, the argon argument Is followed as it takes the audience 
from such an understanding to an understanding of AuAgiimnria as 
I argue that Aristotle views the phronimos as imitating the 
divine. Although in principle the life of theOria is the life of 
perfect happiness, whilst the life of virtue is only secondarily 
happy (EY X7 1178a4ff), the actual lives available to human 
beings fall far short of the divine model. In some ways, the 
politican's life nay be more divine than that of the philosopher 
by being closer to the divine paradigm of the8ria. In any case, 
the EN, by making the politician more aware of and more able to 
articulate his divine ergon makes his life closer to the divine 
mode 1. 
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It is only in lines 1177al2ff that we find arguments that appear 
to be independently supportive of the view that the8ria is 
happiness. There are two points that are warth making at the start 
of this discussion. Firstly, it nust be remembered that 
Aristotle does not appear to regard the results of these 
arguments -ie that the life of the8da Is the best life- as 
conclusive. He ends the discussion thus: 
Sucb arguments then carry some degree of conviction; but it 
is by tbe practical experience of life and conduct that the 
trutb is really tested, since it is there that the final 
decision lies. Ve must therefore examine the conclusions we 
bave advanced by bringing them to the test of the facts of 
life. If they are in barmony witb the facts, we may accept 
tben; if found to disagree, we must deem them mere tbeories. 
EN X8 1179a17-221 
low on my interpretation of the argument, Aristotle is here, 
quite reasonably, gesturing back towards the ultimate subJect 
matter: the good man and his life. Aristotle has been putting 
forward thought-provoking views: stirred in our preconceptions, 
we have been sent back to look at good men's lives again in a new 
light. 
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An alternative view is that Aristotle believes he has deduced the 
best life for man from a pricrl reflection an his nature: 
Once bappiness itself bad been viewed as intrinsically 
relative to man's distinctive nature, then pbilosopbical 
psycbology bad to enter witb its normtIve contribution as to 
wbat is distinctive of that nature. Thus in the positive 
steps Isc of the argument] the terms of comparison are not a 
posterIC. EJ opinions, but the candidate 'contemplation' and 
the IL pz1orl demands of buman nature itself. 2 
Vhat an advocate of such a view has to answer is why, if 
Aristotle Is engaged in deduction from a priori premisses, does 
he believe that his arguments are inconclusive? 3 
Secondly, as far as I an aware, no modern commentator is 
convinced by Aristotle that thi-ar, A as some variety of 
philosophic contemplation is a viable or even attractive 
lifestyle4. Aristotle's conclusions are normally thinned down to 
a justification of intellectual life in general or simply 
rejected as false. For many commentators, such views are 
unproblematic: Aristotle has simply produced bad arguments which 
either do not prove anything or prove less than he thinks. I. 
however, have argued that Aristotle is gesturing primarily at the 
actual lives of actual men: if Aristotle is mistaken in his 
conclusions, he has not just made an error in a highly complex 
philosophical argument, a not uncommon fate, but has mistaken the 
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motivations and actions of people whom he came across daily. It 
is, of course, not impossible that this is the case; but for 
someone of Aristotle's genius, such a profound misreading Of 
everyday life would be unexpected. As a result, any account which 
I produce of the good life must be more attractive and more 
commonplace than those normally proposed by commentators. 
These points having been made, in this chapter I shall turn to 
the text to examine precisely what sort of life Aristotle is 
advocating. 
o? 
The arguments in 1177a12-1179a17 seem, broadly. to fall into twO 
types. The first type might loosely be described as prudential: 
that, if you pursue a life of contemplation rather than a life of 
action, you are more likely to be happy in a fairly comnonsense 
understanding of the word. Thus, contemplation requires fewer 
material resources (1178a23-24) and can be carried on for longer 
periods without fatigue (1177b2l-22). The second type do appear 
at first sight to be based on a priczi truths about human nature. 
Thus, contemplation is the activity of our highest part (1177alg- 
21). 
low the prudential arguments provide a fairly straightforward 
insight into the phronimos' life. No one in Aristotle's audience 
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is going to be surprised to hear that actions which are less 
tiring and less costly in use of resources are ceterls pa-ribus 
desirable: that said, the reasons, although relatively 
unexceptionable, still need to be brought to the audience's 
attention in order that they nay be articulated in the passing on 
of their lives. 
There nay, on the other hand, seen something rather shabby about 
such considerations to the rather high minded megalopsuchos. 
Perhaps there is an echo here of Republic Book VI 496a-c, where 
it is noted that the best a philosopher can do in the world as 
presently ordered is to withdraw from public life, even though 
this withdrawal is not absolutely the best life for a 
philosopher, that best life being to take an active public role 
in a state properly organized on rational principles. Plato notes 
that such philosophical valetudinarianism can be motivated by a 
megalA psuchA despising the petty politics of the city (496b). 
This might suggest that characters better suited to an active 
political role are, in the current way of things, diverted into a 
life of pure philosophy. In the Plato's best city, the prudential 
motives favouring the purely philosophical life would not apply. 
Although some prudential motives will still favour the 
philosophical life from Aristotle's point of view since praxis 
always requires resources (EN X8 1177a34-1178b7), the cost in 
effort results in a pay-off in terms of the greater nobility of 
the action (ibid). So while more effort will always be required 
to live a practical rather than a philosophical life, in a well 
329 
managed 12ol I a, that greater ef f ort might only serve to increase 
the nobility of the practical life. 
The prudential arguments in favour of the6rIa may, therefore, be 
less compelling the more well organized a polis is, their 
persuasiveness lasting only as long as the Dnlis remains such as 
to render all political effort almost futile. Vith the nature 
arguments, the position is less straighforward. 
Aristotle has argued throughout the EbT that virtuous activity is 
characterized by a sort of self-sufficiency: broadly, that it is 
done for its own sake (eg EN 11 4 1105a32ff). Given that 
Aristotle is trying to articulate the life of the virtuous, if we 
are talking about the activity which is most sufficient, least 
performed for the sake of other things, there may well be a 
corresponding lack of reasons for pursuing it to give to someone 
who doesn't immediately grasp its goodness: whatever else may be 
said about it, to capture its place as seen by the phron1most it 
has to be described as a categorical demand. 
Turning to the apparently a priori arguments from human nature. 
at EX X7 1177al3-18, it is stated rather than argued that the 
activity of the highest part of us will be happiness, and it is 
suggested that it has previously been argued that this activity 
is the6ria. Now as Rackham points out (note ad locum) it has not 
in fact been previously argued that the activity is tlip8rla, only 
that sophla is the highest of the virtues. 6 Since that argument 
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about sophia is contained in Book VI -one of the common books 
usually attributed to the EE- we must also be an our guard 
against assuming that the arguments in Book VI are precisely the 
arguments that Aristotle would have used at the time of the EN. 
This warning notwithstanding, let us turn to Book VI. 
The term wisdom fso; 2blal is employed in the arts to denote 
those men wbo are the most perfect masters of their art... In 
t. his use then wisdom merely signifies artisti-c excellence. 
But we also think that some people are wise in general and 
not in one department.. Hence it is clear t1at wisdom must be 
the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man 
tberefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from 
bis first principles, but also have a true conception of 
t. hose principles tbemselves. Hence wisdom must be a 
combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must 
be a consummated knowledge of tbe most exalted objects. 
(EI VI 7 1141a9-20) 
Now there is really very little here to justify the claim that 
intellect is the highest thing in us and the8rIa the best 
activity of intellect. But if the arguments in Books VI and X are 
taken rather as revealing the self-understanding of the 
Rhroninoz they become more comprehensible. Phrnnimni such as 
Pericles regard the intellect as the finest thing there is, 
something which has a categorical claim on them. Their lives are 
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structured and informed by this commitment to intellect, 
intellect which is exercised noreaver on the most important and 
exalted things. 
Vhat had been said so far might be sufficient to explain the 
self -understanding of the phronlmns; biographically in the same 
way that saying VG Grace thought cricket the finest thing might 
explain his life. But this makes it rather like a life-style 
choice: some people like the intellect, some people like 
gardening. For the phrnninns, the value of the intellect is not a 
categorical demand Just for him, but also f or the whole of 
hunanity. This wider perspective is given in the relationship 
between the Dhrnninn-_' life and God's. 
I have already indicated in my discussion of Aristotle's 
dismissal of paidia as a candidate for happiness that, in arguing 
against Plato, he already has in mind an understanding of 
humanity's ergon which, in some sense, brings God into the 
picture. We left that discussion with the conclusion that, if we 
were looking for an action that was self-sufficient and 
predicable of God, we would do better to look in the direction of 
practical virtue rather than play. 'What I did not address at that 
tine was why we should think God of any relevance to the argon 
argument at all. 
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In Netapbysics XII 7, Aristotle argues about the nature of God. 
Here, if anywhere, Aristotle is perhaps open to the charge of 
relying on an outdated or more accurately a simply false 
metaphysics based on final causality. Alternatively, it may just 
be noted that the arguments appear somewhat hasty: 
Tbese arguments are perbaps unsatisfactory to the extent that 
they proceed by too straight and narrow a patb from the order 
of the world to an ordering Intelligence. c- 
Xore generally, it is unlikely that any argument which involves 
the existence of God is going to achieve widespread acceptance 
among modern philosophers. 
All this noted, what Aristotle actually needs for the EX's 
arguments to be valid does not seem to involve the existence of 
God but rather the conception of God. If God were to exist, what 
would he be like? Vhy, for example, couldn't God be like Mrs 
Jones who lives just down the road and, apart from an overriding 
interest in cats, lives an unremarkable sort of life? Broadly, 
the answer is that whatever God is, he is going to be supremely 
good and deserving of worship, and Mrs Jones, however estimable, 
Just isn't going to fit the bill. 
low, among the differences between the ergon argument as given in 
the EE and the version in the EX, it is notable that, at least in 
some texts, the EE consistently refers to a contenplation of God 
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while the EN refers to a contemplation of divine thingS. 7 Such a 
difference may indicate a substantive difference between the two 
works: that there is a knowledge of divine things does not entail 
or rely on the existence of God, any more than a knowledge of 
hellish things entails or relies on the existence of bell. It is 
also a somewhat wider term than what strictly belongs to God 
(understood as Aristotle's Prine Mover) since it will include 
what is commonly thought of as belonging to gods or what is 
analogous to the properties of God. Moreover what is divine 
allows of degrees unlike the properties of God which, presumably, 
he either does or does not possess. Thus, Aristotle has no 
hesitation in describing the securing of the good of a nation or 
polis as more divine (tI2Lij2t2xsm) than securing the good of one 
person (EX 12 109010), even though Aristotle's God in the 
Netapbysics is clearly not in the business of founding cities. 
All this suggests that. even if Aristotle's God as the Prime 
Xaver is rejected, the argument of the EN at least should be 
relatively unaffected. But though the analysis of what is divine 
is thus separated from strict theology, divine as an epithet 
locates that goodness as something which has a categorical call 
on us as human beings: to regard something as divine is to both 
say that it is supremely good and also that, like God, it has a 
call on our attention and indeed our worship. 
This analysis suggests an approach to the problem put forward in 
Kathleen Vilkes' paper, 'The Good Xan and the Good for Man'. 8 
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Vilkes distinguishes between what a good man does, and what it is 
good f or him to do. Broadly, the thought behind the paper is 
that, given the identification of the function of an object or 
animal, that nay tell you what a good such-and-such will do. But 
that says nothing about what it is good for that such-and-such to 
do. It may the function of a bomb to explode; yet the explosion 
of the bomb will result in its own destruction. It may be the 
function of a dairy cow to produce as much milk as possible; yet 
that production may result in deformities and an early death for 
the cow. Vilkes then applies this distinction to Aristotle's 
claims about rationality and concludes that while practical 
rationality is indeed good for man, the same cannot be said of 
theoretic rationality: 
-his argument that the better a man Is at practical 
reasoning, the better a life be will lead, is of great 
Importance; and its Importance is enbanced if we extend the 
scope of pbronesis, as we legitimately may, to include lzu n 
problem-solving intelligence in generaP. 
Vilkes' point appears to be this. Assuming something like 
Aristotle's hierarchy of souls for a moment, we can see that 
practical reasoning is both promoted by and itself promotes the 
good performance of the sensitive and vegetative souls: by 
planning, the human being obtains food and sensual pleasure-, 
sensual pleasure and food ensure that the human being has the 
correct resources to reason correctly. Now theoretical reason 
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doesn't obviously fit In to this virtuous circle: satisfaction of 
the need to know seens to stand alone and to have no connexion 
with the other, lower needs of the human being. Even if it were 
argued, say, that developing the virtues of theoretical reason 
served to strengthen the virtues required for practical reason. 
such an argument Ir. less straighforwardly self-evident than is 
the virtuous circle of practical reason and the vegetative and 
sensitive souls; it might for example be the case that exercising 
theoretical reason diverted resources from the exercise of 
practical reason leading to its attenuation. Accordingly, Vilkes 
appears to be correct in arguing that, whatever the relationship 
of theoretical reason to the rest of the soul, that relationship 
is not evidently one of being good for man as a whole. 
That Wilkes is right here is, I suggest, acknowledged by 
Aristotle. The happiness consequent on thp5ria is not an 
accidental concomitant, but is inherent in the activity (Eff X8 
1178b28-32). The life of the6ria is more than human and will only 
be obtained by that part of the human being which is divine (EN X 
7 1177b26-1178a4). On any reading, this does suggest that the 
theoretical intellect and its activity stand outwith the virtuous 
circle of the rest of the soul. But isn't this just true? To deny 
that, broadly understood, a devotion to divine things has always 
stood at least partially against the rest of human life would 
appear futile: to be divine just is to transcend humanity whilst 
at the same time retaining a call on its attentions. Now Wilkes 
might think the belief in divine things to be simply an error, 
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and perhaps she would be right. But that is something which 
requires argument and, moreover, is something which is unrelated 
to our present task which is, so I have argued, to understand the 
lives and self-understanding of people who have acknowledged such 
a more than human vocation. That phrnn1nni do acknowledge a 
divine claim on their lives, that there are some activities which 
transcend humanity and, perhaps, make other activities seem 
rather shabby In comparison is, at the least, a recognizable and 
comprehensible world-view and is, I suggest, precisely what is 
being articulated here. 10 
5.00., What dne-; rnd dn? 
In Netaphysics XII 7, God's activity is of continuous duration, 
lasts for ever, is pleasure, and that activity is God thinking 
about his own thinking. 
low we know that human beings cannot be exactly like God. 
Aristotle for example states that man's composite nature causes 
hin to desire variety: 
For tbere is not only an activity of motion but also an 
activity of i=obility, and there is essentially a truer 
pleasure in rest than In motion. But cbange in all tbings is 
sweet, as the poet says, owing to some badness in us; since 
Just as a cbangeable man Is bad, so also is a nature that 
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needs cbange; for it Is not simple nor good. Ey VII 14 
115026-31 
Thus, of the qualities of the God's activity mentioned above, we 
know immediately that human beings cannot attain the eternity Of 
God's activity, and very probably neither the complete identity 
with pleasure, nor the continuous duration. Insofar as human 
beings are going to imitate God's activity, we know certainly 
that they are only going to be able to do so imperfectly. 
This is important because it suggests an approach to the 
'dominant' versus 'inclusive' end debate on the nature of 
happiness. Perfect happiness is God's activity: since we can 
never achieve this, anything we can achieve is going to be 
measured on a scale of being more or less divine. Ifeverthelesso 
although not achievable, the aim of perfect happiness is not 
irrelevant to the phronimos: it is the target towards which he 
ains his entire life. 
low, as there is not a single measure of the quality of the 
divine activity. so there is not a single measure by which the 
closeness of any activity to that perfect activity can be judged. 
That said, there are two nain candidates for the imitation of the 
divine: the activity of the8rla and those activities IrAta tAil 
all4n ar, -tAn (Eff X8 1178ag-10). 
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I have already noted that the rejection of play as a suitable 
analogue of divine activity seems to leave Ut IrAt' aret6n 
praxels of 1176b7-8 as the favoured candidate for happiness. 
Since most of the preceding nine Books have also concentrated on 
the practical life, the expectation that the good life consists 
in practical virtue can only be stronger in the audience's mind. 
Aristotle seems very rapidly to remove this expectation in EN X7 
1177al2-18 where he seems to advance activity In accordance with 
theoretical reason as happiness. But on a closer reading, this 
conclusion is somewhat less obvious. Ve are referred to the 
activity of that part which seems to rule and direct (archein 
kai. h6geisthaf) (1177al4-15). Xenories of Book I would naturally 
lead the audience to think here of the supreme architectonic 
science of politics (Eff 11 1094a6-28), a tendency which night be 
reinforced proleptically by the discussion of law which is soon 
to commence (EN X9 1179a33ff). The dominant part of the agent 
(ta h6zounennn) is described earlier as that part which chooses 
Qjj proairounennn) (EN 111 3 1113a5). " The general impression 
that we are dealing here with the practical life is only 
reinforced by Aristotle's vagueness with respect to the status of 
the dominant part, refusing to be precise about whether or not it 
is mr)-m; and thus suggesting a link with the life of phrongsis 
which is shortly to be declared not purely to be that of n= (EY 
I 1178al6-23). Thp6rla as has already been noted can be used of 
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the objects of practical as well as theoretical reason (eg EN VI 
1139a7; IX 9 1169b33). The description of the objects Of 
knowledge as being noble and divine (Pnnninn Pchpin pg,; L Iralan 
kal thel6n) again does nothing to remove the suggestion that the 
field of concern is the practical life: : La kainn is of course the 
motivation of the virtuous (cf Eff 13 109014-15; 111 8 1116b3O- 
31) and I have already noted that political action is described 
as divine at EN 12 1094blO. 12 
Iristotle goes an to suggest that the gods -and thus not the 
Prime Xover of the MetapbYsics- cannot worthily be conceived of 
as performing virtuous actions (Ell X8 1178b8-18). There is 
however apparently no difficulty in conceiving of then as taking 
an interest in human lives Mid 1179a24-32). " Accordingly, it 
would seem to follow that there would be no difficulty in 
understanding how human beings who take an interest in human 
affairs could be acting divinely. Thus political philosophers and 
politicians in a more relective mode might both be regarded as 
acting divinely. 
argued above that the result of the ergon argument might prove 
wanting if it failed to explain, in some sense, hunan beings' 
lives. 
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One way in which the activity of contemplating inf orms human 
lives is through the desire to understand. Netapbysics I 
indicates that science arises from natural curiosity: 'All men by 
nature desire to know'". Originally, this curiosity was aimed at 
useful invention; but, over time, some arts and sciences were 
developed which did not lain at giving pleasure or at the 
necessities of life'. These pure arts were valued more highly 
than the practical ones's. 
That curiosity informs much of human endeavour, that it explains 
what human beings are like, night be readily accepted. Vhat 
renains unclear is how the desire to understand and the initation 
of the divine are related; for it must be remembered that what 
appears to be aimed at is success in intellectual pursuits rather 
than the pursuit itself. As Vilkes puts it: 
Perbaps, tbough, Aristotle does not mean [by tbe6rial.. tbe 
endeavour to come to grips witb and disentangle knots of a 
certain sort. In 10.7 the element of discovery is excluded 
from the activity of theoria: "it Is to be expected that 
Chose wbo know will pass their time more pleasantly than 
those wbo inquire" (1177A26-27). He cannot mean tbjý knowing 
is a way of passing time, for it obviously is 
ýot. Tbecria 
must ratber be something tbat follows on the solution of a 
problem, or on the discovery of a satisfactory tbecry, after 
researcb bas sbowm bow tbings must be or bow tbey must bang 
togetber -a contemplation of sometbing at last fully grasped 
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and understood. And one can indeed grant that after a 
difficult piece of work -intellectual, practic'211, or 
tecbnical-. bas been brougbt to a satisfactory conclusion, one 
can sit back and look witb pleasure and apprz7bation on the 
results acbIeved; and there my be a quasi-aestbetic deligbt 
in the very thougbt of the structure of the double belix, the 
design of a jet engine, or a pbilosopbical tbeory. "6 
Such an account is all very well, but this still, it might be 
objected, fails to explain why the8r1a as contemplation Of 
achieved truth is connected to the desire to understand. It seems 
to be rather missing the point about understanding to suggest 
that its purpose is Just contemplation of the solution. As Vilkes 
puts it, once we have achieved understanding, there may be a 
moment of contemplative satisfaction. 
But sucb contemplation is not sustained Indefinitely, and 
presumably we do not tbink it sbould be: this Is not the end 
at wbicb inquiry is directed. All researcb is intended to 
produce some answer, tbeory or solution; but the point and 
pleasure of the work does not derive from the passive post 
factuir contemplation of the results acbieved but ratber in 
the work itself and the discoveries. 17 
low, the point of any research is to know: to achieve that point, 
there has to be both a truth obtained, and that truth has to be 
known. As Vilkes has already admitted in the previous passage, 
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that moment of discovery does seem to fit Aristotle's conception 
of the highest form of the8ria. That this moment is fleeting 
would not, in itself, be either an objection to the validity of 
the interpretation of Aristotle or to Aristotle's view itself, 
for Aristotle recognizes that the highest moments of happiness 
are indeed fleeting and outwith the normal run of things: 
Suc. h a life as this however will be higber than the bu n 
level: not In virtue of bis bumanity will a man achieve it, 
but in virtue of sometbing within him that is divine... Elf X 
7 1177b26-28 
But even beyond the moment of initial discovery, the building up 
and possession of human knowledge is the point of all academic 
activity; and it is in this sense that the contemplation of 
truths explains the desire to understand, which in turn explains 
much of human life. That some or other researcher finds 
satisfaction in, say, the accidental features of the pursuit of 
truth is irrelevant: the phronimos has his eyes firmly focussed 
on humanity's possession of truth and, without this focus, 
academic studies become perverted. It is, moreover, by taking 
pleasure in this essence of academic studies that the phrnnlynn-- 
brings the good of the future attainment of truth into his 
present life. 
So this is one way in which t1le6ria shapes hunan beings: by way 
of the desire to understand. And since truths are nore 
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successfully comprehended in some areas rather than others, so 
sone areas of intellectual endeavour are more divine than others. 
Vhen Aristotle suggests a division between two parts of the 
rational soul -the scientific faculty (= apist6monikon) and the 
deliberative faculty (: LcL logistikon) (EN VI 1 1139a5-15), the 
virtue or excellence of the deliberative part being pbrnnAsla 
and that of the scientific part ==a7 that division Is based an 
the determLinacy of the object of reasoning. phron6sis dealing 
with those areas which are indeterminate, sophla with those areas 
which are invariable and of the 'most exalted nature' 11LIL 
tini8tat8n. t&J 12husei] (ER VI 7 114112-3). If we take the final 
form of any science to be a deductive systen'O, then we can Bay 
that while it might (just) be possible to set out a science 
concerning human life in the form of deductions from premisses, 
it would be intellectually unsatisfactory both in that the 
premisses would only hold for the most part and, presumably, the 
science would require an almost infinitely large number and 
variety of premisses to get anywhere near an understanding Of 
huzan life. Other sciences, for example, astronomy, would require 
fewer premisses and these would be universally true: this is 
because, according to Aristotle, the heavens are an area where 
'the ordered and the defined is far more apparent-than about 
us'(PA I1 641 b18). 
however explains more than the desire to understand. I 
have already argued that the end at which a prohairesis is aimed 
is the contemplation of a life from the perspective of its 
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f inish. On a grander scale, the actions of a legislator are 
directed at the creation of the good polis, a polis which, I have 
argued, will be able to sustain itself rather than enter into the 
decline which is necessarily consequent upon a failure to pass on 
the lives of the present generation. The ethical life of human 
beings will then have become as eternal as the physical existence 
of the species already is, the eternal recurrence of each 
generation's life mirroring, as far as is humanly possible, the 
eternal circular motion caused by the Prine Nover Meta XII 7 
1072bg-10). The legislator's life is accordingly structured by 
the same aspiration towards a time of perfect divine imitation as 
the researcher's. Indeed, without the political circumstances 
ained at by the legislator and required to ensure the progress 
and maintainence of human science, the researcher's ain of 
the8rla is unachievable. That human beings will never be divine 
Is certain. That we will never achieve the perfectly established 
city or perfectly achieved science is likely, even though, in 
Aristotelian terms, that achievement is not absolutely 
impossible. But it is the aspiration towards such states which 
explains the notivation and the life of the phronimos and thus of 
the sort of human life we are trying to pass on to our children. 
Xoreover, because the ph-ronimos as a megalopsuchos is highly 
aware of himself and his status (EN IV 3 1123a34ff), he takes 
pride and reflects on his actions and his aims, retrospectively 
but also prospectively, and also an the virtuous actions of his 
friends (EN IX 9 116gb33-1170al). He thus imitates the self- 
reflective activity of God and, by taking present pleasure in a 
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future good, transforms what is otherwise a fairly thankless 
sacrifice for the benefit of the marrow. into an activity which 
realizes a present good. 19 It is in this sense that it is Tne 
explanatory argon which we have been seeking. It is =reover the 
sane task in which both the philosopher and the legislator and 
the man of ordinary practical reason are engaged, albeit at 
different levels of divinity. 
At a number of points in this thesis, I have noted the points Of 
contact between the Republic and the EX. A further and 
fundamental point should be noted here. 
In Book IV of the Republic, Adeimantus makes the objection to 
Socrates that the Guardians of the ideal city will not themselves 
be very happy. Socrates replies that, even if the Guardians 
themselves were unhappy, what he is interested in is the 
happiness of the city as a whole, and not the happiness of any of 
its conponent. parts (420b-d). 
low, while Adeinantus claims that the Guardians will be unhappy 
in that they have abandoned the trappings of wealth and power, 
there is the more fundamental point that the Guardians have been 
forced to turn their minds away from contenplation. of the Forms 
towards the workaday and rather shabby business of running a 
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city. Vhat about such a life makes the Guardians happy? Are we 
Just forced to concede that, in Vilkes' terms, the Guardians' 
life is good, but not good for them? 
Aristotle's answer to this can now be seen. The political life of 
Aristotle's equivalents to the Guardians does not deny 
contemplation of the divine, but is instead devoted to it. The 
life of politicians ensures, firstly, that contemplation exists, 
even if politicians themselves cannot contemplate. Moreover, the 
goodness of what they can contemplate -their own role in the city 
and the benefits produced by their actions- is dependent on 
seeing themselves as part of the divine process and is devoted to 
the divine. The life of philosophy, as it is actually lived, on 
the other hand, is less about contemplation than about research 
and enquiry; and may be less aware of its place in the divine 
scheme. Thus while, abstractly, the philosopher's direct 
contemplation of the divine must be a life happier than that of 
the politician who contemplates, as it were, indirectly through 
the lives of those he has allowed to exist, in practice, the life 
of the actual politician is not so obviously further from the 
goods of the8ria than the life of the actual philosopher. 
The EN is a practical work. But of any practical work. it nust be 
asked: What good is it setting out to achieve? I have argued that 
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it is setting out to improve the transmission of the good life 
from generation to generation by articulating the unarticulated 
values of the virtuous. Such articulation serves both as a 
prolegemenon to the science of legislation proper, dealt with in 
the Politics or, more exactly, in its missing analogue, and also 
as an immediate contribution to the informal debates which 
precede legislation in the public arena, and which take its place 
in private arenas such as the family. 
As I have frequently stated, since the EN is not out to provide a 
textbook of case-morality, there is very little point in 
attempting to draw from it rules about how the virtuous agent 
decides precisely how to live out his ergon. In particular, there 
is the difficulty in resolving the claims of the best life of 
the6ria and the second best life of practical virtue. Questions 
will arise both at the political level and at the individual 
level about whether, say, to look after the sick or to devote 
tine to contemplation of mathematical truths. 20 The balances that 
the virtuous have struck at the level of the polis are broached 
in the Folitics; the balances that are struck at the individual 
level are a matter, perhaps, for biography or drama. But the 
sharpness of the proposed dilemma is blunted if, firstly, it is 
noted how far even the most divine activity accomplished by 
hunans is from that of Aristotle's God himself; and, secondly, if 
it is noted how even the practical life is part of the same 
vocation to imitate the divine as the theoretical life. The 
priggishness of the megalopsuchos is merely an unfavourable 
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description of his extreme self-awareness and consciousness of 
his status. Unlike, perhaps, the Christian ideal which emphasizes 
the immediate unregarding act of charity, the inagalopsuchos IS 
engaged in the reflection on his life and that of his friends, 
polls and species which is both an imitation of the divine and 
the condition for its being articulated and thus realized in the 
eternal recurrence through successive generations of the achieved 
good polls. The legislator perhaps does not reflect so much on 
the detail of the truth of the divinest objects in the universe. 
But he cannot avoid reflecting an then to the extent that he must 
be aware that part of his vocation is to carry them on through 
the generations. And he is perhaps more aware of the great divine 
pattern of human history than is, say, the retired Cambridge 
mathematician immersed In his subject. Both fail dismally when 
Judged against the absolute standard of the Prime Mover. Yet both 
are embodiments of that divine vocation. 21 
It is thus that human nature enters Aristotle's ethical theory: 
human beings characteristically are pulled towards imitation of 
the Prime Mover. In a sense, all of nature is regarded as 
Aristotle as imitating the divine. In a complex series of 
analogies in De caelo, Aristotle compares the various actions of 
the celestial bodies to that of the Prime Mover, and also the 
actions of various living creatures to the actions of the 
celestial bodies (DC 11 12 292alO-25). Vhile human beings need to 
perform a great variety of actions in order to obtain happiness 
-and are thus correspondi ugly unlikely to obtain success (ibid 
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291a25-30)- they at least, unlike the lower animals, can actually 
attain it (ibid 292b5-20). Part of the reason for this is perhaps 
that human beings have a direct perception of good and evil 
whilst the lower animals have to make do with perceptions of 
pleasure and pain (Pol 11 1253alO-28). Human beings can thus 
identify the divine as their good and try to aim at it 
directly. 22 
To recognize this vacation to an imitation of the divine by the 
philosophical reflection of the EN is both to improve the quality 
of that the8ria by making it more self-aware, and to help realize 
it over the generations of humankind by ensuring that what is 
learned in one generation is not lost to the next. Face some 
commentators, Aristotle's ethics is accordingly not dependent on 
an outdated metaphysics, but rather on a perfectly straighforward 
description of human motivation. Vhether this description is in 
fact itself outdated or in some sense false is, of course. 
another matter. 
This thesis has fallen into three parts. The first part -chapters 
one to three- has argued for the political purpose of the EN. 
That political purpose is to articulate the lives of the virtuous 
so that those lives can be more easily passed an to future 
generations. 
350 
The second part -chapters four to eight- took an aspect of the EN 
that would appear difficult to reconcile with such a purpose. 
Vhile Aristotle's discussion of the virtues might well be useful 
in describing how the present generation lived, of what possible 
use could his account of pleasure and prohairesis be? I argued 
that both his account of prohairesis and his account of pleasure 
revealed substantive attitudes of the virtuous: that they acted 
with a view to assessing their lives from the standpoint of their 
ends; and that by taking pleasure in the pursuit of such an ain, 
they turned the ineluctable pains of struggle and pursuit Into a 
present good. 
The third part -chapters nine to eleven- reconciled the account 
of the second part of the thesis with the ergon argument. The 
Inegalopsuchnaalthough in fact imitating the divine like the rest 
of creation fails to articulate that Imitation: he is thus not 
yet fully self-reflective. Between the philosopher and the 
Politically minded megalopsuchns there exists, as between 
Pericles and Anaxagoras, a relationship of phillft, such that the 
normally proud negalopsunhos acknowledges the authority of the 
philosopher to describe nature and the place of human beings 
therein. From the philosopher, the politican learns that he too 
imitates the divine. By such a revelation. his actions become 
more divine in that they become more completely self -reflective. 
Additionally, by becoming more articulate, the prime task of the 
Politician which is to ensure the eternity of the species becomes 
more easily effected since, as argued In the first part of the 
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thesis, articulation eases the passing on of ways of life to 
future generations. In this way too, by making the politician's 
actions more longlasting, the philosopher's work in the EN 
increases the divinity of the politician's life. 
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Notes to chapter eleven 
I assume that EN X8 1179a22-32 is likely to be misplaced due 
to editorial error and that, accordingly, 1179a17-22 conclude 
the argument. (cf Rackhan 1934, ad loc. ) 
2. Xonan 1968, p110. Xonan's view that the EN contains an a 
priori justification of the8ria should be contrasted with his 
view that the EE contains an a posteriori justification: 
For the kalon and contemplation are not proved to be goods 
Isc In the Eudezdan EtbicsJ; Aristotle's metbodic analysis of 
the confused judgments wbicb assert them to be does no more 
than reflectively point to those objective values as the Ones 
wbiCb motivate moral Judgeiwnts, in the lzope that bis learers 
will Intuitively see them as values in the context of their 
Own affective experience. (ibid, p145) 
Face Monan, I do not believe that there is a contrast in 
method between the EE and the EN although there nay well be a 
difference in the purpose of the two works and In the 
conclusions drawn. The above quotation from Xonan seems to me 
a reasonable summary of the EN, although I would not accept 
Xonan's use of the language of cognitivism (eg 'objective'; 
'Intuitive'; 'affective*) as being either helpful or correct 
in this context. 
3. Annas 1993 argues that, in ancient ethics generally, nature 
does not play an evidential role absolutely independent from 
the resulting ethical theory: 
The best model for this kind of increased understanding is a 
holistic one: we appeal from ethics to nature, but to 
understand nature properly we have to bring some ethical 
understanding to bear, so that we clarify the two concepts 
together. (p217) 
And again: 
We bave some intuitive independent grasp of bumn nature; but 
the bigger the role nature plays in an etbical tbeory, the 
more it is shaped by etbical considerations from the tbeory 
itself. Mid) 
Clark 1975 in drawing parallels between the6ria and Eastern 
philosophies may be an exception to this. 
5. Cf Broadie 1991, p436: 
It refers either to a lost passage or to anotber Work or to 
passages in EN VI (1141alB-22; 33-b-2; 1143b33-34; 1145a6-11) 
wbicb Imply tbe Inferiority of practical to tbeoretic 
intellect (or of the former's objects to the latter's). 
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6. p393, FInnis 1980. 
7. Cf EE VIII 3 1249b16-23 and EN X7 1177al2-20. EX uses God at 
1178b2l-22, but this is an argument additional to and 
confirnative of the main argument which is based on how we 
conceive gods (tnim theoug gAr =Iisla hupellAphamen 
3w1cArinuc% ]M; L Pudalmonas Cinai 1178b8-9) thus suggesting an 
analysis of popular vieýs rather than a co=itment to their 
existence. (I follow here the Rackham text of both the EN and 
the EE. Valzer & Kingay 1991 gives t_a tbpimn rather than 
theos in the EE, noting Ja theiQu as an alternative. Whatever 
the precise text of the EE, the EN's does not seem to offer a 
sinilar variation. Accordingly, putting aside the textual 
difficulties of the EE, the use of tg-tbeinr in the EN 
renains noteworthy. 
8. In Rorty 1980, pp341-357. 
9. ibid, p354. 
10. Cf chapter eight, 92.04. 
11. But contrast EE VIII 3 1249b6-23 where it is made clear that 
the dominant part in the EE argument does not issue orders 
but is the best part (of Kenny 1992, ppQ5-G; Broadie 1991, 
p386). 
12. Cf Fol VII 3 1325bl6ff where the6ria is argued to be 
praktikos. 
13. That the gods cannot be conceived of as acting virtuously 
does riot mean that they cannot be conceived of as acting. 
Quite apart from the doings of the gods in Classical 
literature, the Prime Mover is a cause (Meta XII 7 1072blO- 
11). Moreover, the virtues of the EN do not seen to include 
the sort of empire building and city founding traditionally 
ascribed to a semi-divine person and being effected at the 
tine by Macedonian expansion. By such standards, even the 
magainpsunbna seems a bit of a village Hampden. 
14. Meta 11 980al. 
15. Xeta II 981b13-25. 
16. Wilkes, op cit, p353. 
17. Wilkes, op cit, p353. 
18. A possible understanding of the account In the Pcsterior 
Analytics. See Sorabji 1080 ch 3, and Reeve 1992 for a 
discussion of this area. A modern perspective an the question 
of the scientific unsatisfactariness of sociology and related 
disciplines is provided in MacIntyre 1985, ppB8-108. 
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19. Thus avoiding Kant's criticism of the aim of historical 
progressi 
Wbat remains disconcerting about all this Is firstly, that 
the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks 
only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare from 
them a further stage from wbicb tbey can raise still bigber 
the structure intended by nature, and secondly, that only the 
later generations will in fact have the good fortune to 
inbabit the building on wbicb a wbole series of their 
forefatbers (admittedly, witbout any conscious intention) bad 
worked witbout tbemselves being able to sbare in the 
bappiness they were preparing. 
From Kant's 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose' (1784) quoted Finnis 1980, pp373-4. 
20. cf Kraut 1989, p10-11 and passim. 
21. Kraut 1989 (eg pp58-9) takes the broad point that both the 
practitioner of practical wisdon and the6ria engage in a 
godlike activity, although his detailed explanation of the 
sinilarity differs from mine. 
22. Cf Broadie 1991, p405: 
In them lie other, non-human species] tbe Individual relates 
directly to its good (its because it individually seeks it) 
but only indirectly to divine eternity b7 Its membership In a 
species always instantiated. 
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Chapter twelve 
Han iness irp 
1.00., Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the main purpose of 
the EN is to articulate the life of the virtuous agent in order 
to allow that life to be passed on to future generations. In 
chapters four to six, I argued that the virtuous typically aimed 
at a future end. In chapters seven and eight, I argued that the 
virtuous took pleasure in that pursuit of a future end and found 
a present good in that pursuit. In chapters nine to eleven, I 
argued that the virtuous agent, by holding these two attitudes, 
imperfectly imitates the divine, whether in a philosophical life 
or in a life of political virtue. 
In this chapter, I bring together the various conclusions reached 
in the course of this thesis to deal directly with the question: 
Vhat is audainnnig? (Al, l page references in this chapter refer to 
the present thesis unless indicated otherwise. ) 
2.00. - RudAlmnnIA 
In Metapbysics XII, God's energala is described as being pleasure 
(1072bl7), most good and eternal (1072b27). God's life is such as 
the best life (diag8ge) human beings experience for short periods 
(1072bl5>. 
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All of nature in a sense imitates this divine life but only human 
beings can aim directly at it and indeed, as noted in the 
Netapbysics passage cited, in part achieve it (pp349-350). The 
perfect happiness is accordingly God's, and human beings are 
happy insofar as their activities approach that perfection: 
It follows, then, that the activity Eenergsial of God, wbich 
is supremely bappy, must be a form of contemplation; and 
tberefore among buman activities that which is most akin 
(suggenestat6l to God's will be the happiest. (EN X8 
1178b2l-23; cf Ibid 1178b25-27; see pp337-8). 
3.00. - BAIng akin to God's actimltx 
Hunan audalmnni; % will accordingly fall short of perfect, divine 
eudalmnniA, One way in which human PudminnniA seems likely to 
fall short of divine eudAinnnjA is in duration: 
Not. hing bowever can continue to give us Pleasure alwaYsp 
because our nature is not simple, but contains a second 
element (wbicb is wbat mkes us perisbable beings) .... Hance 
God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually ... But cbange 
in all things is sweet, as the poet says, owing to some 
badness in us.... (Eff VII 14 115020-29; cf Meta XII 
1072b15). 
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Given that God's activity is contemplation, this perhaps suggests 
that human t-tidj%iTnr1nIa is achieved in brief moments, Says 
in the 
satisfaction immediately consequent on understanding a scientific 
truth after a long period of research (cf p343). But whatever 
the 
precise occasion of emAjj=njzL, human beings will only achieve 
it 
in brief, godlike flashes. 
Such an understanding of euAajzcaj& as transitory seems, however, 
in tension with a view maintained throughout the BY which is that 
human tzii(JAinnnin essentially involves a whole lifetime: 
... it follows that It is the enerZgla of the intellect 
that 
constitutes complete buman happiness -provided it be granted 
a complete span of life, for hotbing that belongs to 
bappiness can be Incomplete. (EN X7 1177b23-26; cf 7 
1098al8-20) 
As said, the two views appear in tension. On one view, if I am 
engaging in scientific research which will lead to discovery of a 
truth and that brief moment of satisfaction as I contemplate that 
truth, I am not happy but I am preparing for happiness. I wills 
in even the most fortunate human life, be spending most of the 
tine preparing for happiness rather than actually achieving it. 
On the other view, it is only that complete lifetime which can be 
described as happy. 
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Let's style that happiness which can only be achieved for short 
moments IT-happiness' for 'transitory happiness'; and that 
happiness which can only be achieved over a lifetime as 'L- 
happiness' for 'lifetime happiness'. low a sinple solution here 
is to say that T-happiness and L-happiness are conpletely 
different things and that Aristotle, throughout most of the EN. 
Just happens to be interested in L-happiness rather than T- 
happiness. Putting aside any considerations as to what might be 
the possible motivation for such a concentration on L-happiness, 
in terms of explanatory neatness, it would certainly be 
preferable to point to some substantive links between the two 
concepts. 
One possible' route would be to suggest a sort of utilitarian 
calculus: L-happiness is achieved by maximizing T-happiness. Now 
my reasons for not pursuing this line of enquiry rest partly on 
the usual problems associated with such calculi -for example, is 
maximization of T-happiness to be assessed solely in terms of 
duration or is its quality somehow to be flung into the balance? - 
and partly on the absence of any such maximizing suggestions in 
the text. It remains, however, a possible -although in my view an 
unpromising- avenue of enquiry. 
Xy own reconciliation Of the two conceptions depends rather on 
identifying links between the two conceptions of human Audalmanift 
and the paradigm of divine PudAjinnnlA. Xy view is rather that 
T-happiness tends to spread its goodness beyond the simple 
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'Eurekall moment by, for example, the agent's looking forward to 
that moment or, from the perspective of that moment, looking back 
on the k1nAsIs which led up to it and transforming it into an 
energela throughout which a good is constantly found present. L- 
happiness is simply an extreme case of such spreading, where an 
entire life is lit up by the goodness aimed at on its completion. 
3.01- PlannIng fnr happlnpsq 
In chapters f our to six of this thesis, I argued that human 
beings characteristically aim at a future goal (cf pp127-8). 
Prinarily, that goal is eudalmonia understood as satisfied 
reflexion on a life from the perspective of the end of that life. 
Put crudely, the virtuous agent strives throughout her life to be 
in a position, after retirement, to look back on it and 
appreciate its worth (see esp. chapter four, passin). Generallys 
however, human action is characterized by having a future goal 
(see esp. chapter f ive, passim). 
low, in the case of T-happluess, it is something that has to be 
worked for. The philosopher or natural scientist has to pursue 
the truth before she can contemplate it. Thus, T-happiness as an 
ain is indeed characterizable as a future goal. In some forms of 
T-happiness -the natural scientist's 'Eurekall moment for 
example- the object of contemplation is the discovered truth 
itself. But I have argued that tha8r1a both as word and concept 
in Aristotle extends beyond the simple contemplation of the most 
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divine objects to include reflexion on action involved with such 
objects, such action including virtuous action (see eg p154 n23; 
pp339-340). One such form of T-happiness would be the reflexion 
an one's life at the end of one's life. Even in the 'Eurekall 
moment of scientific discovery, it is surely normally the case 
that what is contemplated with satisfaction is not just the 
discovered truth itself, but also the process which led up to 
that discovery: 'I've been racking my brains to see how to test 
Hieran's crown and now I've got ittl It is therefore at least 
plausible that human beings never -or perhaps only extrenely 
rarely- achieve contemplation of divine objects which does not 
involve some reflexion on the actions which produced that 
contemplation. 
Those forms of T-happiness which go beyond the mere contemplation 
of divine objects and involve reflexion on action are related to 
the perfect divine happiness in a number of ways. Firstly, they 
remain, more or less directly, related to and dependent on divine 
objects. The case of, - say, the astronomer is clear; but I have 
argued that even the politician's ain is directed at the divine 
(pp346-349). Secondly, like God's activity, it involves thought 
about thought (p148). Thirdly, insofar as it involves reflexion 
on the process leading up to the moment of T-happiness, it tends 
to transform retrospectively what was a kInAsia of struggling to 
obtain a future good into an anargeia of a worthwhile project. 
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So now let us consider the two latter qualities: thinking about 
thinking; and transfornation from kinUai-- to energeia. In each 
case, it will be seen that within these broad categoriess there 
are numerous possible realizations which may not- be directly 
comparable without the ajrthA,:; 1r, of the 12hronimos. Accordinglyp 
whilst it will be possible to say why a particular human activity 
is related to the divine activity, it will normally be difficult 
to compare how near two different human activities are to that 
divine parnadigm. 
3.02o Thinking about thinking 
As already noted, God's life is the life whose perfection we only 
approach. And that life is a thinking an thinking (Meta XII 9 
1074b33-35). Although Aristotle goes on to note that, even for 
human beings, thinking about thinking is a normal aspect of 
science, whether practical or theoretical (1074b38-1075a5)9 the 
precise realization of this 'thinking an thinking' in the sphere 
of human action is open to various, possibilities -and 
complexities. Firstly, as I have stressed before in this thesis, 
acting under a description itself involves thought: what all 
action Is is not completely separable from how it is thought Of 
(see eg p138 and p232). So there is the complexity of the 
interaction of thought and object at the level of what 
constitutes action, Secondly, moving beyond that level, there are 
the multifarious contexts and perspectives in which a particular 
action can be placed and thought about. The lifting of an arm can 
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be part of a mesh of descriptions under which the action is 
performed, one of which nay be 'lifting an arm' and another of 
which nay be 'bringing an end to tyranny'. Thirdly, there is the 
tenporal perspective. One nay remember an action. Thus, the 
virtuous agent looking back on her life, remembers the actions 
which brought her to her PmjAI7nnnjA. One may look forward to an 
action. Thus, the scientist can look forward to getting and 
contemplating the results even while setting up his bunsen 
burner. Finally, one nay remenber looking forward to an action or 
look forward to remembering. So, for example, the retired agent 
may look back on the hopes of his youth, or the youth may look 
forward to his post-retirement contemplation. 
There are accordingly many different ways In which human thinking 
about thinking can approach or fall short of the divine 
perfection where the thinking and what is thought are identical. 
And this is quite apart from the additional complexities which 
are involved when one adds that the objects of human thinking 
need not be one's own actions (EN 11 9 1169b33-35) and indeed, 
are not primarily actions at all but rather objects of the most 
exalted type (EN VI 7 1141b2-3; cf p344 of this thesis). 
103! PleaRilre and jamergeia 
The divine activity is energela and pleasure (see S2.00 above). 
In chapters seven and eight, I argued that the virtuous tend to 
see their prohairetic actions -aimed at a future good and thus 
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Irlussels as also embodying immediately present goods, and 
so 
transform the kInAsPIR into energelai by enjoying them- 
Even in the 'Eurekal I moment of scientific discovery, there MaY 
well nornally be an admixture of reflexion, not c3n the -truths 
discovered but on the kInAsIs which is the work which - was 
involved in making that discovery (see 93.01 above). As noted 
in 
93.02, retrospective reflexion can transform the description of 
an action. Thus, what may have been experienced at the tine as a 
dull senseless grind nay be seen afterwards, whether by the agent 
herself or by others, as a glorious hard quest for truth which 
was ultimately to prove successful. More complexlYs 
the 
experience of the dull grind may be transformed into pleasure at 
the time by say. a daydream of the satisfaction to be won at 
the 
successful conclusion. 
The virtuous agent aims at eudainzU. & at the completion Of 
his 
life (chapter four); but on the one hand by taking pleasure, in 
the prospect of such a finish and, an the other hand, - having 
reached that finish, by taking pleasure in the pursuit w1licIl 
achieved it, he extends the T-happiness of post retirement 
contemplation into the L-happiness of a lifetine. 
It should be noted here that the failure to achieve the good 
aimed at does not in general entail that the pursuit ofýthat good 
is deprived of its goodness (pp260-263). In particular, even if 
an agent doesn't achieve the post-retirement T-happiness he has- 
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been aiming at -say, because he drops dead of a heart attack 
before his plans reach fruition- that wouldn't necessarily nean 
that his life lacked L-happiness. 
In fine, human audaj=jj& struggles to imitate the divine 
energplA; but as noted in EX X7 1177b26-27: 
Sucb a life as this bowever will be bigher than the bu n 
le7el 
Human endaizannia approaches and falls short of the divine 
energala on -nnay different levels. It is a goal at the end of a 
life, but by taking pleasure in the pursuit of that goal, its 
goodness can be enjoyed in the present. Failure of plans need not 
destroy claims to -iidainnnia, but may in some circumstances. 
Aristotle's account of Puda4mnnia does not give us a recipe for 
achieving it; but it does allow us to say a little more about it, 
particularly its relationship to the divine, and thus aids our 
ability to pass it on to future generations. 
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